State v. Qualls
| Decision Date | 27 January 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 40,630-KA.,40,630-KA. |
| Citation | 921 So.2d 226 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Ronnie QUALLS, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Culpepper & Carroll, PLLC by Bobby L. Culpepper, Teresa Culpepper Carroll, Jonesboro, for Appellant.
Walter E. May, Jr., District Attorney, Douglas L. Stokes, Jr., Robert A. Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Before WILLIAMS, CARAWAY & PEATROSS, JJ.
Defendant, Ronnie Qualls, was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and assault by discharge of a firearm. He was sentenced to 12 years at hard labor, without benefit, and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine on the possession conviction. Defendant was adjudicated a third-felony offender, and, as such, sentenced to 10 years on the assault conviction, without benefit. The two sentences were to run concurrent. Defendant appeals and, for the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
FACTS
Although the eyewitness' testimony at trial was conflicting on several factual issues, all of the witnesses agreed on the following facts. On May 27, 2003, Defendant and Phillip Andrews ("Andrews") agreed to meet for a fight on the parking lot of a business in Jonesboro called "Jody's." Andrews threw the first punch and subsequently won the fight to the point that spectators had to forcibly pull Andrews off of Defendant. Afterwards, Defendant, a convicted felon,1 ran to his father's truck, retrieved a pistol from inside the cab and first fired it in the air. Several eyewitnesses identified the gun as a specific .40-caliber Ruger pistol that Andrews had sold to Defendant on an earlier date. Defendant then chased Andrews, firing the pistol several more times. Thereafter, Defendant fled into some nearby woods, leaving his father's truck behind.
The eyewitnesses were all friends or family to one or both of the combatants. Some of the eyewitnesses testified that Andrews also brought a pistol to the fight, wrapped in a bandanna. These witnesses testified that Andrews' first blow in the fight was to hit the unarmed Defendant in the head with the pistol, instead of his fist. They further testified that they took Andrews' pistol away from him to make it a fair fight. Andrews and other witnesses denied he ever had a pistol during the fight.
None of the witnesses testified that, after Andrews was pulled off of Defendant, he made any further attempt to attack Defendant. Some of the witnesses testified that they and Andrews began moving away when they saw Defendant going to his truck. All of the witnesses testified that neither Andrews nor any bystander pulled or fired a gun after Defendant left the fight and went to his truck. Several of the witnesses testified that Defendant fired the first shot in the air, then ran after the unarmed Andrews, firing several shots, and shouting words to the effect, "I'll kill you, I'll kill you." Andrews and all of the bystanders began running after the first shot was fired.
There is some dispute as to the time this incident occurred. The victim and some witnesses placed the time around mid-afternoon. Other witnesses, including the chief of police, placed it in the evening, around 8:00 p.m. The police were quickly called after the shooting. They found Defendant's father's truck and two fired .40-caliber pistol cartridge casings at the scene. The pistol was never recovered.
The matter went to jury trial. During the voir dire, it became quickly apparent that Defendant's parents were well-respected members of the community. Mr. Qualls was a longtime employee of a local paper mill and Mrs. Qualls was a longtime educator. Both were very active in community affairs. A relevant point in this appeal is the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Qualls and their son, Defendant, are African-American. Many of the jurors, identified as African-American, stated they knew or were close friends with the Qualls family. Many stated having a very high opinion of the family. Several prospective jurors who knew the Qualls stated that knowing them would affect their ability to act as a juror in the case. Of the State's 11 peremptory challenges, 9 were against African-Americans. Of Defendant's 12 peremptory challenges, all were against white prospective jurors.
At the conclusion of the jury selection, Defendant asserted a Batson2 challenge, based on 9 of the State's 11 peremptory challenges having been against African-Americans. The trial court agreed, finding this established a prima facia case of purposeful discrimination. The State provided reasons for each peremptory challenge. The trial court denied Defendant's Batson challenge. The State then made a "reverse Batson" challenge, which was also denied by the trial court.
