State v. Rankin
| Decision Date | 23 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 50903-9-I.,50903-9-I. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER WAYNE RANKIN, Appellant. |
Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County, Docket No: 02-1-01356-7, Judgment or order under review, Date filed: 07/19/2002.
Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, Counsel for Appellant(s).
Sharon Jean Blackford, WA Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, Counsel for Appellant(s).
Oliver Ross Davis, WA Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, Counsel for Appellant(s).
Constance Mary Crawley, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, Counsel for Respondent(s).
Seth Aaron Fine, Attorney at Law, Everett, WA, Counsel for Respondent(s).
Christopher Rankin appeals his conviction for eluding a police vehicle, arguing his plea did not include a sufficient factual basis to show that the pursuing vehicle was appropriately marked as `an official police vehicle.'1 Because the prosecutor's factual statement and Rankin's plea statement expressly included all the elements of the crime, we affirm the conviction.
Rankin also appeals the exceptional sentence imposed by the trial court. We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion by finding substantial and compelling reasons for imposing the sentence and affirm it as well.
Around 2:00 a.m. on June 6, 2002, Snohomish County deputies saw Christopher Rankin driving a stolen vehicle. The deputies tried to make a high risk traffic stop, and Rankin immediately fled. Rankin turned off the headlights of the stolen vehicle and entered oncoming lanes of traffic. He continued at speeds over 90 miles per hour, running traffic lights and driving recklessly. The deputies lost sight of Rankin, and Everett police officers joined the chase. Eventually, Rankin eluded the Everett police and was spotted again by Snohomish County Deputies. Speeds continued near 100 miles per hour through oncoming lanes of traffic as Rankin tried to cause collisions with the officers on several occasions. One police vehicle crashed, and another was disabled before Rankin also crashed. On June 10, 2002, the State charged Rankin with attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle in violation of RCW 46.61.024. The information alleged that Rankin `did willfully fail and refuse to immediately bring his/her vehicle to a stop . . . after being given a visual or audible signal . . . by a police officer in uniform, whose vehicle was appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.' On July 3, 2002, Rankin pled guilty to the charges. The plea stated:
I have been informed and fully understand that:
. . . .
The elements of the crime are: That the defendant . . . did willfully . . . refuse to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop . . . after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop . . . by a police officer . . . whose vehicle was appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.
Later in the plea, Rankin stated in his own words: `I wilfully {sic} refused to bring my vehicle to an immediate stop . . . after being given a visual or audible signal . . . by a police officer in uniform in an appropriately marked vehicle.'
Rankin appeared for sentencing on July 17, 2002. The standard range sentence was three to eight months, and both parties recommended a four-month sentence. Before imposing sentence, the trial court inquired about Rankin's history of automobile theft: Rankin replied, `I really couldn't tell you,' and he admitted being under the influence of methamphetamines, alcohol, and marijuana during the chase. He also admitted he had never had a driver's license, had driven 100 miles per hour on Highway 99 with his headlights off, passed through several intersections without stopping, and caused two police car wrecks.
Refusing to follow the parties' sentencing recommendation, the trial court noted that Rankin's flight from the police was particularly egregious and sentenced him to 12 months incarceration. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered as follows:
The Defendant had a{n} exceptional number of auto theft related crimes.
The facts of the attempted elude were particularly egregious, involving high speed, 3 police jurisdictions, 2 damaged police cars, and danger to a passenger and other motorists.
Given the findings of fact above the standard range sentence is inadequate and it is necessary, appropriate, and in the interest of justice that he be sentenced outside the standard range.
Rankin now appeals both the conviction and the sentence.
Rankin argues his guilty plea was insufficient. Specifically, he claims there is no factual basis to establish that the police cars chasing him were appropriately marked, showing them to be official police vehicles, as required by RCW 46.61.024. The main support for his argument is that his own plea statement includes the language, `in an appropriately marked vehicle,' but does not include `showing it to be an official police vehicle.' This argument is unpersuasive.
CrR 4.2(d) provides that `{t}he court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.' The purpose of this factual requirement is to make sure the defendant's actual conduct falls within the elements of the crime charged.2 Although the factual basis requirement of CrR 4.2(d) is satisfied if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to convict, the trial court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.3 The trial court can look to any reliable source of information in the record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the plea.4 In particular, the trial court may consider the defendant's own plea statement.5 We have previously held that a defendant's plea statement provides a sufficient factual basis for acceptance of the plea when it admits to all the elements of the crime charged.6 Here, Rankin not only indicated that he understood all the elements of the charge, but also admitted that the pursuing cars were `appropriately marked.' If the defendant agrees to let the trial court do so, it can also consider the prosecutor's statements in the certification for determination of probable cause.7 Here, the certification alleged that Rankin failed to stop after `being given a visual and audio signal to stop by uniformed police officers in fully marked patrol vehicles.'
Based on the statements of both parties, it is clear that Rankin not only understood the nature of the charge, but also realized that his conduct actually fell within the charge. There is no danger that he unwittingly signed a deficient plea or that the plea lacked a sufficient...
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