State v. Ramseur

Decision Date05 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. 388A10,388A10
Citation843 S.E.2d 106,374 N.C. 658
Parties STATE of North Carolina v. Andrew Darrin RAMSEUR
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Daniel K. Shatz and Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellant.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Jonathan P. Babb and Danielle Marquis Elder, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for the State-appellee.

Cassandra Stubbs, for ACLU Capital Punishment Project, Burton Craige, Raleigh, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, and James Coleman and Irv Joyner, for North Carolina Conference of the NAACP, amici curiae.

EARLS, Justice.

Defendant, Andrew Darrin Ramseur, was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 2010. After his trial, defendant filed a motion seeking relief pursuant to the newly enacted North Carolina Racial Justice Act on the basis that race was a significant factor in the decision to seek or impose the death penalty in his case. Before the trial court ruled on defendant's motion, the General Assembly amended the Racial Justice Act in 2012 and then, in 2013, repealed the Racial Justice Act in its entirety. The trial court determined that this repeal rendered defendant's pending motion void and therefore dismissed defendant's Racial Justice Act claims. Here we are asked to decide the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the repeal of the Racial Justice Act. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that applying the repeal retroactively violates the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws, and therefore we reverse the trial court.

Background

On 31 December 2007, defendant was indicted for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon in connection with the 16 December 2007 murders of Jennifer Lee Vincek and Jeffrey Robert Peck. On the same day, the State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty in defendant's case. Before trial, on 7 December 2009, defendant filed a "Motion for Change of Venue" based upon allegations of prejudice stemming from pre-trial publicity and racial tensions in Iredell County that were exacerbated by the fact that he was a black defendant accused of killing two white victims. In his motion, defendant alleged that the likelihood of a death sentence in Iredell County and the surrounding area was greater because of, inter alia , substantial pre-trial publicity and public comments including: the distribution to media outlets of surveillance footage of the crime, inflammatory media coverage of the case, and the prevalence of overtly racist comments and discussion on community internet blogs and websites. On a similar basis, defendant simultaneously filed a "Motion to Continue Trial to Investigate Claim Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act" to examine whether the decision to seek the death penalty was free from racial discrimination.

The North Carolina Racial Justice Act (the RJA, or the Original RJA) was ratified by the General Assembly on 6 August 2009 and provided that "[n]o person shall be subject to or given a sentence of death or shall be executed pursuant to any judgment that was sought or obtained on the basis of race." North Carolina Racial Justice Act, S.L. 2009-464, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1213, 1214 [hereinafter Original RJA] (codified at N.C.G.S. § 15A-2010 (2009) ) (repealed 2013). The RJA implemented a hearing procedure authorizing a defendant to raise an RJA claim either at the Rule 24 pretrial conference or in postconviction proceedings. Id. , § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214–15. Upon the filing of an RJA claim, the RJA mandated that "[t]he court shall schedule a hearing on the claim and shall prescribe a time for the submission of evidence by both parties." Id. , § 1, N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214. With respect to the evidence required to establish racial discrimination, the RJA placed the burden of proof on the defendant and provided, in pertinent part:

(a) A finding that race was the basis of the decision to seek or impose a death sentence may be established if the court finds that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed.
(b) Evidence relevant to establish a finding that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed may include statistical evidence or other evidence, including, but not limited to, sworn testimony of attorneys, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, jurors, or other members of the criminal justice system or both, that, irrespective of statutory factors, one or more of the following applies:
(1) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more frequently upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race.
(2) Death sentences were sought or imposed significantly more frequently as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one race than as punishment of capital offenses against persons of another race.
(3) Race was a significant factor in decisions to exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection.

Id. , § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214. When a defendant meets his evidentiary burden, and it is not successfully rebutted by the State, the RJA prescribes a remedy distinct to RJA claims:

If the court finds that race was a significant factor in decisions to seek or impose the sentence of death in the county, the prosecutorial district, the judicial division, or the State at the time the death sentence was sought or imposed, the court shall order that a death sentence not be sought, or that the death sentence imposed by the judgment shall be vacated and the defendant resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Id. , § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214. The General Assembly provided that the RJA "applies retroactively" and that for defendants sentenced to death prior to the RJA's effective date, "motions under this act shall be filed within one year of the effective date of this act." Id. , § 2, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1215.

