State v. Ramirez

• Decision Date: 19 October 1976
• Docket Number: No. 2379,2379
• Citation: 89 N.M. 635,1976 NMCA 101,556 P.2d 43
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfredo B. RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

Page 43

556 P.2d 43

89 N.M. 635

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alfredo B. RAMIREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2379.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Oct. 19, 1976.

Bruce L. Herr, Acting Chief Public Defender, Sarah M. Singleton, Acting Appellate Defender, Don Klein, Asst. Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant

Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Albert V. Gonzales, Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

LOPEZ, Judge.

Defendant, Alfredo Balderrama Ramirez, appeals the verdict of a Dona Ana County jury finding him guilty of two counts of second degree murder. Section 40A--2--1B, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl. Vol. 6, 1972). We affirm.

The defendant asserts four points on appeal: lack of jurisdiction; error in the exclusion of tests conducted by the State police laboratory; error in refusing instructions to the jury concerning manslaughter; and error in the admission of a confession because not voluntary nor pursuant to a waiver of constitutional rights.

On a Spring night, April 24, 1974, at about 10:14 p.m. two bodies were discovered, one on each side of a dirt road in Anthony, New Mexico. Hector Carabajal and Francisco Padilla, shot at close range, were dead with multiple head wounds.

On December 2, 1974, the defendant was brought to the Roosevelt County jail in Portales after his arrest on murder charges. The deputy sheriff of Portales advised Ramirez of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

On December 4th, the defendant was picked up in Portales by the Las Cruces police and taken to the Dona Ana County jail. Prior to departure, the defendant was read his constitutional rights, both in Spanish and in English, and acknowledged that he understood. Later, during a motion to suppress, defendant denied having received the warnings prior to leaving Portales for Las Cruces. That afternoon, defendant was arraigned before a magistrate and in the courtroom was given Miranda rights in English and Spanish. Defendant requested appointed counsel so the court asked the arresting officer to help Ramirez fill out the necessary forms.

Soon after the December 4th arraignment, defendant indicated to officer Raymond Pantoja that he wanted to talk. Under-sheriff Edward DiMatteo testified that he spoke with the district court clerk to see whether counsel had been appointed, but the defendant did not insist on the presence of an attorney. Defendant was given his Miranda rights in Spanish and signed a constitutional rights notification certificate and waiver form before giving the statement. The statement was given in Spanish and was recorded on magnetic tape and taken into shorthand; subsequently, it was transcribed into English. The December 4th statement indicated no involvement with the murders.

Two days later, during his daily morning rounds of the jail, DiMatteo was informed by the defendant that he wanted to talk. DiMatteo was busy and forgot to get back to the defendant. Later that afternoon, Ramirez communicated to DiMatteo, through the jailer, that he wanted to talk. DiMatteo testified he informed the defendant to wait until an attorney was present, but Ramirez was insistent. DiMatteo testified he learned from the district court clerk that defendant had been appointed counsel. To no avail, he called the defense lawyer twice. Ramirez was given his Miranda rights, and again signed a Spanish waiver form. The procedure followed with the December 4th statement was repeated: the statement was recorded, transcribed, and translated into English. The December 6th statement told a highly incriminating story which effectively confessed the double crime.

At the suppression hearing, Ramirez stated he wanted to talk to the sheriff merely to contact his lawyer. The defendant stated he did not understand the full meaning of the Miranda warnings; in particular, he did not understand that his statements could be used against him. Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the December 4th and 6th statements to be introduced into evidence; both were given to the jury.

Voluntariness of Statements and Compliance with Miranda

Defendant asserts the trial court committed error by not suppressing the two statements as involuntary and not pursuant to a knowledgeable, intelligent waiver of rights. Voluntariness relates to the trustworthiness or reliability of the statements, whereas waiver of rights relates to the compliance with the strictures of Miranda. Miranda requires law enforcement officers, before questioning someone in custody, to give specified warnings and follow specified procedures during the course of an interrogation. Any statement given without compliance with these procedures cannot be admitted in evidence against the accused over his objection. This is true even if the statement is wholly voluntary. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).

At a hearing on a motion to suppress, evidence was introduced, briefs submitted, and oral argument taken on the issues of voluntariness and waiver. At the completion of this hearing, the trial court concluded the defendant's confession was:

'. . . legally obtained inasmuch as the (d)efendant, having been advised of his civil and constitutional rights and having understood the same, freely and voluntarily submitted to interrogation after knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to have counsel present during interrogation and to confer with counsel prior to being interrogated.' (Emphasis added).

The defendant questions this finding and contends that the statements should have been excluded.

In the search and seizure context the '. . . prime purpose (of an exclusionary rule) is to deter future unlawful police conduct . . ..' United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). This rationale may be applicable to the right against compulsory self-incrimination. As the Supreme Court has stated:

'The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in wilful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.' Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974).

Another purpose of an exclusionary rule is related to the quality of the evidence. Before Miranda the issue was framed in terms of whether the statement of the accused was 'voluntary,' which was used as a test for protecting the courts from relying on untrustworthy evidence. Where police conduct offends standards of fundamental fairness under the due process clause, the evidence is excluded.

First, Ramirez argues that his December 6th confession was made as the result of promises and inducements. There is no evidence that such were made. The only arguable coercive statements that appear on record are by the arresting officers asking the defendant to cooperate in booking and arraignment.

The right against self-incrimination must involve an element of coercion since the clause provides that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. We cannot find severe pressures or coercion so unfair or unreasonable rendering a subsequent confession involuntary and untrustworthy, or amounting to a denial of due process. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) (defendant held incommunicado); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (threat of mob violence); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 60 S.Ct. 1032, 84 L.Ed. 1342 (1940) (defendant whipped and kept incommunicado); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940) (all night interrogations lasting five days); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (confession extorted by brutality and violence). Ramirez was promptly arraigned, was not interrogated at length, and was told that he could terminate the questioning at will. The first statement was given on the day of arraignment, the second statement came two days thereafter. The statements were obtained in a manner indicating that they were given voluntarily within the meaning of fundamental fairness. Moreover, the deterrence of overzealous and unlawful police activity would not be served by the exclusion of the statements.

The trial court correctly submitted the statements to the jury after a specific finding of voluntariness. As stated in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964):

'. . . the jury passes on voluntariness only after the judge has fully and independently resolved the issue against the accused, the judge's conclusions are clearly evident from the record since he either admits the confession into the evidence if it is voluntary or rejects it if involuntary. Moreover, his findings upon disputed issues of fact are expressly stated or may be ascertainable from the record. . . .'

The Massachusetts rule, which is followed in New Mexico, was the procedure used in this case. The judge, on record, passed on the voluntariness and admissibility of the statements at the suppression hearing. The statements were then submitted to the jury with the following charge:

'. . . Before you consider confessions or statements for any purpose, you must determine that the confession or statement was given voluntarily. In determining whether a confession or statement was voluntarily given, you should consider if it was freely made and not induced by promise or threat.'

The defendant's argument that his statements were the product of promises and inducements was to be considered with all the conflicting evidence. It...