State v. Quick

• Decision Date: 27 October 1927
• Docket Number: 12298.
• Citation: 140 S.E. 97,141 S.C. 442
• Parties: STATE v. QUICK.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

140 S.E. 97

141 S.C. 442

STATE v. QUICK.

No. 12298.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 27, 1927

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Darlington County; E C. Dennis, Judge.

Marshall Quick was convicted of violation of the prohibition law, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Miller Lawson & Stokes, of Hartsville, for appellant.

Solicitor M. J. Hough, of Chesterfield, for the State.

BLEASE J.

The defendant, Marshall Quick, appeals to this court from his conviction and sentence in the court of general sessions of Darlington county for violation of the prohibition law (Cr Code 1922, § 820 et seq., as amended). There were five counts in the indictment. Only two of these were submitted to the jury, the second count, which charged "storing," and the third count, which charged the receipt, acceptance, and having in possession of alcoholic liquors.

The appellant's first exception charges error on the part of the trial judge in refusing his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. The second exception alleges error in refusal to grant appellant's motion for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict. These two exceptions may be considered together.

The state submitted testimony showing that peace officers, on December 15, 1926, searched certain premises in possession of the appellant, and where he resided. The appellant was at home at the time, having recently returned from a hospital, where he had been confined on account of a gunshot wound, but the appellant was able to walk around. Some six or eight pints of whisky were found in appellant's garage, which was locked.

Appellant's dwelling house and other outbuildings were all inclosed by a wire fence, and the garage was not over 20 feet from the dwelling. At a time previous to the date alleged in the indictment, at the instance of officers, the appellant was induced to sell a half gallon of whisky, and, when the officers attempted to seize the whisky, the appellant broke the vessel in which it was contained, and other whisky was found in appellant's house. Quite a number of empty bottles and fruit jars were found in different places on appellant's premises, and a "trapdoor" for the hiding of goods, presumably whisky, was discovered. It is true the appellant and his witnesses denied that the appellant was in possession of the whisky found by the officers on December 15, 1926, and they attempted to show that another person had placed the whisky there during the appellant's absence.

We think the evidence was entirely sufficient to warrant the case being submitted to the jury, and there was no legal error on the part of the trial judge in refusing the motion for new trial on the ground stated.

The appellant, by his third exception, complains of error in the admission of testimony offered by the state, through Rural Policeman Segars, as to a former search of the defendant's premises, at a time not alleged in the indictment, and the finding of whisky on the premises at such time. It was shown by the appellant that he had pleaded guilty to the former offense, and had paid the fine imposed upon him therefor. The evidence was competent on the charge of "storing," and we cannot ssutain this exception.

The appellant's fourth exception claims there was error in the exclusion of testimony offered by him by witness Miller one of the officers who searched appellant's premises, to the effect that he was not loking for the appellant, but for another person in consequence of the discovery of the liquor found on the premises of the appellant. The matter came up in this way. Appellant's counsel asked the witness: "What was the information you received?" The trial judge stopped this examination. A little later the presiding judge stated that the witness could tell everything that he saw, but that he could not give information which came to him as that was hearsay. It seems the purpose of appellant's examination was to show that this officer suspected one Dave Brockington...