State v. Ramirez

• Docket Number: 2022AP959-CR
• Decision Date: 25 April 2024
• Citation: 412 Wis. 2d 55
• Parties: State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Luis A. Ramirez, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

412 Wis. 2d 55

State of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent,^† v. Luis A. Ramirez, Defendant-Appellant.

Court of Appeals

No. 2022AP959–CR. Submitted on briefs December 13, 2023.— Decided April 25, 2024.

2024 WI App 28

(Also reported in — N.W.3d —.)

APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the circuit court for Columbia County: W. ANDREW VOIGT, Judge.Reversed and cause remanded with directions.

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Jennifer A. Lohr of Lohr Law Office, LLC, Madison.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Sarah L. Burgundy, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.

Before Kloppenburg, P.J., Blanchard, and Graham, JJ.

¶ 1.GRAHAM, J. Luis Ramirez appeals his judgment of conviction and two circuit court orders denying his postconviction motions.Ramirez's motions alleged that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial based on the 46-month delay between the filing of charges and his trial, and that he is entitled to dismissal of the charges on that basis.

¶ 2.Based on the test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514(1972), and related Wisconsin case law, we agree that Ramirez's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.Although Ramirez has not demonstrated significant prejudice in fact from the delay, the total delay in this case was extreme—the longest of any published Wisconsin constitutional speedy trial case decided since Barker—and presumptively prejudicial.The vast majority of the delay was caused by government actors and is therefore attributable to the State.The State identifies neutral reasons for some of the delays, but it provides no explanation for other substantial portions of the delay, which may be taken as indicating a "cavalier disregard" for Ramirez's speedy trial rights.Ramirez twice asserted his right to a speedy trial and was not promptly brought to trial following his assertions.There is no evidence that Ramirez deliberately sought to delay the trial, and the circuit court's finding that Ramirez's actions during the pretrial proceedings were inconsistent with a desire for prompt resolution of the matter is clearly erroneous.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and the orders denying Ramirez's postconviction motions, and remand for the circuit court to dismiss the complaint.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3.In February 2016, Ramirez was charged with one count of battery by a prisoner and one count of disorderly conduct, both with repeater and use-of-a-dangerous weapon enhancers.¹These charges stemmed from Ramirez's May 2015 assault of a prison guard at a state correctional institution where he was serving a 40-year sentence for a 1997 armed robbery conviction.Ramirez was finally tried in December 2019, 46 months after the charges were filed, and a jury convicted him on both counts.

¶ 4.In the discussion section of this opinion, we divide this 46-month total delay into eight periods and provide additional details about relevant events that transpired in each period.For now, it suffices to say that we identify the following periods:

(1) the 17 days that elapsed between the filing of the complaint on February 1, 2016, and the first scheduled preliminary hearing on February 18, 2016;

(2) the approximately five and one-half months that elapsed between the adjournment of that first scheduled preliminary hearing and the preliminary hearing that eventually occurred on August 4, 2016;

(3) the approximately eight months that elapsed between the August 2016 preliminary hearing and the first scheduled trial date on April 13, 2017;

(4) the almost six months that elapsed between that first scheduled trial date, which the State asked to adjourn due to the unavailability of a witness and its need for more trial days, and the second scheduled trial date on September 26, 2017;

(5) the approximately six months that elapsed between that second scheduled trial date, which the State asked to adjourn because the prosecutor and courtroom were double booked, and the third scheduled trial date on April 4, 2018;

(6) the almost six months that elapsed between that third scheduled trial date, which Ramirez's defense counsel asked to adjourn to allow him time to evaluate Ramirez's mental health records, and Ramirez's initial speedy trial demand on September 26, 2018;

(7) the approximately six months that elapsed between that speedy trial demand and the fourth scheduled trial date on April 3, 2019; and

(8) the eight months that elapsed between that fourth scheduled trial date, which the State asked to adjourn due to the retirement of the district attorney and the appointment of a new prosecutor, and the trial that ultimately commenced on December 3, 2019.

