State v. Ramey
| Decision Date | 14 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. A04-1056.,A04-1056. |
| Citation | 721 N.W.2d 294 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Scott Wade RAMEY, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, James B. Early, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, Douglas L. Ruth, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, MN, for Appellant.
Davi E. Axelson, Office of the State Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondent.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
This appeal arises from a jury trial in which respondent, Scott Wade Ramey, was found guilty of violating an order for protection. The court of appeals reversed Ramey's conviction, holding that the district court erred in giving a no-adverse-inference instruction without Ramey's request or consent and the prosecutor committed misconduct during the closing argument. The state petitioned for review, claiming that the court of appeals erred in applying the two-tiered analysis from State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 218 N.W.2d 197 (1974), to Ramey's claim of prosecutorial misconduct because Ramey had not made a contemporaneous objection to the asserted misconduct. We granted review on two issues: (1) whether the plain error doctrine applies to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, and (2) the legal standard that should be applied in determining whether the asserted misconduct was prejudicial. We hold that, on appeal, the plain error doctrine applies to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. However, once the defendant has borne the burden of showing that the prosecutorial misconduct was error that was plain, the state bears the burden of showing that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. We reverse and remand to the court of appeals to determine whether the prosecutor's conduct constituted plain error affecting substantial rights in accordance with this opinion.
Ramey and S.S. dated for approximately one month in 2001. In February 2003, S.S. obtained an order for protection against Ramey in response to his unwanted attempts to contact her, which sometimes amounted to 20-30 phone calls per day. On April 8, 2003, at approximately 4:00 p.m., S.S. was sleeping at her home. Ramey woke S.S. from her sleep by kissing her on the cheek. S.S. asked Ramey to leave her house multiple times, and he eventually did. S.S. called the police, and the responding officer discovered that Ramey had not yet been served with the order for protection.
Between 8:30 and 9:00 p.m. that night, Ramey returned to S.S.'s home. S.S. did not allow Ramey into the house and instead called 911. When law enforcement officers arrived, Ramey was still outside of S.S.'s home. The responding officer served Ramey with a short-form notification of the order for protection and explained to Ramey that he was to have no contact with S.S. Ramey signed a form acknowledging that he understood the order.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on April 9, while S.S. was working, she received a telephone call. She recognized the caller as Ramey, immediately hung up the phone, and called the police.
Because Ramey had three prior domestic-violence convictions, he was charged with felony violation of an order for protection. Minn.Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2004). The case was tried to a jury, which found Ramey guilty of violating the order for protection. The court convicted Ramey and imposed a 21-month stayed sentence and a $3,000 fine, with $2,000 stayed for five years.
Ramey appealed his conviction, claiming the district court erred in giving a no-adverse-inference instruction without his request or consent and that the prosecutor had committed misconduct during the state's closing argument. State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2005 WL 832054, at *1 (Minn.App. Apr.12, 2005). Ramey did not object at trial to either the giving of the instruction or to any statements during the state's closing argument. Id. at *2.1
Applying the plain error doctrine, the court of appeals held that the district court committed plain error when it gave the no-adverse-inference instruction in the absence of Ramey's request. Id. However, when addressing the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, the court of appeals applied the Caron two-tiered approach for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct. Ramey, 2005 WL 832054, at *2. It determined that the misconduct was of the "less serious" variety but that, when viewed in the light of the no-adverse-inference instruction, the misconduct substantially influenced the jury to convict and denied Ramey a fair trial. Id. at *3. The court of appeals did not make it clear whether it would have granted a new trial based only on the no-adverse-inference instruction. Id. The state petitioned for review.
In this case, we must determine whether the court of appeals applied the correct analysis to Ramey's claims of prosecutorial misconduct. This question is one of law, which we review de novo. See Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn.2003).
We first address whether the plain error doctrine applies to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. Ordinarily, the defendant's failure to object to an error at trial forfeits appellate consideration of the issue. State v. Darris, 648 N.W.2d 232, 241 (Minn.2002). On appeal, an unobjected-to error can be reviewed only if it constitutes plain error affecting substantial rights. Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02. The plain error doctrine is derived from the rules of criminal procedure. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02. In 1975, we adopted Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.02, which states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be considered * * * on appeal although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." We first cited the plain error doctrine in 1978. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 264 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1978) (quoting Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 717-18, 82 S.Ct. 1287, 8 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962)); State v. Gruber, 264 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Minn.1978).
Prior to the development of the plain error doctrine, in Caron we adopted a two-tiered standard to be applied when determining whether prosecutorial misconduct required a new trial:2
[I]n cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct this court has required certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was harmless before affirming. * * * On the other hand, in cases involving less serious prosecutorial misconduct this court has applied the test of whether the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.
300 Minn. at 127-28, 218 N.W.2d at 200.
Our jurisprudence has not been completely consistent on the standard applicable to an analysis of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. For example, in the 1980s, while some cases used the Caron standard to analyze unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, we also applied the plain error doctrine in other cases of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. Compare State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn.1984) (), with State v. Atkins, 355 N.W.2d 410, 411 (Minn.1984) (), and State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 384 (Minn.1983) (same).
In 1998, we decided State v. Griller, which clarified the plain error analysis. 583 N.W.2d 736 (Minn.1998). Citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), we held that
before an appellate court reviews an unobjected-to error, there must be (1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights. If these three prongs are met, the appellate court then assesses whether it should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740 (footnote omitted). Since Griller was decided, and particularly in the last few years, we have most often applied the plain error doctrine, rather than the Caron standard, when reviewing cases involving unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., State v. MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 235 (Minn. 2005). By contrast, the Caron standard has mainly been limited to cases involving objected-to prosecutorial misconduct since the late 1990s. See, e.g., State v. Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 473-75 (Minn.2005) ().
Applying the plain error doctrine encourages defendants to object at trial, which is preferred because the district court is in an unique position to determine what actions constitute prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Minn.2002). When a defendant does not make a contemporaneous objection the district court does not have the opportunity to rule on the misconduct or make a determination as to whether a corrective instruction is required or appropriate. See Brown, 348 N.W.2d at 747 (). Defendants should be encouraged to object at trial because "[o]bjections provide the trial court an opportunity to prevent or cure the effects of alleged prosecutorial misconduct." Rairdon v. State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 323 n. 5 (Minn.1996). Although we recognized in State v. Caldwell that curative instructions will not solve every problem prosecutorial misconduct creates, 322 N.W.2d 574, 590-91 (Minn. 1982), the district court is in the best position to attempt to remedy the effects of the misconduct, and it should be given this opportunity in the first instance.
In the past we have also recognized that defendants may decline to object at trial to secure reversible error on review. State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 747 n. 4 (Minn.2003); State v. Stofflet, 281 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn.1979). We reemphasize here what we articulated in Ray:
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