State v. Rankin

• Decision Date: 23 February 1925
• Citation: 102 Conn. 46,127 A. 916
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. RANKIN.

127 A. 916

102 Conn. 46

STATE v. RANKIN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 23, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; John R. Booth, Judge.

Charles G. Rankin was convicted of abortion, and he appeals. No error.

Joseph F. Berry, of Hartford, for appellant.

Hugh M Alcorn, State's Atty., of Hartford, for the State.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and BEACH, CURTIS, KEELER, and KELLOGG JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The information charges the accused with the crime of abortion. He was bound over to the criminal term of the superior court held on September 16, 1924. On September 17, 1924, the accused appeared in court, pleaded to the information " not guilty," and at the same time elected to be tried by the court instead of the jury, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 267, § 2, of the Public Acts of 1921, which provides:

" In all criminal causes, prosecutions and proceedings the party accused may, if he shall so elect when called upon to plead, be tried by the court instead of by the jury; and in such cases the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try such cause and render judgment and sentence thereon."

For the accommodation of the counsel for the accused the date of trial was set for October 7, 1924, the court then informing counsel that this was the last date at which the trial could be set as he was assigned elsewhere on the following October 10th, and that on this date the criminal courtroom would be otherwise occupied. On October 3, 1924, counsel for the accused filed in writing a withdrawal of election to trial by the court, and on October 7th, at the opening of court at 10 a. m., he orally argued his motion for withdrawal, basing his reasons upon the grounds that he had the right to a jury trial and did not elect to be tried by the court. No reason was given or cause shown for the withdrawal of the election. The court announced his decision in these words:

" I presume the defendant, having elected to be tried by the court, would have the right to withdraw that election and be tried by the jury, if the court approved it. Whether or not his constitutional right to a jury trial is such that he can, at any time, and for no reason at all, withdraw it, I should have my doubts. I should not hesitate about granting the withdrawal in this particular case if we had a jury, but the result of the request to withdraw the election of trial by the court is equivalent to a motion for postponement, and unless there is some other reason shown than has appeared so far, why, I should not grant it."

At this time the witnesses for the state were in attendance but, upon counsel for the accused stating that he was not prepared to proceed at that time, the court continued the hearing until 2 p. m., at which hour the trial proceeded and continued into the following day. The accused offered a large number of witnesses in his behalf, all of whom had been previously notified to appear. Before the hearing of the evidence counsel for the accused made objection to all evidence introduced by the state, on the ground that the court had no right to proceed with the trial without a jury as prescribed by the United States and state Constitutions, and upon the further ground that the court had no power to convict the accused when he requests that he be tried by a jury, and does not elect to be tried by the court.

We think the accused's motion for the correction of the finding by striking from paragraph 6 the clause as to the apparent purpose of the accused in his motion being to secure the continuance of the cause to the next term of court, and by striking from paragraph 7 the clause that he suffered no prejudice as a result of the denial of his motion, should have been granted. These corrections do not make a new trial necessary since we are of the opinion that the ruling made by the court upon the facts found exclusive of these was not erroneous.

The act under which the accused elected to be tried by the court and the court heard the cause and rendered judgment thereon is, with an immaterial change, a copy of chapter 56 of the Public Acts of 1874, which was declared constitutional in State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 33 Am.Rep. 27. The accused therefore had the right to waive a trial by jury and elect to be tried by the court. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 13 S.Ct. 105, 36 L.Ed. 986; State v. Worden, supra.

" The Constitution, in providing that the right of trial by jury should remain inviolate, was designed to perpetuate its essential characteristics, as they existed at common law; preserving its substance, while leaving its form to be regulated from time to time as the legislative power might deem the public interests to require." State v. Main, 69 Conn. 131, 37 A. 82, 36 L.R.A. 623, 61 Am.St.Rep. 30.

The accused had the right to a trial by jury; his election to be tried by the court when put to plead was his own voluntary act and a relinquishment of his right to a jury trial at the time when by the act he was called upon to plead. Withdrawal thereafter of his election by the accused could not be had as matter of right. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 13 S.Ct. 105, 36 L.Ed. 986; State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 33 Am.Rep. 27; State v. Almy, 67 N.H. 274, 28 A. 372, 22 L.R.A. 744. If the withdrawal could be exercised as one of right, it would follow that it could be exercised at any time and under any conditions. If the right could be exercised once, it could be repeated an indefinite number of times. Speedy determination of criminal causes is almost as essential as their right determination. The right to elect and then withdraw the election, and repeat this at will, would give the accused the opportunity to postpone the cause indefinitely. The...