State v. Ranker

• Citation: 359 So.2d 129
• Decision Date: 22 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 61199,61199
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Roland RANKER.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 129

359 So.2d 129

STATE of Louisiana v. Roland RANKER.

No. 61199.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 22, 1978.

Frank G. DeSalvo, Maurice T. Hattier, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Joseph E. Roberts, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

CALOGERO, Justice.

Defendant Roland Ranker was charged by bill of information with armed robbery in violation of R.S. 14:64. Following a trial by jury defendant was found guilty and given a sentence of ninety-nine years at hard labor in the custody of the Department of Corrections. On appeal defendant raises only three assignments of error.

Because we find merit in assignment of error number one we find it unnecessary

to discuss the second and third assignments. ASSIGNMENT OF

ERROR NUMBER 1 DEFENDANT'S BEING BANISHED FROM THE

COURTROOM THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL ¹

The Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The fourteenth amendment makes the guarantee of this clause obligatory upon the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Perhaps the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892). In the context of this case this fundamental right would have permitted the defendant to face and observe the state's witnesses who came forth and testified about earlier line-up identifications and identified the defendant at trial as the armed robber.

The right of confrontation is not absolute, however, as the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Therein, in its review of a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision which had in effect held that there was an absolute right of the defendant to be present at all stages of the proceedings, 413 F.2d 232 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that "a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom." ²

It was in reliance upon this expression of the United States Supreme Court that the trial judge in this case had defendant removed from the courtroom during voir dire of the jury and kept out of the courtroom during the entire trial except for two brief returns for the purpose of identification by witnesses.

The question posed here is whether or not defendant's conduct was so disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful of the court that the trial could not be carried on with him in the courtroom. The record indicates, and the trial judge in his per curiam to this assignment acknowledges, that the first six pages of the transcript reflect the disruptive conduct of defendant upon which the trial judge relied. We thus incorporate by way of the attached appendix to this opinion those six pages.

In our assessment the record in this case does not portray Roland Ranker as a disruptive, contumacious, or stubbornly defiant defendant. On the contrary it appears that Ranker attempted to voice his dissatisfaction with his appointed attorney in a non-disruptive and almost polite, although insistent manner. We do not question the right of the trial judge to conduct the proceedings before him so as to maintain dignity, order and decorum, the hallmarks of all court proceedings in out country. See, Illinois v. Allen, supra. We simply cannot find on the basis of this record that defendant speaking out as he did and relating the substance of his complaint, that his lawyer would not communicate with him, was the type of disorderly, disruptive or disrespectful conduct which was of such dimension as to warrant the denial of defendant's constitutional right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial. For these reasons we find merit in defendant's assignment of error number one.

Decree

For the foregoing reasons defendant's conviction and sentence are hereby reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for retrial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

SANDERS, C. J., dissents.

APPENDIX

(During the time that the Sheriff was calling prospective jurors the following transpired.)

BY THE COURT:

One minute, Mr. Sheriff, let the defendant be seated at the bar. You can talk to your lawyer while you are seated just as well. Now, Ranker, listen to what I am going to tell you. This trial is going to proceed today in an orderly fashion and it's going to proceed with or without your cooperation. I have a duty under my oath of office to conduct this trial fairly, with dignity and decorum, and to see that your rights are protected to the fullest extent of the law. Do you understand that?

BY THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT:

I'm going to be a very indulgent man, but I am not going to tolerate any deviation from the law or from the rules of dignity and propriety. And I will not have it in this court. If you persist in disobeying such as my order to take a seat I will have means to deal with you. I don't want to do that unless you force me to do that. Do you understand?

BY THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

BY THE COURT:

Okay, take a seat.

BY THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor,

BY THE COURT:

I do not want to hear from you because I don't listen to defendants except through their lawyers. During the course of the trial at the proper time if you want to take that witness stand and testify under oath then I will certainly listen to you and the jury will too. Proceed, Mr. Labich.

(Thereupon the Sheriff called more prospective jurors and the following transpired.)

BY THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, my judge (lawyer) don't want to speak for me.

BY THE COURT:

You have to be quiet. If you say one more word I will have to exclude you from the courtroom and then proceed with your trial without you. That would not be to your interest, but I will have to do that in order to proceed according to the rules.

BY THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, my lawyer don't want

BY THE COURT:

Take the defendant out of the courtroom. Let me tell you before you leave when you at any time you tell the Sheriff one minute, let me talk to him, Mr. Sheriff. Any time you tell the Sheriff that you are ready to sit down, communicate with your lawyer, but obey the rules of the law in this court then I will bring you back into the courtroom. As a matter of fact I will even extend it now if you are willing now to sit down and proceed with this trial in an orderly fashion you won't be removed. Are you willing to do that?

BY THE DEFENDANT:

When my lawyer speaks to me I will have to see.

BY THE COURT:

You can talk to your lawyer.

BY THE DEFENDANT:

I talks to my lawyer, but my lawyer understand don't wants to talk to me. I am speaking to him to try to get him to talk to me.

BY THE COURT:

I see you and your lawyer conversing back and forward. He is your lawyer.

BY THE DEFENDANT:

But he don't want to say nothing for me. I talk to him and he tells me to be quiet.

BY THE COURT:

Mr. Hattier, you can talk with your client, you understand that.

BY MR. HATTIER:

I am trying to keep track of the jurors when they take their seats to select the jury. I can not do 2 things at once.

BY THE COURT:

Take a seat. I will give you one more chance. If you persist in talking except through your lawyer then you are going to be removed from the courtroom in accordance with the law....