State v. Randolph

Decision Date05 July 1983
Citation190 Conn. 576,462 A.2d 1011
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Rainey RANDOLPH.

Suzanne Zitser, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on brief, were Jerrold H. Barnett, Public Defender, Bruce A. Sturman, Asst. Public Defender, and John R. Gulash, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Edward J. Caldwell, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on brief, was Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and GRILLO, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

After a trial to the jury, the defendant, Rainey Randolph, was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) 1 and sentenced to a term of not less than nine years nor more than eighteen. In this appeal, the defendant is claiming that the trial court erred with respect to three evidentiary rulings. The specific claims will be set out after a recitation of that evidence which is relevant to the issues raised by this appeal.

In the evening of December 18, 1979, Joe Otis Dupree was shot and killed next to one of the buildings located in Father Panik Village in Bridgeport. At the defendant's trial, Ruby Murphy was the state's principal witness. Murphy was a tenant in one of the buildings situated in Father Panik Village. She testified that at about 6 p.m. on December 18, 1979, she left the building to take a walk outside by herself. She immediately saw two men running towards her with one chasing the other. She could describe the man being chased, who turned out to be the victim, but testified that she had never seen him before. The victim was being pursued by a man with a large gun whom she knew as "Big Hand Pete." Murphy made an in-court identification of the defendant as being the man she saw chasing the victim. She had known the defendant for nine to ten years and testified that he used to go out with her younger sister. As the men approached her, she asked what was going on and testified that the defendant had replied: "I'll kill the [M________ F________]." At that time, the defendant fired a shot which Murphy thought had struck the victim because he slowed down. The two men continued the chase, with the victim going around a corner of the building. Murphy then heard a second shot fired, but did not see it because she had moved behind a dumpster, a big trash can. A few seconds later, the defendant walked back by her and, upon her inquiry as to what had happened, repeated his previous statement: "I'll kill the [M________ F________]." He then walked away.

By way of illustrating Murphy's testimony, the state introduced a sketch, while she was testifying, containing a layout of a few of the buildings in Father Panik Village which were relevant to the crime scene. It also depicted the positions of Murphy, Dupree and Randolph as the shooting occurred. This sketch was made by Detective Thomas Giblin of the Bridgeport police department later that night at police headquarters during an interview with Murphy. It was based, in part, upon his knowledge of Father Panik Village and, in part, upon information supplied to him by Murphy. When the sketch was offered, Murphy was asked if "this [was] the sketch that was made to assist you to tell them [the police] what had happened and where it has happened?" She answered "Yes" and the sketch was admitted as a full exhibit. Murphy referred to the sketch as she described the shooting. 2

After the shooting, Murphy returned to her apartment without investigating what actually happened to the victim. She testified that her boyfriend, Ben Jones, and her two children were present at that time in her apartment. Jones then went out to the grocery store and upon his return informed her that he had seen a body outside and that the man was dead. She then went back outside with her sister and saw the body of the same person whom she had seen earlier being chased by the defendant.

Murphy testified that she talked to the police on two occasions that night while in her apartment, although Giblin testified that he had only been there once. She did not tell the officer who came the first time very much because her boyfriend kept telling her to "shut up." The second time, however, although she was reluctant to speak at first, she eventually did tell Giblin what happened and then accompanied him to the police station. There she gave a signed statement, made a photographic identification of the defendant after being shown seven photographs, 3 and assisted Giblin as he made the sketch that has been referred to earlier. Finally, Murphy testified that no promises had been made to her in reference to her testifying against Randolph and that no threats or promises had been made to her to induce her to sign her written statement to the police.

During his cross-examination of Murphy, the defendant's counsel sought to impeach her credibility by eliciting testimony regarding the fact that she had been arrested and had a case pending against her at that time in the same judicial district. 4 She testified that she did have a case pending and that it was in connection with her arrest at her apartment. She also testified that the police had found, and seized, approximately 100 bags of heroin in her apartment, as well as a .38 caliber revolver, a sawed-off shotgun, and "probably" a pellet gun. The defendant's counsel then asked: "As of now, are you aware that for the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell you're facing a possible sentence of 15 years in jail?" The state's objection to the question was sustained and the court instructed the jury that it was to disregard the question. Defense counsel took an exception to the ruling, without asking either the state's attorney or the court the basis for their reasoning. Defense counsel then went on to question Murphy further as to whether she was represented by counsel in that pending action and whether her counsel had discussed her case with the state's attorney. She answered affirmatively to both questions.

After Murphy had finished testifying, the state called Giblin to the stand. He testified, inter alia, as to his investigation on the night of the shooting and about his contact with Murphy on that night. During his testimony, the state's attorney referred him to the sketch of the scene that had previously been introduced without objection as an exhibit through Murphy. He identified the sketch as "the sketch I drew for [Murphy]," in order to help her "identify where she was and what she saw." When the state's attorney requested Giblin to come down from the witness stand to explain to the jury what the sketch intended to show, defense counsel objected. He claimed that any testimony would be hearsay because Giblin drew the sketch as a result of information that he obtained from Murphy. The trial court reserved decision on the objection because Giblin had not testified in any manner regarding the sketch at that time. Thereafter, the state's attorney asked some preliminary questions about the location of certain buildings and streets depicted on the sketch, which Giblin testified he drew based upon his personal observation. 5 The state's attorney then asked Giblin to identify the meaning of certain lines and arrows on the sketch. At this point, defense counsel renewed his objection. During a voir dire concerning the further admissibility of Giblin's testimony, the trial court rejected the claim that the testimony was "classic hearsay when the individual he [Giblin] discussed it with [Murphy] was here and available for testimony." In addition, the state's attorney argued that the sketch would be "enlightening to the jury," and that Giblin, who was available for cross-examination, "should be given an opportunity to explain what he put together." The court overruled the objection to which an exception was taken. Thereafter, Giblin testified, specifically in response to four questions by the state, concerning certain information Murphy had indicated to him when the sketch was being prepared.

Finally, as part of his defense, the defendant called Doris Coles to the stand. Coles' testimony conflicted with various aspects of Murphy's testimony. In particular, she testified that on the day of the shooting she had spent the whole day with Murphy, whereas Murphy testified that she did not even know Coles at the time. Coles testified that at around 5:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting she went to the store. When she returned, she saw a body next to one of the buildings, which she subsequently found out was the victim. When she went up to Murphy's apartment, Coles testified that Murphy did not give her any indication that she knew what had occurred.

During cross-examination she testified that her five children lived in foster homes. Thereafter, over the objection of defense counsel, she was asked why they were in foster homes, and she responded that she was financially and mentally unable to take care of them at that time. A number of questions followed as to the details of how and why they were put in foster homes. The state's attorney claimed that the answers were relevant, while defense counsel objected to them on only two occasions on the basis that they were "far afield" and irrelevant. The trial court overruled the objection, and defense counsel took an exception only after his second objection was overruled.

As noted previously, the defendant claims the trial court erred in regard to three evidentiary rulings. First, he claims the court erred in allowing into evidence Giblin's testimony concerning the contents of the sketch Giblin made based upon information provided to him by Murphy because such testimony was hearsay. His second claim is that the court erred in limiting the cross-examination of Murphy and, as a result, deprived him of his sixth amendment rights. Finally, the defendant claims that the...

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