State v. Raglin
| Decision Date | 30 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 96-2872,97-141,s. 96-2872 |
| Citation | 699 N.E.2d 482,83 Ohio St.3d 253 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. RAGLIN, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
During the early morning hours of December 29, 1995, appellant, Walter Raglin, and appellant's friend, Darnell "Bubba" Lowery, were looking for someone to rob. Appellant was wearing dark clothes and a black ski mask and was armed with a .380 semiautomatic pistol he had obtained from Lowery. The two men considered robbing a "dope boy," i.e., a drug dealer, but decided against it Meanwhile, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Michael Bany, 1 a musician, concluded an engagement at a bar on Main Street in Cincinnati. At approximately 1:45 a.m., Bany left the bar carrying a bass guitar and a black bag or suitcase with music equipment and headed toward the parking lot where he had parked his car. Appellant and Lowery saw Bany and decided to rob him. While Bany was attempting to unlock the door to his vehicle, appellant approached him from behind, pulled out the .380 semiautomatic pistol, and demanded Bany's money. Bany handed appellant three $20 bills. Appellant then asked Bany whether Bany's car had an automatic or manual transmission since appellant planned to steal the car if it was an automatic. Bany did not reply to appellant's question. Appellant repeated the question, but Bany remained silent. At some point, Bany bent down to pick up his guitar case and/or his music equipment and turned to face appellant. While appellant and Bany were looking at each other, appellant shot Bany once in the side of the neck, killing him. The projectile entered through the left side of Bany's neck, just below the earlobe, and exited through the right side. The path of the projectile indicated that appellant and Bany were not standing face-to-face at the time of the shooting. Additionally, the record indicates that the shot was fired at the victim from a distance of more than three feet.
for fear that such a person could be armed. They also discussed the possibility of robbing a taxicab driver, but appellant suggested that it might be safer for the two men to rob a more vulnerable victim.
Following the killing, appellant and Lowery ran to a house several blocks away from the scene of the murder. There, appellant cleaned the pistol of fingerprints and gave it to Lowery. Appellant told Lowery that he (appellant) had received only $20 from the victim. Later, appellant spent the $60 he had taken from Bany to purchase marijuana.
On January 3, 1996, Cincinnati police received an anonymous telephone call identifying appellant as a suspect in the murder. Appellant was apprehended by police and was taken to an interview room for questioning. There, appellant voluntarily agreed to speak with police after being advised of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
During questioning, appellant lied to the police and denied any involvement in the murder. When police informed appellant that they had received telephone After giving a full confession to police, appellant agreed to repeat his statement on tape. Appellant was once again advised of his Miranda rights. At that time, appellant indicated that he wanted to speak to an attorney. Therefore, police stopped the recorder, ceased their interrogation of appellant, and offered to bring appellant a telephone book and to assist him in obtaining counsel. Appellant stated that he did not want to inconvenience the officers, but police assured him that his request for counsel was not an inconvenience. Nevertheless, despite these assurances, appellant told police that he had changed his mind concerning his request for counsel and that he wished to continue with his statement. At that point, police resumed the interview and once again advised appellant of his rights. After ensuring that appellant fully understood his right to counsel and had freely and intelligently abandoned his known rights, police resumed the interrogation and tape recording of appellant's statement, and appellant reiterated the details of the robbery and killing.
calls naming appellant as a suspect, appellant changed his story and admitted that he had been at the scene of the murder. Appellant told police that he had been paid $25 for being a lookout for Lowery, and that Lowery had robbed and killed Bany. The police officers then left the interview room. A short time later, appellant summoned an officer back to the room and admitted that he had shot Bany. Appellant then confessed to robbing and killing Bany and gave police a detailed account of the murder.
In January 1996, appellant was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for the aggravated murder of Bany. Count Four of the indictment charged appellant with purposely causing the death of Bany during the commission of an aggravated robbery. Count Four of the indictment also carried an R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) death penalty specification. Count Three of the indictment charged appellant with the aggravated robbery of Bany. Counts One and Two of the indictment charged appellant with certain offenses that were unrelated to the robbery and killing of Bany. Counts Two, Three, and Four carried a firearm specification. Appellant eventually entered a plea of no contest to the charge set forth in Count One of the indictment and the specification in connection with that count. Additionally, the state of Ohio eventually dismissed Count Two.
The charges and specifications relating to the aggravated robbery and aggravated murder of Bany (i.e., Counts Three and Four and related specifications) proceeded to trial by jury. The jury found appellant guilty of these charges and specifications. With regard to the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) death penalty specification, the jury found that appellant was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. Following a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of Bany. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and imposed the sentence of death.
For the aggravated robbery of Bany (Count Three), for the matter to which appellant had pled no contest (Count One), and for the firearm specification in connection with Count Three, the trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with law.
In case No. 96-2872, appellant directly appeals his convictions and sentences for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery (and for the associated firearm specifications) from the trial court to this court pursuant to Section 2(B)(2)(c), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, as amended in 1994. See, also, R.C. 2953.02. Appellant also filed a notice of appeal in the court of appeals. However, the court of appeals issued an entry striking the notice of appeal because the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider appellant's appeal from the imposition of the death penalty. See Sections 2(B)(2)(c) and 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, and R.C. 2953.02. In case No. 97-141, appellant appeals from the court of appeals' decision striking the notice of appeal. Upon motion, we consolidated the two cases.
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, Steven W. Rakow and Ronald W. Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
H. Fred Hoefle and David J. Boyd, Cincinnati, for appellant.
Appellant presents twenty-one propositions of law for our consideration. (See Appendix, infra.) We have considered each of appellant's propositions of law and have reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness and proportionality. Upon review, and for the reasons that follow, we uphold appellant's convictions and sentences, including the sentence of death.
We have held, time and again, that this court is not required to address and discuss, in opinion form, each and every proposition of law raised by the parties in a death penalty appeal. We continue to adhere to that position today. We recognize that the case at bar is among the first of the death penalty appeals that have come to this court on direct appeal from the trial courts of this state. However, in this case, as in all other death penalty cases, we have carefully considered all of the propositions of law and allegations of error and have thoroughly reviewed the record in its entirety. Most of the issues raised by appellant have been addressed and rejected by this court under analogous circumstances in a number of our prior cases. Therefore, these issues require little, if any, discussion. Additionally, a number of appellant's arguments have been waived. Upon a careful review of the record and the governing law, we fail
to detect any errors requiring reversal of appellant's convictions and sentences. We have found nothing in the record or in the arguments advanced by appellant that would, in any way, undermine our confidence in the integrity and reliability of the trial court's findings. Accordingly, we see no reason to deviate from our prior procedures in death penalty appeals. We address and discuss, in detail, only those issues that merit analysis.
The trial court, in its sentencing opinion, considered and weighed an R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) aggravating circumstance even though appellant was neither charged with nor convicted of an R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) death penalty specification. However, this error in the trial court's sentencing opinion, and all other allegations of error raised by appellant in Proposition of Law No. 1, can be readily cured by our independent review of appellant's death sentence. See, generally, State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 170-173, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304-307. See, also, State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 684-685, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1373; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 424, 653 N.E.2d 253, 265; and State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 191-192, 631 N.E.2d 124, 131.
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