State v. Radler
| Decision Date | 24 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-36233,A-1-CA-36233 |
| Citation | 448 P.3d 613 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jason RADLER, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
Jason M. Alarid, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
{1} In this refiled concurrent jurisdiction case, Defendant Jason Radler moved to dismiss, alleging a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Eight months after the charge was originally filed in magistrate court and five months after the charge was dismissed and then refiled in district court, the district court granted Defendant’s motion. The State appealed. We reverse.
{2} The State charged Defendant in magistrate court with aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(D)(1) (2010, amended 2016). After spending three days in jail, Defendant was arraigned on March 28, 2016, and released on bond. On April 11, counsel for Defendant entered an appearance and made a pro forma demand for speedy trial. On June 27, the State dismissed the magistrate court case and refiled the charge in district court. The district court set trial for December 19.
{3} On November 4, Defendant moved to dismiss. He contended that, because his trial had not commenced before the expiration of the 182-day period that would have governed his case in magistrate court, his right to a speedy trial had been violated and Rule 5-604(B) NMRA () contemplated dismissal. The State responded by observing that Rule 5-604(B) sets out familiar factors from our speedy trial case law—i.e., the length of delay, the reasons for delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant from the delay. See State v. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. With respect to the length of delay, the State noted our Supreme Court in Garza had adopted "one year as a benchmark for determining when a simple case may become presumptively prejudicial." Id. ¶ 48. The State contended that benchmark constitutes a kind of threshold, and if a defendant cannot establish a delay exceeding the benchmark, the district court need not even consider the other factors set forth in the case law and the rule. Defendant’s case had been pending just eight months since the original filing in magistrate court, and the State thus argued his motion should be denied for failure to establish delay exceeding the Garza benchmark.
{4} The district court heard argument on Defendant’s motion in November 2016. Defendant presented testimony at the hearing, without objection from the State, regarding potential prejudice he had suffered. Defendant explained he had been "offered an opportunity to apply to the academy at Los Alamos County Fire Department" (the Department), but he did not apply because of his pending case. He noted the application window had recently closed, and thus he had missed the opportunity. The State did not cross-examine Defendant.
{5} The district court observed the delay was "not excessive," but concluded it nonetheless weighed against the State because it extended beyond the period that would have governed in magistrate court. The court added that the State’s reasons for dismissing and refiling the case were permissible, and thus the reason for delay factor weighed in the State’s favor. Finally, the court observed Defendant had introduced evidence of prejudice, which the State had not countered, and thus the prejudice factor weighed against the State. The district court concluded Defendant’s trial had been impermissibly delayed and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. After a motion for reconsideration and additional argument, the court entered an order dismissing Defendant’s charge, finding "the [m]agistrate [c]ourt trial should have been commenced [80 days before the scheduled district court trial and that] Defendant suffered actual prejudice[,]" and concluding the speedy trial factors weighed in favor of Defendant.
{6} The State reiterates on appeal that the district court erred in even considering Defendant’s motion, maintaining the speedy trial factors are only to be weighed once a defendant has established delay exceeding Garza arguments, we briefly examine the applicable law relating to speedy trial and Rule 5-604.
{7} In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial, we analyze the four-factor balancing test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) : "(1) the length of delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay." State v. Serros , 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 5, 366 P.3d 1121. Our Supreme Court in Garza established new guidelines as to when, generally, delays should be characterized as presumptively prejudicial and require scrutiny of the Barker factors. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (). At the same time, the Garza Court was careful to note the new guidelines are to be treated as merely guidelines, not rules, and "will not preclude [a] defendant from bringing a motion for a speedy trial violation though the delay may be less than one year." Id. ¶ 49. As a specific illustration of that proposition, Garza emphasized a defendant might bring a speedy trial motion even before the relevant presumptive period has passed where the defendant can establish actual prejudice resulting from delay. Id.
{8} In the past, our Supreme Court used the "six-month rule" in both limited jurisdiction courts and district courts to "provide the courts and the parties with a rudimentary warning of when speedy trial problems may arise." Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 43, 46, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The six-month rule "requir[ed] the commencement of trial in a criminal proceeding within six months of the latest of several different triggering events." Id. ¶ 43 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rule 5-604(B) NMRA (2009) (); Rule 6-506 NMRA (). There was no rule, however, providing guidance as to how the six-month rules should apply in refiled concurrent jurisdiction cases—i.e., where a case initially filed in magistrate court is later dismissed and then refiled in district court. State v. Savedra , 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 2, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20.
{9} In Savedra , our Supreme Court examined earlier case law attempting to interpret the rules in this context and expressed dissatisfaction with the focus those cases gave to the propriety of the State’s justification for dismissing and refiling. Id. ¶¶ 7 -8. The Court determined that in district courts, "the six-month rule ha[d] become an unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant’s right to a speedy trial" and withdrew the district court rule. Id. ¶ 9. The Court directed instead that "defendants may rely upon and assert their right to a speedy trial whenever they believe impermissible delay has occurred; whether that delay is the result of a dismissal and refiling or any other cause." Id. Notably, the Court made no explicit reference to periods of presumptively prejudicial delay as thresholds for these challenges, and instead cited Garza for its provision of new "time frames" guiding a district court’s speedy trial analysis. Savedra , 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 8, 148 N.M. 301, 236 P.3d 20.
{10} In response to Savedra , Rule 5-604 was amended to eliminate the six-month rule in district court. The new rule applies only to refiled concurrent jurisdiction cases. See Rule 5-604(A). For these cases, the rule provides:
{11} Several features of the revision are noteworthy. The factors set forth in Rule 5-604(B) mirror the Barker factors. See Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶...
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