State v. Pyette

• Decision Date: 22 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-677.,05-677.
• Citation: 2007 MT 119,159 P.3d 232,337 Mont. 265
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Stacy PYETTE, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

159 P.3d 232

2007 MT 119

337 Mont. 265

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Stacy PYETTE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 05-677.

Supreme Court of Montana.

May 22, 2007.

Submitted on Briefs September 26, 2006.

Decided May 22, 2007.

For Appellant: Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Brenda Nordlund, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Fred Van Valkenburg, County Attorney; Dale Mrkich, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana.

For Respondent: Jeffrey T. Renz and Kimberly Coburn, intern, School of Law, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana.

Justice JOHN WARNER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The State of Montana (State) appeals from an order entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, remanding this case to the Missoula Justice Court with an order to dismiss the charge of Driving While License is Suspended filed against Stacy Pyette (Pyette). We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On August 21, 2003, Pyette was cited for traffic violations. She was convicted of those offenses on February 10, 2004, in the Missoula County Justice Court (Justice Court). Pyette was fined $270.00. Pyette entered a time-pay contract with the Justice Court which allowed her to make monthly payments on the fine. The Justice Court provided Pyette with a document setting out the terms of the agreement titled "Notice to Defendants Regarding Payments of Fines" (1st Notice).

¶ 3 The 1^st Notice required Pyette to follow the Justice Court's policies and meet its expectations. Pyette was to make monthly payments until paid in full. If Pyette had any problems or issues she was also required to contact "the Court BEFORE the monthly payment is due if problems arise for one (1) extension." Pyette was also required to appear "before the Court for further discussion if advised to do so."

¶ 4 The 1^st Notice listed Pyette as the defendant and advised her of the consequences of non-payment as follows:

according to [§§] 61-5-214, 215, and 216, [MCA,] the Defendant's driver's license may be suspended indefinitely until all fines are paid in full and a $100.00 reinstatement fee is paid to the Motor Vehicle Division in Helena.

¶ 5 Pyette acknowledged that she received the 1st Notice. Subsequently, Pyette made two payments but did not make the remainder of the required payments.

¶ 6 On March 25, 2004, the Justice Court sent Pyette a second notice entitled Notice of Imminent Driver's License Suspension (2^nd Notice). The 2^nd Notice stated:

[y]ou have not made an appearance before this court or paid the assessed fines. If you do not appear to address this notice, this Court will notify the Department of Justice, and your driver's license will be suspended. To avoid this consequence you must act within ten (10) days.

The 2^nd Notice also stated that once Pyette's driver's license was suspended she would not be eligible for a probationary driver's license, a work permit, or any driving privileges during suspension. Pyette did not appear within ten days. She did nothing. She has not alleged that she did not receive the 2^nd Notice, nor has she challenged whether the notice was properly served. Pyette has not argued that the ten days provided for her to act was too short a time.

¶ 7 On April 29, 2004, the Montana Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) sent Pyette an Order of Suspension. The Order of Suspension stated that Pyette's license was suspended under § 61-5-214, MCA, because she failed to pay fines associated with an earlier traffic offense. The Order of Suspension stated that Pyette should contact the Justice Court directly to obtain information, requirements and fees for restoration of her driver's license. Pyette was informed that her driver's license could be restored when the Justice Court notified the Department that the suspension should be lifted and when she complied with court requirements to regain her license. Again, Pyette did nothing.

¶ 8 On October 19, 2004, Pyette was stopped for speeding and, inter alia, cited for operating a vehicle while her driver's license was suspended. She moved the Justice Court to dismiss the driving while her license was suspended charge, arguing § 61-5-214, MCA, is unconstitutional on its face. The motion was denied. On April 18, 2005, Pyette plead guilty in the Justice Court to operating a motor vehicle while her driver's license was suspended, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to dismiss, as provided by § 46-12-204(3), MCA. After sentencing, Pyette timely filed notice of appeal from the sentence and judgment to the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County (District Court).

