State v. Radford

• Decision Date: 29 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 24762.,24762.
• Citation: 998 P.2d 80,134 Idaho 187
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert RADFORD, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

998 P.2d 80

134 Idaho 187

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert RADFORD, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 24762.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 1999 Term.

March 29, 2000.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General, argued.

Westberg, McCabe & Collins, Boise, for respondent. Thomas McCabe argued.

TROUT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the order of the district judge granting the defendant's motion to suppress. The defendant, Robert Radford (Radford) was indicted for first-degree burglary and first-degree kidnapping. Prior to trial, Radford filed a motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers. This motion was eventually granted by the district judge and the State of Idaho is now appealing that decision. The State argues the district judge incorrectly determined that our decision in State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998) mandated suppression of the statements made by Radford.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 1, 1991, an unknown male entered the home of C.B. and detained her with the intent to commit the crime of rape. C.B. promptly reported the incident to the Boise police, but could not identify her assailant. Eventually, because of a lack of leads, the police put the case on inactive status some time in 1992.

On June 22, 1995, Radford entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement in a completely unrelated case. The agreement called for Radford to plead guilty to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor in return for the State recommending a specific sentence, most of which would be suspended with Radford placed on probation. One of the conditions of Radford's probation was completion of the SANE (Sexual Abuse Now Ended) program. SANE is a privately operated treatment program for sex offenders and their families. The court accepted the plea agreement and Radford was given the sentence recommended by the State.

Prior to sentencing and in anticipation of the expected sentence, Radford entered into a contract with SANE. This contract specifically authorized Radford's therapist to release information regarding his treatment to law enforcement personnel. Additionally, the contract provided that Radford understood that "previously committed crimes must also be reported, and may be prosecuted...." This contract must be signed by anyone seeking entrance into the SANE program. As part of his participation in the SANE program, Radford prepared a written sexual history and took a required polygraph examination on May 28, 1996. During the polygraph, Radford revealed that in 1991 he had entered a woman's home during the night and restrained her. This is the incident which is involved in the instant appeal.

A summary of the polygraph was provided to the SANE counselor. The next day, the counselor met with Radford's probation officer, Dottie Hook, and disclosed the evidence to her. Hook passed this information to Detective Anderson who then accompanied Hook on a visit to Radford's home that same day. During this visit, Hook had a conversation with Radford in which he described the 1991 incident. Radford stated that he entered a house wearing a ski mask and intended to rape a woman who lived there. However, upon entering the residence, Radford discovered only the intended victim's sister. He then stated he handcuffed the sister, stayed for about an hour and a half, and then removed the handcuffs and left. It is undisputed that, during the probation officer's home visit, Radford was not placed in custody and no Miranda warnings were given. Following the home visit, Detective Anderson reported the information to Detective Ayotte who had originally investigated the 1991 incident. After hearing the story, Ayotte believed that Radford might have committed the crime against C. B.

Radford met with Hook for an office visit on June 4, 1996, and both Detectives Ayotte and Smith attended the meeting. Prior to the interview, Detective Ayotte told Radford that he was not in custody and advised him of his Miranda rights. Radford then signed a written Miranda waiver. At first Radford refused to talk about the 1991 incident, citing the advice of his attorney; however, he did agree to talk to police about other matters. During the course of the conversation, Radford repeatedly brought up the 1991 incident, eventually agreed to discuss the incident, made admissions about it, and wrote a letter of apology to the victim. Radford was not arrested at the conclusion of the interview; however, following a search of Radford's storage unit later that day, Radford was arrested by Hook for violation of the conditions of his probation. His probation in that case was eventually revoked and Radford is now serving his sentence.

After a hearing involving testimony from several witnesses and briefing by the parties, the district judge found the facts as stated above and denied the motion to suppress. Following this Court's decision in State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998), Radford filed a motion, for reconsideration. After argument on that motion, the district judge reversed his decision and granted the motion to suppress the statements based on this Court's decision in Crowe. The State then appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress, this Court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Medley, 127 Idaho 182, 185, 898 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1995). Based upon the trial court's findings, this Court exercises free review over whether the constitutional requirements have been met. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Radford has argued, both below and on appeal, that his statements should be suppressed under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Before discussing Radford's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, we must first determine if the Idaho Constitution should be interpreted to provide greater protection than the U.S. Constitution in this case.

A. The Idaho Constitution Does Not Provide Greater Protection to Radford Under the Facts of this Case.

Radford argues that his right to due process under the Idaho Constitution is violated in this case because he is compelled by the terms of his probation to give honest answers concerning his sexual history and is then punished for these answers by being subjected to further prosecution. Radford argues it is fundamentally unfair to prosecute him for the disclosures he was required to make and, therefore, he is denied due process of law and the statements he made to the officers on June 4th must be suppressed.

Although Radford states that he is only requesting that the statements be suppressed, his actual argument is much broader. By stating that it is fundamentally unfair to compel him to give honest answers during treatment and be subjected to further prosecution based on those answers, Radford appears to be arguing that Idaho's due process provision should be interpreted as requiring not just the suppression of any statements compelled by the terms of his probation, and the fruit thereof, but as providing some kind of blanket immunity for all crimes which are disclosed during treatment. This conclusion is supported by Radford's argument, both in his brief and at oral argument, that the State should have to choose between requiring full disclosure during court ordered treatment, or the ability to prosecute probationers for those crimes they disclose. Radford argues the choice should be full disclosure because there is a greater benefit to society in encouraging full disclosure in order to increase the chances for successful treatment, than in punishing an individual who is already seeking treatment for his behavior.

In Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163 (1989), this Court held that the scope of Idaho's due process provision in Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is not "necessarily bound by the interpretation given to due process by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 40, 785 P.2d at 165. Although the due process clause of the Idaho Constitution is interpreted independently, this Court "consider[s] the rationale used by the United States Supreme Court in deciding Fourteenth Amendment due process cases." Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 577, 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996). Additionally, this Court has applied the United States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution in other due process cases. See, e.g., Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 132 Idaho 221, 227, 970 P.2d 14, 20 (1998)

(due process case involving the determination of whether the plaintiff had a protectable liberty or property interest); Schevers, 129 Idaho at 577-78,

930 P.2d at 607-08 (due process case involving the deprivation of a liberty interest); Smith v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771, 918 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1996) (due process case involving the deprivation of a liberty interest). Finally, under the facts of the present case, there is no compelling reason to expand the protection of the due process provision of the Idaho Constitution beyond that contemplated in the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to the statements made by Radford to law enforcement officers. Because this is not a situation where we believe the Idaho Constitution provides greater protections than those given in the U.S. Constitution, the same analysis used for determining whether Radford's statements were obtained in violation of the right to due process under the U.S. Constitution will be used to determine whether those statements were obtained in violation of the Idaho Constitution.

Radford also argues that his right against self-incrimination as guaranteed by Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution has been violated. In his brief,...