State v. Ramos

Decision Date12 January 2017
Docket NumberNo. 92454-6,92454-6
Citation187 Wash.2d 420,387 P.3d 650
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joel Rodriguez RAMOS, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave., Ste. 701, Seattle, WA, 98101-3647, David L. Donnan, Meryhew Law Group, 600 1st Ave., Ste. 512, Seattle, WA, 98104-2253, for Petitioner.

Gretchen Eileen Verhoef, Spokane County Prosecutor's Office, 1100 W. Mallon Ave., Spokane, WA, 99260-0270, Kenneth L. Ramm Jr., Joseph Anthony Brusic, Yakima County Prosecutor's Office, 128 N. 2nd St., Rm. 329, Yakima, WA, 98901-2621, for Respondent.

Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, 705 2nd Ave., Ste. 1300, Seattle, WA, 98104-1797, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.

Suzanne Lee Elliott, Attorney at Law, 705 2nd Ave., Ste. 1300, Seattle, WA, 98104-1797, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Lawyers.

George Yeannakis, Office of Public Defense, P.O. Box 40957, Olympia, WA, 98504-0957, Marsha L. Levick, Juvenile Law Center, 1315 Walnut Street, Suite 400, 4th Floor, Philadelphia, PA, 19107, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Juvenile Law Center.

Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, 901 5th Ave., Ste. 630, Seattle, WA, 98164-2008, Marc Allen Boman, David A. Perez, Mica Dawn Simpson, Perkins Coie LLP, 1201 3rd Ave., Ste. 4900, Seattle, WA, 98101-3099, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

Robert S. Chang, Lorraine K. Bannai, Jessica Levin, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, Seattle, WA, 98122-4411, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality.

Ann E. Benson, WA Defender's Assoc., 110 Prefontaine Pl. S., Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98104-2626, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.

Melissa R. Lee, Seattle University School of Law, 901 12th Ave., Korematsu Center For Law & Equality, Seattle, WA, 98122-4411, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Columbia Legal Services.

YU, J.

¶1 When a juvenile offender is sentenced in adult court, youth matters on a constitutional level. Even for homicide offenses, "mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment." Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (citing U.S. CONST. amend VIII ). Therefore, where a convicted juvenile offender faces a possible life-without-parole sentence, the sentencing court must conduct an individualized hearing and "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 2469. This individualized Miller hearing "gives effect to Miller 's substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity." Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 735, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).

¶2 As a juvenile homicide offender facing a de facto life-without-parole sentence, petitioner Joel Rodriguez Ramos was entitled to a Miller hearing, just as a juvenile homicide offender facing a literal life-without-parole sentence would be. Based on the record presented, we hold that Ramos did receive a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing and he has not shown that his aggregated 85-year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. We decline to engage in an independent state constitutional analysis because the issue is inadequately briefed. We further hold that the State did not breach the plea agreement, and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals in result.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The basic facts of Ramos' offenses are undisputed:

Mr. Ramos and his friend, Miguel Gaitan, both 14, broke into the Skelton family home on March 24, 1993. They were armed with knives. Mr. Michael Skelton, who was disabled, confronted the burglars and was stabbed and beaten to death by the two young men. Mr. Gaitan then attacked and killed Mrs. Lynn Skelton in the bathroom shower. He stabbed her 51 times and also beat her with a baseball bat. Twelve-year-old Jason Skelton went to his mother's aid. Gaitan killed him as well; Jason's body was found near his mother's.
The two young men searched the house for items to steal. They found six-year-old Bryan Skelton in his bedroom and told the youngster to go to sleep. They pulled the bedcovers over his head, and Mr. Ramos then hit Bryan in the head with a piece of firewood, fracturing his skull. Bryan was also stabbed in the heart. Mr. Ramos later told the court that he killed Bryan in order to prevent him from identifying the two assailants.

