State v. Randles

Decision Date16 January 1990
Docket Number18194,Nos. 18193,s. 18193
Citation117 Idaho 344,787 P.2d 1152
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gary RANDLES and Sue Ernst, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Dan J. Rude, Coeur d'Alene, for defendants-appellants.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., argued, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

McDEVITT, Justice.

The home shared by Gary Randles and Sue Ernst was searched pursuant to a warrant on August 26, 1983. Inside the residence officers found the following items of contraband: a paper bag holding seven sandwich bags containing approximately one ounce of marijuana apiece, a finger scale atop a box of clear sandwich bags, six paper bags and a glass jar containing loose marijuana leaves, two drying trays containing marijuana, a tray containing loose marijuana, marijuana cigarette butts, rolling papers, a paper bag containing marijuana stems, a film canister filled with what appeared to be marijuana seeds on a hutch in the kitchen, and a baggie containing an unspecified quantity of marijuana in a purse in the kitchen.

Twenty immature marijuana plants were found outside, in a greenhouse attached to the residence. There was testimony that the plants were well cared for, and Officer Rankin testified as to what the plants would be worth if they had been allowed to mature.

Randles and Ernst were charged with manufacture of marijuana and possession with intent to deliver, and they were both convicted of each count by a jury in the District Court. The convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeals.

Defendants argue on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to sustain their convictions, and challenge the jury instructions given at trial concerning evidence sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver. For the reasons set out below, we do not find it necessary to reach other issues raised by appellants concerning the application of I.C. § 18-301, and the propriety of testimony concerning the future value of the growing marijuana plants.

I. Manufacture of Marijuana

Under I.C. § 37-2701(r), the term "manufacture" is broad, and includes not only production or propagation, but also packaging or repackaging a controlled substance. Under this definition, the manufacturing charge might have been based on the growing marijuana in the greenhouse, or the marijuana that was put into sandwich bags inside the residence. The jury instructions narrowed the definition of "manufacture," however, to the production ("manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting") or propagation of a controlled substance. Thus, the only question before us is whether the growing plants in the greenhouse were sufficient to sustain a conviction of manufacture against the defendants. We hold that they are not.

This case involves premises which were shared by both defendants. Even if we assume that they are the only two people who had access to the greenhouse, there is no evidence in the record as to which of the two was guilty of the act of manufacture. It is a fundamental principal of our system of justice that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt against each individual defendant. Delgado v. United States, 327 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.1964); State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct.App.1986). In this case, no evidence was produced at trial of fingerprints, footprints, or any other physical evidence which would have connected either defendant to the cultivation activity in the greenhouse. Without such evidence, we are unable to sustain the conviction of either defendant for manufacturing marijuana.

The State argues that both defendants may be convicted of manufacture, since it is obvious that at least one overtly cultivated the plants, and that the other could not have been ignorant of this activity. The reasoning is that even if one defendant did not actually help to cultivate the plants, he or she is equally guilty of the substantive offense as an accomplice for aiding and abetting in the cultivation.

It is true that one who aids and abets a crime is guilty as a principal. I.C. § 18-204. However, "aiding and abetting" requires some proof that the accused either participated in or assisted, encouraged, solicited, or counseled the crime. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1938); Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.1952); State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274, 42 A.L.R.3d 1061 (1970). Mere knowledge of a crime and assent to or acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability. State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 655 P.2d 99 (Ct.App.1983); State v. Sensenig, 95 Idaho 218, 506 P.2d 115 (1973); State v. Schrag, 21 Or.App. 655, 536 P.2d 461 (1975); Morrison v. State, 518 P.2d 1279 (Okl.Cr.1974). Failure to disclose the occurrence of a crime to authorities is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 23 S.Ct. 42, 47 L.Ed. 100 (1902); State v. Grant, 26 Idaho 189, 140 P. 959 (1914). Rather, under the Idaho Criminal Code, failure to report a felony makes a person guilty only as an accessory, not as an accomplice. I.C. § 18-205. Neither defendant was charged with being an accessory in this case.

