State v. Ramsey
| Decision Date | 22 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 20040035.,20040035. |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Terry RAMSEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Jonathan R. Byers, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D. for plaintiff and appellee.
TaLisa Nemec (argued), law graduate, and Kenneth B. Bulie, Grand Forks, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1] Terry Ramsey appeals a criminal judgment and commitment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of Gross Sexual Imposition, a class A felony, for engaging in sexual contact with a female under the age of 15 years. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Terry Ramsey ("Ramsey") and his brother Neil Ramsey ("Neil") were separated in childhood from their half-sister. The brothers were reunited with their sister and her two daughters in the late 1990's and began to spend time together as a family. In mid-June of 2001, one of the daughters, ("Jane," a pseudonym), then age 10, and her sister spent a week with Ramsey and his brother at the Ramsey family farm in North Dakota. On June 16, the girls returned to their home in Wyoming for a few weeks before joining Ramsey and his family at their home in Florida on July 4, 2001.
[¶ 3] While in Florida, Ramsey's wife, Valerie Ramsey ("Valerie"), discovered Ramsey in a locked bathroom with Jane. Ramsey was touching Jane's vaginal area while applying a yeast infection medication that she frequently applied to herself without assistance. Valerie confronted Ramsey, and after a brief argument, Ramsey left the family home. The next day, Jane told Valerie that Ramsey had touched her breasts and vagina on more than one occasion during the week she spent in North Dakota. Jane said that Ramsey explained the touching by claiming he thought Jane was his wife and that he told her if she told anyone she would not be allowed to travel to Florida.
[¶ 4] Valerie then notified Jane's mother, who asked that Valerie report the situation to the local police. Both the North Dakota and Florida incidents were reported to local authorities in Florida, including a deputy sheriff and a sex crimes investigator. After being advised to do so by officials in Florida, Jane's mother reported the situation to the appropriate authorities in North Dakota. A warrant was issued in North Dakota, and Ramsey was arrested.
[¶ 5] Ramsey signed a written plea agreement causing the cancellation of his initial trial scheduled for March 2003. At the July 14, 2003, sentencing hearing, however, Ramsey refused to plead guilty and the trial was rescheduled for December 2003. Ramsey was tried by a jury in December 2003. In addition to Jane's own testimony, the trial court allowed Jane's mother, Jane's aunt, a Florida deputy sheriff, and a Florida sex crimes investigator to testify as to what Jane had told them about Ramsey's actions. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
[¶ 6] On appeal, Ramsey challenges his conviction, arguing the trial court committed reversible error in its pretrial evidentiary motions and violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. Ramsey argues the trial court decision to allow Jane's hearsay statements was in error because the court did not set forth explicit findings regarding the circumstances, time, content, and place as required by N.D.R.Ev. 803(24) and applicable case law. Ramsey contends that allowing the hearsay testimony affected his procedural rights to a fair trial because the words of the victim were "bolstered" by presenting them through her mother, her aunt, and subsequent interviewers of the child. Ramsey further argues that the trial court's admittance of evidence regarding his contact with the victim in Florida is reversible error because the prejudicial effect of his subsequent actions far outweighed the probative value.
[¶ 7] Ramsey also argues that by not allowing evidence of a prior rape committed by her step-brother, the trial court denied him an opportunity to confront Jane. Ramsey contends that the previous sexual abuse suffered by Jane produced feelings of shame and guilt on her part, consequently causing her to "instigate and fabricate" the allegations against him in order to rid herself of the blame for the chaos in the family caused by this situation. Without the opportunity to present this evidence, Ramsey asserts his ability to fully confront his accuser was hindered.
[¶ 8] Ramsey argues the trial court committed reversible error in two of its pretrial evidentiary rulings, thereby admitting testimony affecting his substantial rights under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. A trial court abuses its discretion in evidentiary rulings when it acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law. State v. Messner, 1998 ND 151, ¶ 13, 583 N.W.2d 109 (citing State v. Christensen, 1997 ND 57, ¶ 5, 561 N.W.2d 631). An error affecting a defendant's substantial rights is reversible error. In the Interest of F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 206 (N.D.1979).
[¶ 9] The first error, according to Ramsey, occurred when the trial court admitted Jane's out-of-court statements through the testimony of her mother, her aunt, a Florida deputy sheriff, and a Florida sex offender/child abuse investigator under N.D.R.Ev. 803(24). Ramsey contends the purpose of Rule 803(24) is to assist the prosecution when an available witness is unable to testify to the details of abuse during trial. State v. Hirschkorn, 2002 ND 36, ¶ 11, 640 N.W.2d 439.
[¶ 10] Rule 803(24), N.D.R.Ev., provides:
[¶ 11] Ramsey argues that because the trial court failed, under N.D.R.Ev. 803(24), to set forth explicit findings regarding the time, content, and circumstances of the hearsay statements that provided sufficient guarantees of its trustworthiness, the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and allowing the jury to hear it was an abuse of discretion affecting his substantial rights. Hirschkorn, 2002 ND 36, ¶ 13, 640 N.W.2d 439. Ramsey contends that the trial court was aware Jane had restated her allegations consistently during previous interrogations and interviews, and thus, the use of the Rule 803(24) hearsay exception in this case is inconsistent with the original purpose of the rule. Consequently, according to Ramsey, allowing this testimony only serves to bolster Jane's testimony rather than supplement it.
[¶ 12] Ramsey, however, never renewed his hearsay objections to this testimony during trial except for the testimony of Valerie Ramsey. We have held that even if a defendant objects at the pretrial hearing on a N.D.R.Ev. 803(24) motion, failure to object at trial to the testimony of a child victim's out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse limits our inquiry to determining whether its admission into evidence constitutes obvious error affecting substantial rights under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Hirschkorn, 2002 ND 36, ¶ 6, 640 N.W.2d 439 (citing State v. Wiest, 2001 ND 150, ¶ 6, 632 N.W.2d 812). In order to establish obvious error, the defendant must show "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights." Hirschkorn, at ¶ 6. "An alleged error does not constitute obvious error unless there is a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law." Id. "This Court will not set aside a correct result merely because the district court assigned an incorrect reason, if the result is the same under the correct law and reasoning." Cannaday v. Cannaday, 2003 ND 58, ¶ 8, 659 N.W.2d 363.
[¶ 13] We conclude that while the testimony of Jane's mother, her aunt, the Florida deputy sheriff, and the Florida sex offender/child abuse investigator was admitted by the trial court under N.D.R.Ev. 803(24), the Florida contact would have been admissible under N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1)(ii). Rule 801(d)(1)(ii), N.D.R.Ev., in pertinent part, states:
A statement is not hearsay if:
[¶ 14] In his pretrial motion in opposition to admitting this testimony, Ramsey argued that N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1)(ii) was not applicable because it could only be used when the testimony was "offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive" and because he had presented "absolutely" no evidence of such a charge.
[¶ 15] It is true that at the pretrial motion hearing Ramsey had not yet raised the argument or implied that Jane's statements to her mother, her aunt, the Florida deputy sheriff, and the Florida sex offender/child abuse investigator were fabrications. Beginning with his opening statement and throughout the trial, however, Ramsey argued, both directly and impliedly, that Jane's version of events was a fabrication resulting from improper influence and motive. Therefore, once Ramsey argued that improper influence and motive caused Jane to fabricate her allegations, Rule 801(d)(1)(ii) became applicable.
[¶ 16] We conclude the...
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