State v. Pyle, 47535

• Decision Date: 01 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 47535,47535
• Citation: 532 P.2d 1309,216 Kan. 423
• Parties: The STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael Duane PYLE, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1309

532 P.2d 1309

216 Kan. 423

The STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael Duane PYLE, Appellant.

No. 47535.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 1, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The corpus delicti of homicide consists of two elements: the death of the alleged victim and the existence of some criminal agency as the cause, either or both of which may be proved circumstantially or inferentially.

2. The elements must be established independently of admissions or confessions of the defendant, but as a basis for introduction of the defendant's confession or admission the prosecution is not required to establish corpus delicti by proof as clear and convincing as is necessary to establish guilt; a slight or prima facie showing is sufficient.

3. Once corpus delicti is shown by independent evidence-the degree of the crime not being a part of the corpus delicti-the circumstances of the homicide and its degree may be shown by extrajudicial statements of the accused.

4. It is for the trial court to determine whether a prima facie showing has been made.

5. Production of the body of the missing person or of evidence of the means used to produce death is not essential to the establishment of corpus delicti or to sustain a homicide conviction.

6. Venue is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, and like any other fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

7. Under K.S.A. 22-2603 (Weeks 1974) venue lies in any county where an act requisite to the commission of the crime takes place.

8. Where a person is last seen alive in one county, and from the evidence the jury may infer that he either was killed there or was spirited away from there and killed in some other, unknown county, venue of a murder prosecution will lie in the first county or in any other county where an act requisite to the commission of the crime is shown to have occurred.

9. Once a suspect is fully advised of his rights and understands them, it is not necessary to give repeated Miranda warnings each time he is interviewed.

10. The test for determining whether a suspect is so mentally incompetent as to preclude his ability to make a voluntary confession is the same as the test for determining his criminal responsibility for committing the crime.

11. In the absence of insanity meeting the M'Naghten test, the mental condition of a defendant at the time he makes a statement is relevant to the issue of voluntariness but is not necessarily conclusive; its weight is for the trier of fact.

12. At a Jackson v. Denno (378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908) hearing the trial court is not bound to adopt the opinion of a medical doctor qualified in psychiatry to the exclusion of nonexpert testimony on the issue of the defendant's mental condition at the time the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and interrogated.

13. At trial court's finding after a Jackson v. Denno hearing that the defendant was sane and made his confessions knowingly and voluntarily is binding on appellate review if supported by substantial competent evidence.

14. If a doctor who examined a defendant to determine competency to stand trial under K.S.A. 22-3302 (Weeks 1974) is not called as a witness by the defense, the privilege attaching to the defendant's statements to the doctor under the last sentence of 22-3302(3) is absolute.

15. If such a doctor is called by the defense to give his expert opinion in support of an insanity defense, he is subject to cross-examination as to the data on which his opinion is based in the same manner as any other expert. If his opinion is based on statements made by the defendant those statements must be revealed, and to that extent the statutory privilege is waived.

16. The district court has an affirmative duty to instruct on lesser included offenses even in the absence of a request by defense counsel or the prosecution; however, that duty arises only where the omitted instruction is required by the evidence and under circumstances where the appellant might reasonably have been convicted of a lesser offense if the instruction had been given.

17. Among the essential elements of voluntary manslaughter are that the killing be without malice and that it be done either on a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. K.S.A. 21-3403 (Weeks 1974).

18. Where there is no evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant killed the victim, but did so without malice, upon a sudden quarrel, or in the heat of passion, an instruction on voluntary manslaughter is not required.

Harold S. Herd, Coldwater, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Jack Focht, Special Asst. County Atty., argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, Atty. Gen., and Douglas Brunson, County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.

FOTH, Commissioner:

Appellant Michael Duane ('Mike') Pyle was convicted by a jury of the first degree murder of his grandmother, Mrs. Golda ('Goldie') Millar, and of arson for the burning of her house.

Mrs. Millar was last seen by her customary associates on April 5, 1971. Her ranch home in Kiowa county, between Haviland and Belvidere, burned to the ground in the early morning hours of April 8, 1971. No one has seen or heard from her since, and no trace of her body has ever been found.

