State v. Ramirez

• Decision Date: 25 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 102,421.,102,421.
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Michael RAMIREZ, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

299 Kan. 224

328 P.3d 1075

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Michael RAMIREZ, Appellant.

No. 102,421.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

April 25, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The complaint, or other charging document, is the jurisdictional instrument that delineates the district court's authority to convict a defendant of criminal offenses. Generally, a district court lacks jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a crime that was not contained in the charging document.

2. The jurisdictional rule prohibiting the conviction of a criminal defendant of an uncharged crime does not apply where a crime charged in the complaint, or other charging document, contains lesser included crimes as defined by K.S.A. 21–3107(2). Where a charged crime includes lesser included crimes, the defendant can be convicted of the charged crime or an uncharged lesser included crime, but not both.

3. The crime of criminal restraint constitutes a lesser degree of the crime of kidnapping, and, therefore, criminal restraint is a lesser included crime of kidnapping.

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Don L. Scott, county attorney, argued the cause, and Steve Six, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by JOHNSON, J.:

Michael Ramirez was charged with kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and endangering a child after breaking into a home and placing a 1–year–old child in a duffel bag, allegedly to kidnap the child. The jury convicted Ramirez on the aggravated burglary and endangering a child counts but opted to convict him of criminal restraint in lieu of the kidnapping count. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed Ramirez' conviction for the uncharged crime of criminal restraint based upon that crime being a lesser included offense of the charged crime of kidnapping. State v. Ramirez, No. 102,421, –––Kan.App.2d ––––, 2011 WL 2793219 (Kan.App.2011) (unpublished opinion). We granted review on the question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to convict Ramirez of criminal restraint as a lesser included offense. We agree with the concurring opinion of the Court of Appeals and hold that criminal restraint is a lesser degree of kidnapping and, therefore, constitutes a lesser included crime under K.S.A. 21–3107(2)(a). Accordingly, we affirm Ramirez' conviction for criminal restraint.

Factual and Procedural Overview

A detailed recitation of the circumstances giving rise to the kidnapping charge is unnecessary to resolve the purely legal question presented in this appeal. It is enough to know that early on the morning of February 20, 2007, the 1–year–old victim's mother discovered Ramirez in her child's bedroom and that Ramirez had placed her youngest child in a duffel bag, albeit the bag was not moved from the child's bedroom. The mother and her roommate, with whom Ramirez was acquainted, prevented Ramirez from leaving the dwelling until the police arrived to arrest him.

At the close of Ramirez' jury trial, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of kidnapping, which in relevant part were: “One, that the defendant took or confined [the child] by force, threat, or deception. That it was done with the intent to hold such person, to inflict bodily injury, or to terrorize the victim or another.” But, without any objection, the jury was also given a lesser included offense instruction on criminal restraint, the relevant elements of which were “that the defendant knowingly and without authority restrained [the child] so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.” The jury convicted Ramirez of the lesser crime of criminal restraint.

On appeal, Ramirez challenged the trial court's jurisdiction to convict him of the uncharged crime of criminal restraint. Specifically, Ramirez contended that under the strict elements test adopted in State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 505, 133 P.3d 48 (2006), criminal restraint is not a lesser included crime of kidnapping. Under the strict elements test, the abstract elements of a putative lesser crime are strictly compared to the abstract elements of the charged offense. To attain lesser included offense status under the strict elements test, all of the elements of the lesser crime must be identical to some of the elements of the charged crime. State v. Alderete, 285 Kan. 359, 362, 172 P.3d 27 (2007). Ramirez claimed that because criminal restraint contained an element not included within kidnapping, it was not a lesser included offense under Schoonover.