There is sufficient evidence to infer that if only one party was cultivating the marijuana, the other must have at least known of the activity. Yet there is no evidence to show which defendant was actively cultivating the plants, or that the other did anything to incite, encourage, counsel or assist the commission of the crime. Therefore, we cannot say that there is sufficient evidence to hold either defendant criminally liable for the manufacture of marijuana.

II. Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana

The possession with intent to deliver convictions raise the same issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to prove each defendant guilty as an individual, where both defendants were in non-exclusive possession of the premises where the drugs were found.

There is no doubt that the evidence is sufficient to establish illegal possession. Although the defendants were not in actual physical possession of the drugs, constructive possession may be established by evidence that the defendants had knowledge of the drugs, and had control over the premises on which they were found. State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 594, 468 P.2d 660 (1970); White v. United States, 315 F.2d 113 (9th Cir.1963); United States v. Warren, 594 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.1979). Constructive possession may be either joint or exclusive. United States v. Riggins, 563 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1977). Knowledge that the drugs are present normally may not be proved by inference where the defendant is in non-exclusive possession of the premises where drugs are found, unless there are other circumstances which would support the inference of knowledge. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 554 P.2d 684 (1976); State v. Greene, 100 Idaho 464, 600 P.2d 140 (1979). In this case, the bulk of marijuana was in plain view in areas shared by the defendants, indicating that both defendants were aware of its presence.

However, the defendants were not charged with possession, and it is incumbent on the State to prove the additional element of intent to deliver. The question is whether the state has met its burden of proof on this issue.

A. Jury instructions on circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove intent to deliver.

As there was no direct evidence of intent to deliver in this case, the State was required to resort to proof by means of circumstantial evidence. The jury was instructed as to the factors which would be sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver with circumstantial evidence.

Instruction # 22 reads:

Evidence of the quantity of substances found will not, by itself, support an inference of intent to deliver. One or more of the following factors must be proven:

(1) Suspicious activities by a defendant, or the existence of money and transaction records, indicating delivery of controlled substances;

(2) The defendant's personal habits regarding use of the substances in question;

(3) The economic value of the substances, if sold;

(4) Expert testimony concerning typical patterns of use and sale;

(5) The existence of paraphernalia customarily used to process controlled substances for delivery; and

(6) The existence of packages or containers customarily used in delivery.

The evidence, taken as a whole, must establish a substantial, rather than speculative, basis to draw such an inference.

These instructions were taken from the holding of the court in State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct.App.1982).

Appellants claim that this instruction violated their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the instruction does not explicitly state that the inference to be drawn from the listed factors of circumstantial evidence is permissive. Thus, appellants argue that the jury might have been misled into believing that if some factors were proven they would be required to conclude that appellants had the intent to deliver the marijuana. If that were the case, they argue, the burden of proof would be impermissibly shifted to appellants, in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

If a jury instruction lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by creating conclusive presumptions of guilt as to an element of an offense and requires the accused to come forward with evidence to rebut that presumption, it is a violation of due process. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). In State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635, 651 P.2d 569 (Ct.App.1982), overruled on other grounds, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct.App.1984), the court invalidated jury instructions which appeared to shift the burden of...

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  • State v. Shackelford, Docket No. 27966 (Idaho 1/20/2010)
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • January 20, 2010
    ...other than the guilt of the defendant." State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 350, 787 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1990)). The basis for the Court's holding in Holder was the concern that circumstantial evidence was inherently unreliab......
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    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • November 29, 2011
    ...of a crime and assent to or acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability." State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990) overruled on other grounds by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660-62, 8 P.3d 652, 655-57. Here, the jury was instructed......
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    ...other than the guilt of the defendant." State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 350, 787 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1990) ). The basis for the Court's holding in Holder was the concern that circumstantial evidence was inherently unrelia......
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    ...of a crime and assent to or acquiescence in its commission does not give rise to accomplice liability." State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344, 347, 787 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1990) overruled on other grounds by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 660–62, 8 P.3d 652, 655–57. Here, the jury was instructed......
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