During the trial, Defendant stipulated that he was a convicted felon. After Wade Singleton ("Singleton"), a witness to the fight, testified on direct that he saw Andrews bring a gun to the fight, the State attempted to question him about statements he made to the police following the fight wherein he did not mention Andrews having a gun. Defendant objected to the State's impeaching its own witness. The State responded that La. C.E. art. 607A allows the credibility of a witness to be attacked by either party, including the party calling him. The trial court denied the objection. The State then asked Singleton if he had told the investigating officers about Andrews having a gun during his fight with Defendant. Singleton insisted he had told the officers about the gun. The officers who took Singleton's statement denied any such statement.
While cross-examining Jonesboro Chief of Police, G. Wesley Horton, Defendant's trial counsel attempted to ask the chief if the police department had located and served Kevin Jackson ("Jackson") with the subpoena to appear at trial. Jackson and Defendant had driven by and exchanged words with Andrews before the fight. Jackson had also been present at the fight. The State had subpoenaed Jackson for trial. Defendant had not. After the witnesses had been sequestered, the State released Jackson without calling him as a witness. Defendant's counsel then attempted to ask Chief Horton if Jackson had also been served with an outstanding bench warrant when he was served with the subpoena to appear at trial. The State objected, asserting that the question had no relevance to the issues at trial. Defendant's counsel argued that the State had subpoenaed Jackson, but he had not appeared for trial. The trial court sustained the State's relevancy objection. At the State's request, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard Defendant's question as to a pending bench warrant for Jackson.
After the State rested, Defendant's counsel called his parents to testify. Both testified that Defendant lived in their home. Mr. Qualls testified that he kept a.22-caliber pistol in his truck and that it was in his truck when Defendant used it on the night of the fight. Both parents denied any knowledge of Defendant owning a pistol. Mr. Qualls testified that sometime after the shooting, Singleton and Andrews came to his house. Andrews stayed outside and Singleton came in and told him and his wife that Andrews was willing to drop the charges for $15,000.
The jury found Defendant guilty as charged. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, and a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Both were denied by the trial court.
After Defendant was convicted, the State filed an "Amended Bill of Information" alleging that, with the present conviction, Defendant was now a third-felony offender, having first been convicted "on February 8, 1994, in the matter styled, `State of Louisiana v. Ronnie Qualls,' which bears number 31,008 on the criminal docket of the Second Judicial District Court," and, second, having been convicted "on June 21, 1999 in the matter styled `State of Louisiana v. Ronnie Qualls,' which bears number 34,394 on the criminal docket of the Second Judicial District Court."
At the habitual offender hearing, the State introduced evidence that, in docket number 34,949, Defendant was convicted in June 21, 1999, for possession of cocaine and received an agreed-upon sentence. The exhibits included, but were not limited to, the bill of information, filed March 4, 1999 (State's Exhibit HE# 1); form entitled, "Determination Of Understanding Of Constitutional Rights, Nature of Charge and Consequences of Guilty Plea," filed in docket number 34,949 on June 21, 1999 (State's Exhibit HE# 2); Minutes for docket number 34,949, showing Defendant's guilty plea and sentence on June 21, 1999 (State's Exhibit HE# 3); and judgment of conviction, filed June 21, 1999 (State's Exhibit HE# 4).
The State called Chief Horton, who testified about a September 1998 controlled purchase of cocaine from Defendant which resulted in the March 4, 1999 bill of information in docket number 34,949. Chief Horton identified Defendant as the one arrested in the matter.
When the State sought to question Chief Horton about the certified copies of the court records for docket number 34,949, Defendant objected, noting he was not the proper person to identify the court documents. The trial court allowed some questioning. Chief Horton testified that the social security number found on the judgment of conviction in docket number 34,949 was the same social security number obtained from Defendant when he was initially arrested on the charge.
Laura Culpepper, Deputy Clerk for the Jackson Parish Clerk of Court, testified as to the authenticity of State exhibits. With her testimony, all exhibits were introduced into evidence without objection from Defendant.
Thereafter, the State sought to question Deputy Clerk Culpepper regarding why the clerk's office had not produced records regarding criminal docket number 31,008. Defendant objected to the questioning, which was denied...
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