State v. Quintana

• Decision Date: 25 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. S-1-SC-37570,S-1-SC-37570
• Citation: 485 P.3d 215
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ricky QUINTANA, Defendant-Petitioner.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

485 P.3d 215

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Ricky QUINTANA, Defendant-Petitioner.

No. S-1-SC-37570

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: March 25, 2021

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioner

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maha Khoury, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent

BACON, Justice.

{1} This appeal requires us to resolve whether the Legislature intended that the determination of a maximum term of criminal commitment under Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) of the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code (NMMIC), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1 to -1.6 (1988, as amended through 1999), may include enhancement due to aggravating circumstances under Section 31-18-15.1 of the Criminal Sentencing Act (CSA), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-12 to -26 (1977, as amended through 2020). The Court of Appeals applied State v. Chorney , 2001-NMCA-050, ¶¶ 11-12, 130 N.M. 638, 29 P.3d 538, in determining that the enhancement in this case serves the legislative purposes underlying the NMMIC. State v. Quintana , 2019-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 15-16, 446 P.3d 1168. The Court of Appeals consequently affirmed the ruling of the district court that extended Defendant Ricky Quintana's term of commitment based on aggravating circumstances from fifteen years to twenty years. Id. ¶ 2. We affirm and issue this opinion to clarify that a term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 may be increased under Section 31-18-15.1 due to aggravating circumstances that bear a direct relation to a defendant's dangerousness and that are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} In 2003, the decedent's body was discovered lying on the living room floor of Defendant's residence. The decedent had been stabbed multiple times, and his body had been subjected to mutilation, both before and after death. Defendant was charged with an open count of murder and tampering with evidence.

{3} In 2006, the parties filed stipulations including that Defendant remained incompetent to stand trial and remained dangerous, that clear and convincing evidence supported the charge of second-degree murder against Defendant, and that aggravating circumstances existed warranting the addition of three years to his statutory fifteen-year term of commitment.

{4} In 2014, following his ensuing commitment to the New Mexico Behavioral Health Institute (NMBHI) subject to attainment of competency, pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5, "[D]efendant was found competent to stand trial[,] ... and criminal proceedings resumed." However, defense counsel raised competency concerns prior to trial, and in 2016 "the parties again stipulated that ... [D]efendant was incompetent and dangerous as defined by Section 31-9-1.2."

{5} An evidentiary hearing was held to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for commitment pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5. Following the hearing, the district court acquitted Defendant of tampering with evidence and "found that clear and convincing evidence existed to show that ... [D]efendant committed the crime of second degree murder." A subsequent evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to Section 31-18-15.1, at which additional evidence was presented on both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

{6} Following the second evidentiary hearing, the district court entered an order of commitment pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5 enhancing Defendant's fifteen-year term by five years, for a total commitment period at NMBHI of twenty years. This term of commitment "represent[ed] the maximum time that ... Defendant would have been subject had ... Defendant been convicted of the [charged] offense[ ]."

{7} The district court based its order of commitment on findings by clear and convincing evidence from both hearings relating to two "valid aggravating factor[s]." First, the district court found that the murder had been committed with extreme viciousness and brutality, including "the near decapitation of the body, the removal of the genitals, the stabbing of the anus, as well as the numerous wounds to [the decedent's] head and torso." Second, the court found that Defendant represented a threat to community safety because, "[i]f released without supervision, there [wa]s a danger that Defendant would be medically non-compliant and his psychosis would return[.]" Evidence had been presented at the hearings that Defendant had been in a state of psychosis when committing the murder charged and when previously attacking another victim in a separate incident, and that Defendant was not reliable to take his antipsychotic medications without supervision.

{8} Defendant appealed on the ground that enhancing a term of commitment based on aggravating circumstances is not permitted under the NMMIC. Quintana , 2019-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 2, 9, 446 P.3d 1168. The Court of Appeals held that a maximum term of commitment under the NMMIC can include an enhancement that is invoked by " ‘specific marker[s] of dangerousness’ " as determined and defined by the Legislature. Id. ¶¶ 16-17 (alteration in original) (quoting Chorney , 2001-NMCA-050, ¶ 21, 130 N.M. 638, 29 P.3d 538 ). The Court of Appeals concluded that the brutality of Defendant's conduct and his history of prior violent conduct were such markers of dangerousness, and the Court affirmed the district court's order of commitment. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.

{9} Pursuant to Rule 12-502 NMRA, Defendant petitioned this Court for certiorari, which we granted. The parties agree that the central issue before this Court is the legislative intent underlying a maximum term of criminal commitment under Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2).

{10} We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the Legislature intended for Section 31-18-15.1 to be applicable in determining a maximum term of commitment under Section 31-9-1.5 where aggravating and mitigating factors bear directly on a defendant's dangerousness. We further hold that the enhancement of a term of commitment imposed under the NMMIC must meet the same clear and convincing evidentiary standard that is required for commitment under Section 31-9-1.5(D).

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Legislature Lawfully Intended for the CSA to Be Applied in Determining a Maximum Term of Commitment Under the NMMIC

1. Standard of review

{11} "This case presents an issue of statutory construction, which we review de novo." State v. Barela , 2021-NMSC-001, ¶ 5, 478 P.3d 875.

{12} Our guiding principle when construing statutes is "to determine and give effect to legislative intent." Baker v. Hedstrom , 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 11, 309 P.3d 1047 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A statute's plain language is "the primary indicator of legislative intent." State v. Young , 2004-NMSC-015, ¶ 5, 135 N.M. 458, 90 P.3d 477 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Under the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation." State v. Rivera , 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted).

{13} "In addition to looking at the statutory language, we also consider the history and background of the statute[, and w]e examine the overall structure of the statute and its function in the comprehensive legislative scheme." State v. Smith , 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "[A] statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole and in reference to statutes dealing with the same general subject matter." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "In considering the statute's function in relation to related statutes passed by the Legislature, whenever possible ... we must read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one another." Barela , 2021-NMSC-001, ¶ 6, 478 P.3d 875 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) is unambiguous and lawfully allows application of Section 31-18-15.1 to enhance a term of criminal commitment

{14} Defendant argues that Section 31-9-1.5 is unclear in not specifically defining maximum sentence and in not specifically addressing aggravation . Defendant also argues that aggravation of a criminal sentence is inherently punitive and related to culpability and thus "not contemplated" to enhance a term of criminal commitment. Defendant as well argues that aggravating a term of commitment "intended for [Defendant's] treatment to competency" misapplies Chorney . Finally, Defendant argues that the Legislature has failed to address whether a jury must "hear the question of aggravating factors" before a judge may enhance an order of commitment. This legislative silence, Defendant asserts, indicates a lack of legislative intent to permit any aggravation of a term of commitment. We address these arguments in turn.

a. Section 31-9-1.5(D)(2) is clear under plain language and context analysis

{15} The NMMIC has a legislative purpose "to protect an incompetent defendant from indefinite and unjust commitment to a mental health institution without due process of law and to protect society from dangerous criminals." Chorney , 2001-NMCA-050, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 638, 29 P.3d 538. Section 31-9-1.5 of the NMMIC governs evidentiary hearings to determine the sufficiency of the evidence for commitment of an incompetent defendant who has been charged with a felony that involves infliction of great bodily harm or with other enumerated felonies. Section 31-9-1.5(D) governs such hearings in which the district court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did commit the alleged felony and enters a finding that the defendant remains incompetent to stand trial and remains dangerous. For a felony that involves infliction of great bodily harm,...