¶ 5.As stated, Ramirez made an initial demand for a speedy trial on September 26, 2018, well into the 46-month total delay.He made this initial demand in a pro se letter to the circuit court, in which he also raised the issue of prison surveillance footage that Ramirez asserted the State was withholding.Ramirez wrote: "I would also like this court to order the [district attorney] to give us the other 3 videos from the bay room for [the date of the incident].They are withholding evidence that will prove I am not guilty of this crime."Ramirez asserted his right to a speedy trial a second time, on April 15, 2019, by filing a pro se motion to dismiss the charges on the ground that he had been deprived of his "constitutional right to a speedy trial" and his "14th Amendment right to due process."In both the September 2018 and April 2019 filings, Ramirez, who was represented by counsel, stated that he had been forced to file the demand and motion pro se because counsel declined to do so on Ramirez's behalf, despite his requests.

¶ 6.The circuit court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on June 17, 2019, during what we have categorized as the eighth and final period of delay.During the hearing, Ramirez's defense counsel and the circuit court both construed Ramirez's motion as asserting a statutory violation of his speedy trial right, rather than a constitutional violation of the right.SeeWis. Stat. § 971.10(2), (4)(providing that, upon the defendant's speedy trial demand, the trial should occur within 90 days, and that the remedy for a violation is an order requiring the defendant to be released from pretrial custody).Defense counsel explained that he had declined to file a motion on Ramirez's behalf because counsel did not "see any remedy [for a speedy trial violation] under the circumstances"—as counsel explained, Ramirez was incarcerated for a different crime and could not be .released from pretrial custody, which is the sole remedy for violations of the statutory speedy trial right.The court agreed with counsel's assessment, and denied Ramirez's motion on that ground.Defense counsel and the court both appeared to overlook the fact that Ramirez could nonetheless demand a speedy trial, even if the statutory remedy for a speedy trial violation was unavailable to him, and that the remedy for a violation of the constitutional speedy trial right— dismissal of the charges—was potentially available.SeeState v. Urdahl, 2005 WI App 191, ¶ 11, 286 Wis. 2d 476, 704 N.W.2d 324(explaining the contrasting remedies available for Statutory and constitutional speedy trial violations).

¶ 7.The two-day jury trial eventually occurred on December 3 and 4, 2019, and Ramirez was convicted on both counts.The circuit court sentenced him to 12 years of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision on each count, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to the 40-year sentence Ramirez is serving for his 1997 armed robbery conviction.

¶ 8.Ramirez filed a postconviction motion, which alleged that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated by the 46-month delay between the filing of the criminal complaint and his trial.At an evidentiary hearing on the motion, Ramirez testified that, among other things, he had been placed in a more restrictive form of housing while he waited for his trial and he had been told by prison guards that he would remain in restrictive housing until the trial.He also testified that he did not have access to services or programs during the time that he was in restrictive housing and that he experienced stress, anxiety, and panic as a result.

¶ 9.The parties agreed that the applicable standard is the four-factor test from Barker, 407 U.S. 514, which considers the total length of the delay; the reasons for that delay; the defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right; and prejudice to the defendant.After considering these factors, the circuit court denied Ramirez's postconviction motion in an oral ruling.

¶ 10.Regarding the length and reasons for the delay, the circuit court acknowledged that there had been "[a] more than necessary period of delay" that was caused by a "collection of issues" related to per- sonnel changes in the district attorney's office and the unavailability of courtroom facilities in which to conduct the trial, and that the "more than necessary period of delay" was "chargeable to the State."Specifically, the court found that the trial had been postponed for reasons including the former district attorney's retirement; the reassignment of this case to a new prosecutor; the fact that courthouse operations moved "to a temporary location and back" at least twice; and the difficulty of scheduling trials for "a three[-]judge courthouse with only one courtroom that could accommodate a jury trial for almost a full year during this time."However, the court also found that another unspecified portion of the delay was caused by Ramirez's requests for the prison surveillance footage that allegedly depicted the assault.Specifically, the court found, "at least some portion of the delay … was due to [Ramirez] himself and "his insistence that...