Following hearings on 14 and 18 December 2009, the trial court denied defendant's motion for change of venue and defendant's motion to continue for RJA-related discovery. Defendant's trial began during the 10 May 2010 criminal session of Superior Court, Iredell County. On 11 May 2010, defendant made an oral motion to modify the courtroom arrangement objecting to the fact that when the parties arrived for trial, the first four rows directly behind the defense table were cordoned off by yellow crime scene tape. After the trial court denied his oral motion, defendant filed a written motion the following day alleging that this quarantining of the area behind the defense table effectively segregated the courtroom by race and forced defendant's family to sit in the back of the courtroom behind the crime scene tape while others, including white members of the victims’ families, were able to sit in the front of the courtroom behind the prosecution table. The trial court ordered that the crime scene tape be removed but required that three rows behind the defense table remain vacant.

During jury selection, defendant twice objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The trial court denied both of defendant's Batson challenges. Defendant also renewed his motions to change venue and to continue for RJA-related discovery, noting that all twelve jurors selected to hear the case were white, and that all black potential jurors had been excused. The trial court denied these motions. On 28 May 2010, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of all charges. On 7 June 2010, following a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended defendant be sentenced to death for each murder conviction. On 8 June 2010, the trial court sentenced defendant to death for each murder charge and to 61 to 83 months imprisonment for robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant gave notice of appeal to this Court.

Following his trial, on 10 August 2010, defendant filed a post-conviction motion for appropriate relief (MAR) under the RJA in both the trial court and in this Court. On 7 September 2010, this Court entered an order dismissing without prejudice defendant's MAR filed in this Court and staying further proceedings in defendant's direct appeal "until after the trial court's hearing and determination of defendant's Motion for Appropriate Relief Pursuant to the Racial Justice Act filed in Superior Court, Iredell County." State v. Ramseur , 364 N.C. 433, 702 S.E.2d 62 (2010).

On 21 June 2012, following a ruling in an RJA case in Cumberland County, State v. Robinson , No. 91 CRS 23143, Order Granting Motion for Appropriate Relief (Superior Court, Cumberland County, Apr. 20, 2012), vacated by 368 N.C. 596, 780 S.E.2d 151 (2015), and before the trial court ruled on defendant's pending RJA motion, the General Assembly passed a new law substantially amending the RJA (the Amended RJA). An Act to Amend Death Penalty Procedures, S.L. 2012-136, §§ 1–10, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 471 [hereinafter Amended RJA] (repealed 2013). Under the Amended RJA, the trial court was not automatically required to hold an evidentiary hearing upon the filing of an RJA claim. Compare Original RJA, § 1, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1214 ("The court shall schedule a hearing on the claim and shall prescribe a time for the submission of evidence by both parties."), with Amended RJA, § 3, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 472 (enacting N.C.G.S. § 15A-2011(f)(2) (Supp. 2012)) ("If the court finds that the defendant's motion fails to state a sufficient claim under this Article, then ...

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9 cases
  • State v. Robinson
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • August 14, 2020
    ...defendant's conviction or the imposition of his capital sentence.Although I dissented from this Court's holding in State v. Ramseur , 374 N.C. 658, 843 S.E.2d 106 (2020), that case plainly controls the outcome here. It holds that the General Assembly's repeal of the RJA does not apply retro......
  • State v. Richardson
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • September 1, 2023
    ...the "most serious and irrevocable of our state's criminal punishments" is imposed through fair and just proceedings, see State v. Ramseur, 374 N.C. 658, 686 (2020), I would remand for a new sentencing hearing. II. Conclusion I concur with the results of the majority affirming the jury's ver......
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    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 5, 2020
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    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 5, 2020
    ... ... Thus, we disregard this particular portion of Finding of Fact 27. Respondent next challenges the portions of Finding of Fact 28 that state that respondent "specifically refused" to submit to drug screens on 29 March 2018 and 27 June 2018. As to the 29 March 2018 drug screen, respondent ... ...
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