State v. Quillien
Decision Date | 13 August 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 19878,19878 |
Citation | 263 S.C. 87,207 S.E.2d 814 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Loman QUILLIEN, Appellant. |
This is an appeal from a conviction of a violation of Section 16--71 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962) wherein the defendant was convicted of the crime of The exceptions assert error in the admission and exclusion of evidence, in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial, and the reluctancy of the trial judge to take any steps sua sponte to correct damages allegedly done to Appellant's right to a fair trial by threats allegedly made to two of defendant's witnesses.
rape in the Court of General Sessions in and for Lexington County, South Carolina on the 9th day of August, 1973. The sentence of the court was that the defendant Loman Quillien be confined to the State Penitentiary for a period of thirty-five years.
The first exception asserts error in the court's refusal to exclude from evidence the pistol offered by the State. Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred in admitting into evidence a pistol allegedly thrown from Appellant's car as he was being pursued by police. He urges that there was error because the pistol was not subsequently connected to the defendant or to the crime.
It is a well established rule of law that the trial judge has broad discretion concerning the admission of evidence. That discretion will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly abused. State v. Hughey, 214 S.C. 111, 51 S.E.2d 376; State v. Chambers, 194 S.C. 197, 9 S.E.2d 549; State v. Pruitt, 260 S.C. 396, 196 S.E.2d 107.
The prosecuting witness, Marie Gantt and another State witness, Derrick Gantt, testified that the Appellant was armed with a pistol the night in question. Marie Gantt further testified that he had thrown the weapon from the car while being chased at high speed by the police on the Charleston Highway. One of the pursuing officers testified that he saw Appellant's car door open on three occasions; objects were jettisoned twice. Because of the darkness and high speed chase, the witness was unable to identify these objects. However, he did note that one object caused sparks to fly from the road surface when it struck. Another officer testified that he found the pistol near the center of the Charleston Highway, the route which Appellant had taken in his efforts to escape, in the general vicinity where Tyler had seen the objects thrown.
Appellant argues that it was error to admit this pistol unless it was shown by positive, direct, or certain evidence that it was connected to the Appellant or the crime. There is no support for his position in this State.
It is well established that the connecting evidence can either be direct or circumstantial. State v. Graham, 237 S.C. 278 117 S.E.2d 147. Furthermore the rule is that definite or certain evidence is not required. All that is required is that evidence be sufficient to afford a basis for a reasonable inference on a point in issue. 22a C.J.S. Criminal Law § 708, pp. 944--945; State v. Parker, 255 S.C. 359, 179 S.E.2d 31; State v. Jordan, 258 S.C. 340, 188 S.E.2d 780.
Once a basis for a reasonable inference is provided, the demonstrative evidence is rendered admissible. The jury is then left to determine what weight it will give the evidence. State v. Bellue, 259 S.C. 487, 193 S.E.2d 121.
The basis for a 'reasonable inference' was provided, and it was then up to the jury to determine what weight the evidence would have.
Appellant makes much of the fact that two hours passed before the gun was found. In Pruitt, and in State v. Blanden, 177 S.C. 1, 180 S.E. 681, a much longer period had elapsed. The rule in this area is that the lapse of time goes to the weight to the evidence, not its admissibility. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 300 Mass. 45, 13 N.E.2d 939; Kelly v. State, 52 Okl.Cr. 125, 3 P.2d 244.
The evidence in the instant case was certainly sufficient to afford a basis for forming a reasonable inference that the Appellant The second exception asserts error in the Court's allowing the State to elicit testimony to the effect that the pistol had been stolen in Charleston, South Carolina.
had used the pistol in the commission of the crime; that he had thrown it away during the chase; and that it had been found by Chief Miller. The Trial Judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the pistol into evidence and permitting the jury to determine what weight it was to have.
Appellant's assertion of error arises from the admission of certain testimony relative to a weapon allegedly used in the commission of the crime. For purposes of clarity, the following testimony is quoted:
'
has got a prior record. Your Honor, that is damaging.
The appellant alleges that the admission of the above testimony was hearsay and that it admission constituted prejudicial error. When the entire testimony quoted is read, there is not a clear showing that the testimony was actually hearsay and even if this testimony were hearsay and the Trial Court was in error in admitting it, the Appellant waived his objection by cross examining the witness Salters on the same subject matter without specifically preserving his objection. Goudelock v. Prudential Insurance Company, 219 S.C. 284, 65 S.E.2d 114.
The third exception asserts error on the part of the Trial Judge in refusing to order a mistrial because of the following matters.
In the course of the cross examination of Respondent's witness Salters, the following occurred:
Counsel for Appellant did not admonish the witness to answer carefully, nor did he require only a 'yes or no' answer.
As noted by the Trial Judge, the witness was asked for his opinion. He did nothing more, or less, than provide it.
We see no error in the ruling of the Trial Judge. Even if there were error, it was invited by counsel for Appellant, leaving Appellant in no position to complain. State v. Chasteen, 242 S.C. 198, 130 S.E.2d 473.
The fourth exception asserts error on the part of the Trial Judge in allowing
the following testimony to be introduced over his objections:
OFFICER SALTERS
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