State v . Ramos , 152 Wash.App. 684, 687–88, 217 P.3d 384 (2009) (footnote omitted). In his statement on plea of guilty, Ramos stated that "at one point, I ran outside. But then I ran back in. Later while inside I picked up a piece of firewood and hit Brian Skelton in the head with it so he could not identify us later." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 80. A juvenile detention employee overheard Gaitan tell another detainee "that it was a gang initiation and that they were to burglarize the house. If anybody was there, they were supposed to take care of them." 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 49.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 In August 1993, Ramos pleaded guilty in superior court to one count of first degree premeditated murder for the death of Bryan Skelton and three counts of first degree felony murder for the deaths of Michael, Lynn, and Jason Skelton.1 "Both parties recommended that the court impose the minimum possible sentence—consecutive 240 month terms on each count." Ramos , 152 Wash.App. at 689, 217 P.3d 384. Although the sentencing court opined "that the murder of Bryan Skelton deserved more than 240 months, the court nonetheless imposed the requested sentence." Id. Ramos' term of total confinement was thus 960 months (80 years). CP at 15.

¶5 Thirteen years later, Ramos filed both an appeal and a personal restraint petition (PRP). After this court ordered the Court of Appeals to proceed with the appeal as though it were timely filed, the Court of Appeals rejected Ramos' appeal on the merits and dismissed his PRP. This court granted review only as to the community placement term of Ramos' sentence, and "remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of State v. Broadaway , 133 Wash.2d 118, 942 P.2d 363 (1997)." Order, State v. Ramos , 168 Wash.2d 1025, 230 P.3d 576 (2010). The Court of Appeals in turn remanded to the trial court for clarification of the " ‘period of community placement required by law.’ " State v. Ramos , noted at 156 Wash.App. 1041, 2010 WL 2487831, at *2 (quoting Broadaway , 133 Wash.2d at 136, 942 P.2d 363 ). Ramos again petitioned this court for review, and in a per curiam opinion, this court held that the trial court was required to exercise discretion in order to comply with the Court of Appeals decision, and that "Ramos, therefore, has a right to be present and heard at resentencing." State v. Ramos , 171 Wash.2d 46, 49, 246 P.3d 811 (2011).

¶6 By the time Ramos' case was remanded for resentencing, the original sentencing judge had retired. A new judge conducted Ramos' resentencing, at which Ramos argued for an exceptional sentence below the standard range, with his 20-year sentences on each count "to run concurrently rather than consecutively." State v. Ramos , No. 30279–2–III, slip op. at 4, 2013 WL 1628255 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2013) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/302792.pdf. The resentencing court believed that it did not have authority to consider an exceptional sentence downward and denied Ramos' request. Ramos appealed.

¶7 The Court of Appeals noted that the procedural history "presented the trial court, and now us, with a uniquely complex set of issues." Id. at 6. It ultimately concluded that the sentencing court abused its discretion in determining that it did not have the authority to consider Ramos' arguments for an exceptional sentence. Therefore, the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing but noted that

[w]e do not mean to express a view on how the trial court should exercise its discretion. Mr. Ramos committed a heinous crime. The appropriate sentence is the trial court's domain. We only point out that Mr. Ramos has presented real reasons why a court might choose to reduce his sentence. He should have the opportunity to have his request considered with the correct law in mind.

Id. at 35.

¶8 The matter currently on review is Ramos' second resentencing, which was held before a third judge. Ramos presented evidence and argument supporting an exceptional sentence below the standard range, specifically "asking for the three felony murder convictions to be run concurrently," 2 RP at 156, resulting in a total aggregate sentence of 320 months (26 years and 8 months), id. at 158. The State presented its own evidence and argument opposing an exceptional sentence, and asked that the court "deny the exceptional sentence and just reaffirm the sentence of 80 years." Id. at 144. However, the State acknowledged the court's authority to impose a different sentence within the standard range or an exceptional sentence downward.

¶9 The court denied Ramos' request for an exceptional sentence and imposed a sentence near the bottom of the standard range: 20-year sentences for each of the three felony murder convictions and a 25-year sentence for the premeditated murder of Bryan Skelton, all to run consecutively, for a total of 85 years. Ramos appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion, reasoning that Miller applies to literal life-without-parole sentences but not to de facto life-without-parole sentences resulting from aggregate consecutive sentences for multiple homicides. State v. Ramos , 189 Wash.App. 431, 452, 357 P.3d 680 (2015). We granted Ramos' petition for review. State v . Ramos , 185 Wash.2d 1009, 367 P.3d 1083 (20...

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