The absence of a body gives rise to two of appellant's contentions on appeal, namely, that the state failed to prove either the corpus delicti or the venue of the alleged murder. He also contends that a series of incriminating statements he made were improperly admitted, that he was precluded from making an insanity defense because of an erroneous ruling on the doctor-patient privilege, and that the court should have instructed on a lesser degree of homicide. To evaluate these contentions it is necessary to examine the state's evidence in some detail.

Background

Goldie Millar was 78 when she disappeared. She owned a 3100 acre ranch near Belvidere, worth more than $340,000. She had two daughters, Mrs. Lois Allen of Hampton, Virginia, and Mrs. Billie Kratzer of Colorado Springs, Colorado. Mrs. Kratzer was the mother by a former marriage of the appellant Michael Pyle.

Mike had been a troubled child, presenting discipline problems punctuated by aggressive assaults on younger boys, including his brother. The result was a referral at the age of twelve to The Menninger Foundation at Topeka for a psychiatric evaluation, followed shortly by five years at a military academy. Attempts at higher education were failures, and in 1964 or 1965 he went to live with his grandmother Goldie on her ranch. Relations between them were harmonious for several years; in 1967 Goldie made a will in which she left the bulk of her estate to Mike, including the ranch. In 1968 Mike married Linda Clarkson, and he and his wife went to live on the ranch. It appears that some hostility soon developed between Goldie and the new bride.

In 1969 relations between Mike and his grandmother also began to deteriorate. That summer he beat her, cutting her lip and bruising her arms. In July of that year Goldie withdrew her will from the probate court where it had been deposited, took it to her lawyer's office, and there revoked it by tearing off her signature. As it later developed, Mike was unaware of the revocation and in April, 1971, still thought he was her primary beneficiary.

In August, 1969, Mike administered yet another beating to her, and later that month she was forced to call the sheriff to quell a violent argument between herself and Mike and Linda. At that time the sheriff suggested that the young people should leave the ranch. Mike agreed, but told the sheriff as he left, 'This is my ranch and I am going to have it, one way or the other.'

In 1969 Mike sought to enlist the aid of his aunt, Lois Allen, to have Goldie declared incompetent so that he could gain control of the ranch. He already had a power of attorney. Her response was to call her mother, Goldie, and urge that she revoke the power of attorney. Goldie said she would.

Over the fall and winter of 1969-70 matters became progressively worse. On one occasion Mike removed some tools and other property from the ranch, and Goldie wanted to prosecute him for theft. The sheriff and county attorney mediated the dispute. On another occasion, Mike attempted to remove a water pump from the ranch. Goldie called the undersheriff, who came out and persuaded him to reinstall it.

In the spring of 1970 Goldie suffered a slight stroke. Mrs. Allen came from Virginia to be with her mother, and discovered that Mike's power of attorney was still outstanding. She took Goldie to a lawyer where a formal revocation was prepared and Goldie executed it. Mrs. Allen had told Mike she would have no part of his plan to have Goldie committed.

In 1970 Mike sued Goldie on a note.

That October Goldie entered into negotiations with Alfred Barby, of Meade, to sell him the ranch. They agreed on a price of $110 an acre for a little more than 3100 acres and had contract papers prepared, but at the last minute she backed out. Instead, in November she leased the land for two-and-a-half years at $4 per acre per year. When she approached Barby again in December, 1970, the proposition was less attractive to him because of the outstanding lease.

That is the way matters stood when the parties entered the fateful days of April, 1971. Goldie was on the ranch, wishing to sell. Mike and his wife, Linda, were living in Pratt, some thirty-odd miles away, but Mike still came to the ranch on occasion and still got some mail at Belvidere. Relations between Goldie and Mike were strained.

The First Week of April 1971

Thursday, April 1: Goldie went into Belvidere and picked up her mail. Belvidere is a town of some twenty persons, about two to three miles south and east of the ranch. There she visited with, among others, Geneva Braden, the postmistress, and Ellen Davis, keeper of the general store and gas station. She...