State v. Pudlock
| Decision Date | 03 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-1118,74-1118 |
| Citation | 338 N.E.2d 524,44 Ohio St.2d 104,73 O.O.2d 357 |
| Parties | , 73 O.O.2d 357 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. PUDLOCK, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
On January 9, 1974, appellant, Jay R. Pudlock was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19. On January 22, 1974, he filed a demand for a jury trial in the Wooster Municipal Court.
The status of the case remained unchanged until May 31, 1974, when appellant filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the trial court's failure to bring him to trial within 90 days after arrest required his discharge pursuant to R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73. As of that time, the case had never been set for trial. The motion was overruled on June 5, 1974.
On June 25, 1974, appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of the offense charged. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending solely that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Municipal Court.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Stuart K. Miller, Deputy Director of Law, Wooster, for appellee.
Rhonemus, Dalbey, Bradford & Flynn and Thomas T. Flynn, Rittman, for appellant.
Appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of R.C. 4511.19. 1 Pursuant to R.C. 4511.99(A), 2 such an offense constitutes a misdemeanor of the first degree.
As applicable to first degree misdemeanors, R.C. 2945.71(B) states:
'A person against whom a charge of misdemeanor, other than a minor misdemeanor, is pending in a court of record, shall be brought to trial:
'* * *
'(2) Within ninety days after his arrest or the service of summons, if the offense charged is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree * * *.'
R.C. 2945.73(B) provides further that:
'Upon motion made at or prior to the commencement of trial, a person charged with an offense shall be discharged if he is not brought to trial within the time required by sections 2945.71 and 2945.72 3 of the Revised Code.'
As evidenced by the above statement of facts, appellant was not brought to trial within 90 days after arrest. Therefore, he contends, the trial court erred by refusing to discharge him upon a motion to dismiss made prior to the commencement of trial.
Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio provides, in pertinent part:
'* * * In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall * * * have * * * a speedy public trial * * *.'
The provisions of R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73 implement that constitutional guarantee; they are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the state. State v Gray (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 21, 203 N.E.2d 319; State v. Cross (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 270, 271 N.E.2d 264.
In overruling appellant's motion to dismiss in the case at bar, the trial court noted that the time within which an accused must be brought to trial may be extended by R.C. 2945.72 (H) (Supra, fn. 3), and stated in its journal entry that:
'This court is of the opinion that the physical impossibility of bringing this case to trial prior to this date constitutes a 'reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused's own motion.''
Although court congestion may be a valid ground under subsection (H) for extending an accused's trial date beyond the time periods provided for by R.C. 2945.71, which we do not now decide, practices which undercut the implementation of the 'speedy trial' provisions within R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73 must not be employed to extend the requisite time periods.
Here, the court failed to set a date for trial within the 90-day period established by R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). Instead, it allowed the 90 days to expire, and thereafter, sua sponte, ruled that the presence of a crowded docket warranted a continuance. It is evident that to allow a trial court to extend the required time period under the above circumstances would render meaningless the provisions of R.C. 2945.71, and thwart the intent of the General Assembly to provide...
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Heft v. Warden, Madison Corr. Inst.
...and 2945.73 are mandatory, and strict compliance is required by the State. King, 2007-Ohio-335, at ¶ 32, citing State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105, 338 N.E.2d 524. Therefore, when a criminal defendant shows that he was not brought to trial within the proper period, the burden s......
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State v. Pachay
...et seq., as effective January 1, 1974, has been a prolific source of litigation before this court. See, e. g., State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 338 N.E.2d 524; State v. Walker (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 157, 346 N.E.2d 687; State v. Davis (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 444, 349 N.E.2d 315; Sta......
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State v. Davis
...and R.C. 2945.73 are ‘mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the State.’ " King at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Pudlock , 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 105, 338 N.E.2d 524 (1975). "However, R.C. 2945.72 allows for an extension of the time that the accused must be brought to trial under certain circ......
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State v. High
...for the extension. See State v. King (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 637 N.E.2d 903; State v. Mincy, supra; State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 104, 73 O.O.2d 357, 338 N.E.2d 524; Elmwood Place v. Denike (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 427, 10 O.O.3d 528, 384 N.E.2d 707; State v. Harr (1992), 81 Ohio A......