A majority of the three-judge Court of Appeals panel found criminal restraint to be a lesser included crime of kidnapping, albeit for different reasons. The principal opinion noted that the statutes defining kidnapping and criminal restraint use different language to describe the prohibited conduct. But the judge opined that the meaning of the language is identical for purposes of doing a Schoonover comparison. Ramirez, 2011 WL 2793219, at *9. Specifically, the judge found that the phrase “ ‘so as to interfere substantially with such person's liberty’ ” in the criminal restraint statute is equivalent to the kidnapping statute's prohibition of “ ‘taking or confining a person, accomplished by force, threat or deception,’ ” making all of criminal restraint's elements identical to some of kidnapping's elements. 2011 WL 2793219, at *9. That opinion also noted that even after Schoonover, our Supreme Court had recognized criminal restraint as a lesser included crime of kidnapping in State v. Simmons, 282 Kan. 728, 742, 148 P.3d 525 (2006). Ramirez, 2011 WL 2793219, at *10.

The concurring opinion found it unnecessary to compare elements because criminal restraint is a lesser degree of the crime of kidnapping. Pursuant to K.S.A. 21–3107(2)(a), a lesser degree of a crime is defined as a lesser included crime. 2011 WL 2793219, at *13–14 (Atcheson, J., concurring).

Dissenting in part, Chief Judge Greene employed the same strict elements test used by the majority opinion but reached a different result. The dissent read the criminal restraint statute as requiring two elements not included in the statutory definition of kidnapping, namely, that the confinement be “ ‘without legal authority’ ” and “ ‘so as to interfere substantially with such person's liberty.’ ” 2011 WL 2793219, at *11 (Greene, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the dissent noted that criminal restraint can be accomplished without force, fear, or threat, at least one of which is required by the statutory definition of kidnapping. Accordingly, the dissent would have held that all of the elements of criminal restraint are not identical to some of the elements of kidnapping; therefore, criminal restraint is not a lesser included crime of kidnapping; and, consequently, Ramirez' conviction for the uncharged offense of criminal restraint should be reversed. 2011 WL 2793219, at *11–13 (Greene, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

We granted Ramirez' petition for review to address the lesser included crime issue.

Criminal Restraint Is a Lesser Included Crime of Kidnapping

Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Snelling, 266 Kan. 986, 988, 975 P.2d 259 (1999). Likewise, whether a crime is a lesser included offense of another crime is a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Parks, 294 Kan. 785, 802, 280 P.3d 766 (2012).

Analysis

Ramirez was charged with kidnapping but convicted of criminal restraint. Generally, a district court lacks jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a crime that was not charged in the complaint. The complaint, or other charging document, is the jurisdictional instrument that delineates the district court's authority to convict a defendant of the crimes set forth in the charging document. Carmichael v. State, 255 Kan. 10, 12, 872 P.2d 240 (1994). “ ‘An information is the only vehicle by which a court obtains its jurisdiction, and is a limit upon that jurisdiction. Therefore, where the information charges no crime, the court lacks jurisdiction to try the accused.’ ” 255 Kan. at 13, 872 P.2d 240 (quoting 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law § 157, p. 188).

Procedural due process also requires that a criminal defendant have notice of the specific charges asserted against him or her so that the defendant has an opportunity to defend against the stated charges. See Wisner v. State, 216 Kan. 523, 524, 532 P.2d 1051 (1975). Therefore, convicting a defendant of a charge not contained in the complaint and not properly before the district court is a clear violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Chatmon, 234 Kan. 197, 205, 671 P.2d 531 (1983).

K.S.A. 21–3107 provides an exception to the rule that a defendant can only be convicted of the specific crime charged in the complaint. It states that a defendant may be “convicted of either the crime charged or a lesser included crime, but not both.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21–3107(2). The statute codifies the common-law rule that when an indictment charges an offense that includes within it a lesser offense or an offense of a lower degree of the same general class, the accused may be convicted of the lesser offense. 4 Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 1799 (1957); see State v. Terreso, 56 Kan. 126, 128, 42 P. 354 (1895). The presumed rationale for this exception is that the charging of the greater offense satisfies the notice requirements for the lesser offense and the defendant is therefore afforded due process. See State v. Daniels, 223 Kan. 266, 271–72, 573 P.2d 607 (1977).

Here, because Ramirez was not charged with criminal restraint, the only means by which the district court could have obtained jurisdiction to convict him of that crime is as a lesser included offense of the charged crime of kidnapping. K.S.A....