¶ 9 On June 24, 2005, Pyette challenged the constitutionality of § 61-5-214, MCA, in the District Court. She argued that the statute denied her due process because the statute did not provide for a hearing before her license was suspended. The District Court held that Pyette's constitutional right to due process was violated because § 61-5-214, MCA, did not clearly set forth the procedure under which a driver can appear and contest the notice of license suspension. Thus, the District Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face because it violates due process. The District Court remanded this case to the Justice Court ordering that the charge of driving while license suspended be dismissed. This appeal by the State followed.

¶ 10 The facts are not in dispute. The issue presented is whether the District Court erred in concluding that application of the provisions of § 61-5-214, MCA, which resulted in the suspension of Pyette's driver's license, provided her with the required due process.

¶ 11 The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law which we review de novo on appeal. Our standard of review is plenary, and we determine whether a district court's conclusion is correct. State v. McKee, 2006 MT 5, ¶ 16, 330 Mont. 249, ¶ 16, 127 P.3d 445, ¶ 16. When the constitutional issue of denial of due process as a matter of law underlies the action, our review is plenary. In re T.W., 2005 MT 340, ¶ 11, 330 Mont. 84, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 491, ¶ 11.

¶ 12 Statutes are accorded a presumption of constitutionality; the burden of proof is upon the party challenging a statute's constitutionality. GBN, Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 249 Mont. 261, 265, 815 P.2d 595, 597 (1991). Any doubt is to be resolved in favor of the statute. GBN, 249 Mont. at 265, 815 P.2d at 597.

¶ 13 Once issued, a driver's license becomes a property interest that may not be suspended or revoked without the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution. State ex rel. Majerus v. Carter, 214 Mont. 272, 276, 693 P.2d 501, 503 (1984) (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971)). To satisfy due process requirements in the context of a driver's license suspension, states must afford notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Seyferth v. State, Dept. of Justice, Motor Vehicle Div., 277 Mont. 377, 381, 922 P.2d 494, 497 (1996) (citing Bell, 402 U.S. at 542, 91 S.Ct. at 1591). The notice must be one reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to inform the affected party of the impending action and to give an opportunity to present objections. Montanans for Justice v. State ex rel McGrath, 2006 MT 277, ¶ 30, 334 Mont. 237, ¶ 30, 146 P.3d 759, ¶ 30; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656-57, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

¶ 14 While procedural due process does not prescribe exactly what procedural safeguards must be in place, the procedure should reflect the nature of the private and governmental interests involved. Montana Media, Inc. v. Flathead County, 2003 MT 23, ¶ 66, 314 Mont. 121, ¶ 66, 63 P.3d 1129, ¶ 66. The process due in any given case varies according to the factual circumstances of the case, the nature of the interests at stake and the risk of making an erroneous decision. Due process requirements of notice and a meaningful hearing are "flexible" and are adapted by the courts to meet the procedural protections demanded by the specific situation. McGrath, ¶ 30 (citing McDermott v. McDonald, 2001 MT 89, ¶ 10, 305 Mont. 166, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 200, ¶ 10, and Geil v. Missoula Irr. Dist., 2002 MT 269, ¶ 58, 312 Mont. 320, ¶ 58, 59 P.3d 398, ¶ 58).

¶ 15 Pyette contends that § 61-5-214, MCA, is too vague and violates due process because it does not set forth the procedure under which a person can appear and contest a suspension of their driver's license before such suspension occurs. Challenges to statutes based on a violation of a person's due process rights rest on the lack of notice, and thus may be overcome in a specific case where reasonable persons are advised what must be done to avoid a certain result. Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the case at hand, that is, the statute is judged on an as-applied basis. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). If a person of ordinary intelligence is given fair notice of what is required to forestall an adverse result from the application of a statute, such statute is not unconstitutionally vague. See Mont. Supreme Court Com'n on Unauthorized Practice v. O'Neil, 2006 MT 284, ¶ 81, 334 Mont. 311, ¶ 81, 147 P.3d 200, ¶ 81.

¶ 16 The DVM suspended Pyette's driver's license pursuant to § 61-5-214, MCA, which provides in pertinent part:

(1) The department shall suspend the driver's license or driving privilege of a person upon receipt of a report from the court, certified under penalty of law and in a form prescribed by the department, that the person:

....

(b)(iii) when assessed a fine, costs, or restitution of $100 or more, failed to pay the fine, costs, or restitution; and

(c) received prior written notice that the...