State v. Pyle
Decision Date | 10 July 2002 |
Citation | 50 P.3d 591,182 Or. App. 520 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Cullen Johnson PYLE, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Jesse Wm. Barton, Chief Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and KISTLER and BREWER, Judges.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder. ORS 163.115. He asserts that the trial court erred in refusing his pretrial request to discharge his retained attorney and in denying his companion request for court-appointed counsel. We affirm.
Defendant was indicted in 1997 for the murder of his wife. Before his arraignment, defendant retained Steven Plinski (counsel) to represent him. At a pretrial hearing, the court denied the state's motion in limine to admit certain evidence. The state appealed that ruling, and we affirmed. State v. Pyle, 155 Or.App. 74, 963 P.2d 721, rev. den. 328 Or. 115, 977 P.2d 1171 (1998). On remand, the case was set for trial on May 24, 1999. On May 3, 1999, counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the case because defendant had not paid his fees pursuant to their agreement. In a supporting affidavit, counsel attested that defendant "consented to [counsel's] withdrawal and understands that the withdrawal will result in a continuance of his trial."1 At a hearing on the motion to withdraw held on May 3, defendant requested permission from the court to fire counsel:
The court then read the seven page, handwritten statement that defendant submitted. In the written statement, defendant asserted that he had obtained a report from Dr. DeCato opining that a police urinalysis report showed that his blood contained dangerous levels of a prescription drug compound, benzodiazepine, on the night his wife was killed. Defendant also asserted that counsel had misled him throughout the previous two years by repeatedly telling him that a toxicology report showed that the drug was not present in his blood and that the failure to discover this evidence sooner was due to "a gross negligent and careless error made by [counsel]." The statement concluded with the following combined request:
The court also read DeCato's report. Counsel represented to the court that he "would not intentionally lie" to defendant about the potential drug-influence evidence. The court then engaged in the following colloquy with defendant:
Trial was held three weeks later, as scheduled, and defendant, represented by original counsel, was convicted of murder.
On appeal, defendant advances two assignments of error. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his request to fire counsel. In his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for court-appointed substitute counsel. In his brief on appeal, defendant concedes that his requests to fire counsel and for substitute court-appointed counsel "significantly overlap." According to defendant, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests, because granting them would not have impeded the orderly processes of justice. The state responds that defendant's request to fire counsel did not implicate his right to retain an attorney of his choice, because the request was conditioned on the provision of a substitute court-appointed attorney. The state argues that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny defendant's combined request, because defendant raised no legitimate complaint about the quality of counsel's representation.
In his written submission and oral statements to the trial court, defendant made three requests: (1) to fire his retained counsel; (2) for appointment of new counsel at public expense; and (3) for a continuance of his trial date.2 Defendant acknowledges that "accommodating his choice of counsel would have required appointing new counsel at public expense." We agree that defendant made his requests as a package; there is nothing in the record to suggest, for example, that he wanted to fire counsel if the consequence was that he must proceed to trial without legal representation. Accordingly, we regard defendant's assignments of error as addressing a combined request. The first part of defendant's request was for permission to fire counsel. A criminal defendant has the right to discharge retained counsel, "subject to judicial discretion if accommodation of the right would result in `a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.'" State v. Pflieger, 15 Or.App. 383, 386-87, 515 P.2d 1348 (1973),rev. den. (1974) (quoting State v. Greenough, 8 Or.App. 86, 92, 493 P.2d 59 (1972)). The relevant circumstances include all components of defendant's combined request, including the reasons given for them. Id.; see also State v. Zaha, 44 Or.App. 103, 106-07, 605 P.2d 306 (1980)
(. )
The trial court permitted defendant to state, on the record, the reasons why he believed that counsel should be discharged. As the colloquy set out above demonstrates, the court did consider, in making its ruling, defendant's assertion that counsel's representation had been inadequate. In his written submission, defendant asserted to the court that counsel had lied to him about whether a blood toxicology report disclosed the presence of benzodiazepine in his system and that counsel did not have defendant's blood sample tested for the compound. The trial court found that defendant's claim that counsel had lied to him was not credible and that there was no evidence that counsel had failed to have d...
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...remand for the trial court to determine whether defendant's attorney in fact adequately represented him. It relies on State v. Pyle, 182 Or.App. 520, 50 P.3d 591, rev. den., 335 Or. 104, 59 P.3d 1279 (2002), in which we stated that, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in refus......
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State v. Pyle, S49846.
...P.3d 1279 335 Or. 104 State v. Pyle. No. S49846. Supreme Court of Oregon. December 3, 2002. Appeal from No. A107243, 182 Or.App. 520, 50 P.3d 591. Petition for review is ...