State v. Randall, 71136
| Decision Date | 21 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 71136,71136 |
| Citation | 894 P.2d 196,257 Kan. 482 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Ronald RANDALL, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Mislabeled pro se motions for sentence conversion under K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724 may be considered as K.S.A. 60-1507 motions.
2. Where the district court has dismissed a pro se K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724 motion for sentence conversion for lack of jurisdiction and where the substantive contention asserted in the motion raises purely a question of law, a remand by the appellate court to the district court is unnecessary.
3. In an appeal from the dismissal of a defendant's pro se motion for sentence conversion under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, the record is reviewed and it is held: (1) The district court incorrectly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and (2) defendant's K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724 motion for sentence conversion is considered as a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion and denied.
Hazel Haupt, Asst. Appellate Defender, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, were on the brief, for appellant.
Jerome A. Gorman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Nick A. Tomasic, Dist. Atty., and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., were on the brief, for appellee.
This is a jurisdiction case arising from the application of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4701 et seq. Ronald Randall appeals from the district court's dismissal of his pro se motion for conversion to a guidelines sentence under the retroactivity provision of the Act. The district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review the motion, reasoning that Randall should have sought relief under K.S.A. 60-1507 (motion attacking sentence) or K.S.A. 60-1501 ().
Randall's motion raises only questions of law. Our standard of review is unlimited. Gillespie v. Seymour, 250 Kan. 123, 129, 823 [257 Kan. 483] P.2d 782 (1991). Although we hold the district court had jurisdiction, we need not remand for the district court to consider the merits of Randall's motion. We construe Randall's motion as a properly filed 60-1507 motion and dispose of it on the merits under Chiles v. State, 254 Kan. 888, 869 P.2d 707, cert. denied 513 U.S. 850, 115 S.Ct. 149, 130 L.Ed.2d 88 (1994).
In May 1979, a jury found Randall guilty of aggravated robbery, K.S.A. 21-3427. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Randall, No. 51,191, unpublished opinion filed June 14, 1980, 612 P.2d 1244. Randall remains incarcerated.
The Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act took effect on July 1, 1993. The Act was made retroactive for a limited class of "less serious" prior offenders. See K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724; Chiles, 254 Kan. at 901, 869 P.2d 707.
Randall filed a pro se "motion for hearing regarding conversion of sentence under Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act." The motion stated it was "pursuant to [K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724] and objects to the Sentencing Guidelines Report prepared by the Secretary of Corrections." Randall requested retroactive conversion to a guidelines sentence, which would make him eligible for release. He contended that the legislature intended retroactivity to apply to him or, alternatively, that equal protection rules required it. He further contended that the Department of Corrections (DOC) erred in computing his criminal history. He did not allege any error in the DOC's assessment of the applicable severity level for his 1979 crime.
Randall filed his motion in Wyandotte County, where he had been convicted and sentenced. The motion was docketed and set for hearing, and counsel was appointed. When Randall's motion came on for hearing, the district judge explained that he had no "court file" for Randall and he "didn't know what to do with the case."
The State explained that Randall's 1979 crime, aggravated robbery, would be a severity level 3 crime, K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-3427, if he was sentenced under the guidelines. That fact, alone, excluded Randall from the pool of inmates eligible for retroactivity under K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724(b)(1). Thus, while the DOC notified Randall (through a "notification of findings," presumably, but no such notice is in the record) that he was ineligible for conversion--prompting Randall's motion--the DOC was not required by statute to issue Randall a "sentencing guidelines report" under K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724(c)(1). Counsel for Randall confirmed that the DOC had not issued a sentencing guidelines report in the instant case.
The State argued that since no sentencing guidelines report had been filed, Randall had no statutory right to file a motion for conversion challenging the DOC's findings or the constitutionality of the guidelines under K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724(d)(1). Because Randall's motion was styled as a motion under 21-4724(d)(1), the State argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
The district court agreed with the State that Randall had no right to file a motion regarding conversion to a guidelines sentence under K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724(d)(l ). The judge concluded Randall's "proper procedural steps would be to bring this pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1501 or 1507." The district court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction.
The issue is whether the district court properly dismissed Randall's motion for lack of jurisdiction or whether it should have construed the motion liberally and exercised jurisdiction. We favor the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. The answer to the jurisdiction issue, however, will have no bearing on the relief Randall seeks. Randall's only substantive contention is that the limited retroactivity provision in the guidelines is unconstitutional. He relies on the arguments addressed and rejected in Chiles, 254 Kan. 888, 869 P.2d 707. Randall advocates overturning Chiles. We are not persuaded by his argument.
K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724(c)(1) required the DOC to review every inmate as of July 1, 1993, to determine who was eligible for conversion to a guidelines sentence. For inmates deemed eligible, the DOC was ordered to "prepare a sentencing guidelines report ... which shall review and determine what the person's sentence as provided by the [sentencing guidelines] would be as if the crime were committed on or after July 1, 1993." 21-4724(c)(1) (Emphasis added). The legislature required the DOC to send a copy of the report to the inmate, the county or district attorney where the inmate was sentenced, and the sentencing court. 21-4724(c)(1).
After setting a time frame within which the DOC was to "complete and submit to the appropriate parties the report on all imprisoned inmates" deemed eligible for conversion, 21-4724(c)(5)-(7), the legislature provided the right to judicial review of DOC reports:
"Within 30 days of the issuance of such report, the person who committed the crime and the prosecution officer shall have the right to request a hearing by filing a motion with the sentencing court, regarding conversion to a sentence under the Kansas sentencing guidelines act to be held in the jurisdiction where the original criminal case was filed." K.S.A.1994 Supp. 21-4724(d)(1). (Emphasis added.)
Under 21-4724(d)(2), the sentencing court would then "determine...
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