State v. Rael, 26,737.

• Docket Nº: No. 26,737.
• Citation: 184 P.3d 1064, 2008 NMCA 067
• Case Date: March 27, 2008
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

184 P.3d 1064 2008 NMCA 067 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eric RAEL, Defendant-Appellant. No. 26,737. Court of Appeals of New Mexico. March 27, 2008. Certiorari Granted, No. 31,065, May 16, 2008.

[184 P.3d 1065]

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, James W. Grayson, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Jason C. Gordon, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Defendant Eric Rael appeals his conviction after a jury trial for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation of NMSA 1978, § 30-3-2(A) (1963). He raises three issues on appeal, each related to his competency to stand trial. Defendant contends that (1) the district court abused its discretion when it found that he was competent to stand trial, (2) the district court erred in refusing to submit the issue of competency to the jury, and (3) the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to reconsider his competency prior to beginning his trial. We hold that the district court was not required to accept the opinion of Defendant's expert as to Defendant's competency and that (1) there was sufficient evidence of Defendant's competency to stand trial; (2) because there was no new evidence, the district court complied with Rule 5-602(B)(2) NMRA in deciding the issue of Defendant's competency without submitting it to the jury; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to reconsider. We affirm Defendant's conviction.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

{2} Following an incident at the home of his former girlfriend on September 18, 2004, Defendant was charged in district court with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Upon Defendant's motion, the district court ordered a psychological examination of Defendant to determine his competency to stand trial. The examination was conducted by Dr. Will Parsons in November 2004, and Dr. Parsons' report was issued in January

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2005. Among other findings, Defendant's full-scale I.Q. score was determined to be sixty-eight, and Dr. Parsons recommended that he be found not competent to stand trial.

{3} A hearing on the competency issue was held on May 16, 2005. Dr. Parsons testified as an expert consistent with his evaluation, opining that Defendant had mild mental retardation and was not competent to stand trial. The State's only witnesses were the general manager and an assistant manager of the Pizza Hut at which Defendant had worked as a dishwasher and a cook for the previous two years. The district court ruled that Defendant was competent, finding that he had not rebutted the presumption of competence and that the State had rebutted the presumption of mental retardation as set forth in NMSA 1978, § 31-9-1.6(E) (1999).

{4} Defendant's jury trial took place on February 1, 2006. At a bench conference before jury selection on the morning of his trial, Defendant moved for a reconsideration of the district court's finding of competence following the May 16, 2005 hearing. At trial, Defendant's counsel stated, "After talking to my client at length yesterday, he understands nothing. He has no idea what's going on." Defendant's written motion stated that "[d]espite counsel's best efforts, [D]efendant was unable to understand the trial process, the charges against him, [and] the consequences of a trial or of a plea" and that "[D]efendant [was] completely unable to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding because of his inability to comprehend these proceedings." Citing Rule 5-602, Defendant's counsel also orally requested that if the court proceeded with the trial, a jury should determine Defendant's competency. Defendant's counsel further noted that she had requested Dr. Parsons' presence, although apparently he had not yet arrived. The district court denied the motions but allowed Defendant's counsel to raise the issue again later.

{5} During a break after the State's opening statement, Defendant's counsel again moved for a jury determination of Defendant's competency to stand trial and also filed a written motion in open court. That motion made the same allegations as set forth above regarding Defendant's ability to understand the proceedings and consult with his attorney. The motion asserted that the evidence that Defendant sought to present on the issue of competency would "raise a reasonable doubt as to [his] competency to stand trial." Citing Rule 5-602(B)(2)(b), the motion requested that the jury hear testimony regarding Defendant's competency and that the district court rule as to whether the jury should determine Defendant's competency. Defendant's counsel informed the district court that if the motion were heard, Dr. Parsons and Defendant would testify. The judge stated that he had reviewed his notes from the May 16, 2005 competency hearing and noted that Defendant had been able to obtain a driver's license and had attended school through the eleventh grade. The judge ruled that Defendant was competent without hearing testimony on the issue. The judge also ruled that Dr. Parsons could not be called at trial, citing Rule 5-502(A)(3) NMRA, which requires witnesses to be disclosed not less than ten days before trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury, not instructed on the issue of competency, found Defendant guilty.

FINDING OF COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL

{6} "[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial." State v. Flores, 2005-NMCA-135, ¶ 15, 138 N.M. 636, 124 P.3d 1175 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[I]t is a violation of due process to prosecute a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial." Id. ¶ 16 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and bears the burden of demonstrating incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327-28, 721 P.2d 392, 395-96 (1986). If the district court finds reasonable doubt as to competency, the issue is submitted to a jury. State v. Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309. "In deciding the reasonable-doubt

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question, the [district court] judge weighs the evidence and draws his or her own conclusions from that evidence." Id. On appeal, we review the district court's determination "only for an abuse of discretion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judge's decision." Id. A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case." State v. Lasner, 2000-NMSC-038, ¶ 16, 129 N.M. 806, 14 P.3d 1282 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{7} At the May 16, 2005 competency hearing, approximately eight months before Defendant's trial, Dr. Parsons testified as an expert and opined that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Among his findings were that Defendant's full-scale I.Q. score was sixty-eight and that Defendant met the criteria for a diagnosis of mild mental retardation. Dr. Parsons did not test Defendant's I.Q. during the course of his November 2004 evaluation; rather, that score had been determined after a previous evaluation in 2001. Although Defendant notes that "[a]n intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation," Section 31-9-1.6(E), we are not aware of any statutory or case law that directs that a person found to have mild mental retardation is necessarily incompetent to stand trial, and Defendant does not make such an argument on appeal.

{8} In support of his argument that the district court erred in finding him competent to stand trial, Defendant points out that he presented expert testimony at the competency hearing but that the State presented only two managers from Defendant's place of employment. However, Defendant concedes that a court as factfinder may reject expert testimony, even when the opposing party has not countered with expert testimony of its own. See State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, ¶ 29, 125 N.M. 111, 957 P.2d 1145 (holding that, on the issue of the defendant's competence at the time of his confession, the district court was permitted to reject the expert testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist in favor of that of a detective who interviewed the defendant).

{9} Although Dr. Parsons believed that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial, his report and testimony reveal several bases for the district court to conclude otherwise. During the course of the evaluation, Dr. Parsons asked Defendant questions concerning his understanding of the charges against him and the potential consequences. Defendant was able to state the charge against him. He also knew that it was a felony and that a felony was more serious than a misdemeanor. He believed that if he were found guilty he would go to jail, possibly for a year. He described probation as being "out of jail and you have to go see somebody," and he was aware that a condition of probation was "staying out of trouble." He did not understand the concept of not guilty by reason of insanity, but when subsequently asked what pleas he could enter in court, he suggested guilty or not guilty and then asked if he could plead not guilty by reason of insanity.

{10} Dr. Parsons also probed Defendant's understanding of the trial process. Defendant was able to point to six of seven courtroom participants in a picture of a typical courtroom. Although Defendant did not understand the role of the district attorney, he knew that the defense attorney worked for him and knew the function of the judge. He "expressed uncertainty"...