State v. Ransberger

• Decision Date: 12 October 1891
• Citation: 17 S.W. 290,106 Mo. 135
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. RANSBERGER.

17 S.W. 290

106 Mo. 135

STATE v. RANSBERGER.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

October 12, 1891.

REQUISITES OF INFORMATION — "KNOWLEDGE" OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.

1. Sess. Acts Mo. 1885, p. 145, provides that, "if any person has knowledge that an offense has been committed, he may make complaint, verified by his oath, * * * and deposit it with the prosecuting attorney; * * * and whenever the prosecuting attorney has knowledge of the commission of an offense, * * * or shall be informed thereof by complaint deposited with him as aforesaid, it shall be his duty to file an information." Held, that it was not in any case necessary for the prosecuting attorney to have "actual" and "personal" knowledge, as distinguished from knowledge gained by information.

2. It is not necessary for a prosecuting attorney to file an information, on the mere filing of a complaint with him by one having knowledge that an offense has been committed, but in such case, as in others, he should have knowledge; that is, be reasonably convinced, not only that an offense has been committed, but that the accused committed it.

3. It is not necessary that the prosecuting attorney should swear to an information presented

to a justice of the peace, as in presenting it he acts officially under his oath of office.

4. It is not necessary that an information disclose the source of the prosecuting attorney's knowledge of the crime or its perpetrator. It is enough that it affirm that a certain crime has been committed, and that a certain person committed it.

42 Mo. App. 466, affirmed.

Appeal from Saline criminal court; JOHN E. RYLAND, Judge.

Information against one Ransberger for lasciviously and lewdly cohabiting with a certain female. He was convicted, and appealed. The case was transferred from the Kansas City court of appeals, on the ground that a constitutional question was involved. Remanded to the Kansas City court of appeals.

J. P. Strother, for appellant. Alf. F. Rector, for the State.

THOMAS, J.

The reasons for the transfer of this case to this court from the Kansas City court of appeals will fully appear by the following excerpts from the very able opinion delivered by Judge ELLISON on behalf of that court: "This prosecution," says Judge ELLISON, "was begun before a justice of the peace of Saline county by information from the prosecuting attorney, charging defendant with lasciviously and lewdly cohabiting with a female therein named. The only objection urged to the information is in relation to the affidavit made by the prosecuting attorney, and attached thereto. The affidavit is that the facts stated in the foregoing information are true according to his best information and belief. The specific objection is that the affidavit should have been based upon the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney, and not merely his information or belief. The attorney for the state concedes the defendant's point, if the cases of State v. Humble, 34 Mo. App. 343, and State v. Wilkson, 36 Mo. App. 373, are to be regarded as sound law; but he insists that they should not be so regarded. * * * The constitution provides that offenses of the description at bar `shall be prosecuted criminally, by indictment or information, as concurrent remedies.' Section 12, art. 2. The prosecution in this case is by information. The important question then is, what is an information? The answer is not what the legislature may prescribe or designate as an information, which, at the adoption of the constitution, was well known. The information of the common law is the information prescribed by the constitution, and no other mode can be authorized by the legislature. This has been so frequently adjudicated by the supreme court of the state as not to be debatable or questionable. State v. Kelm, 79 Mo. 515; State v. Briscoe, 80 Mo. 643; State v. Russell, 88 Mo. 649." Judge ELLISON, after reviewing the law as to the nature and attributes of an information and the method of its presentation to the court, adds: "From these considerations it would be clear to the legal mind that a common-law information is one that is intrusted solely to the discretion of our state attorney, to be given or withheld at his will, unhampered by statutory restraint; and, as the case in some respects presents a constitutional question, it becomes, under our conclusion herein, of great public importance that the opinion of the supreme court should be taken." The information in this case did not recite that the prosecuting attorney presented it on his own knowledge, but yet made the charge against defendant in direct, affirmative language, and the affidavit attached is in the form indicated by Judge ELLISON. We will add that since the decision in this case by the Kansas City court of appeals the St. Louis court of appeals has affirmed the doctrine of State v. Humble and State v. Wilkson, supra, in the case of State v. Hatfield, 40 Mo. App. 358, and State v. Buck, 43 Mo. App. 443. The doctrine of these cases is this: "An information before a justice of the peace must be based on the personal knowledge of some one, — either on that of some private citizen lodging with the prosecuting attorney a complaint, verified by affidavit, and setting forth the facts, or on an information filed by the prosecuting attorney on his own personal knowledge." And this must affirmatively appear either in the body of the information or in the affidavit attached thereto. We have given the subject a very careful consideration, and our conclusion is that the information in this case conforms to the requirements of the statute, and therefore the constitutional question suggested does not arise for decision.

1. The act of 1885, under the provisions of which this prosecution was instituted, declares that, "if any person has knowledge that an offense has been committed, he may make complaint, verified by his oath, * * * and deposit it with the prosecuting attorney; * * * and whenever the prosecuting attorney has knowledge of the commission of an offense, * * * or shall be informed thereof by complaint deposited with him as aforesaid, it shall be his duty to file an information." Sess. Acts 1885, p. 145. The contention is that the word "knowledge," as here used, means personal or actual knowledge as contradistinguished from information derived from others. We do not concur in this contention, and from these considerations:

First. The words "actual" and "personal" do not occur in the statute, and we have no right to interpolate both or either in our interpretation of the word whose meaning we now seek. Those qualifying adjectives must therefore be eliminated from the discussion.

Second. "Knowledge," in its ordinary and usual sense, has not the restricted meaning contended for by defendant. A discussion of this subject in a philosophical and transcendental sense is not required. The courts, in the administration of law, must look to the substance of things, and not fritter away the rights of men and society by refinements beyond the reach of the common mind, and never contemplated by the legislator. The contention under review assumes that, when a person is informed of a fact, he does not "know" that fact, within the meaning of the law. Mr. Webster defines "know," "to have knowledge; to possess information, instruction or wisdom." "Knowledge" he defines to be "the act of knowing; clear perception of truth and duty; information." Worcester says, "The word `knowledge,' strictly employed, implies three things, viz., truth, proof, and conviction." He defines knowledge as "information, intelligence; as, to have knowledge of a fact." Anderson says, "Knowledge is information; knowledge imported or obtained knowledge, however communicated, is information." Bouvier's definition is, "Knowledge is information of fact." Best, in his work on the principles of evidence, uses this language: "By `knowledge,' strictly speaking, is meant an actual perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, and it is only to such a perception that the term `certainty' is properly applicable. Knowledge is intuitive when this agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by comparison of the ideas themselves; demonstrative, when it is only perceived mediately, i. e., when it is deduced from a comparison of each, with intervening ideas, which have constant and immutable connection with them, as in the case of mathematical truths, of which the mind has taken in the proof; and, lastly, when, through the agency of our senses, we obtain a perception of the existence of external objects, our knowledge is said to be sensitive. But `knowledge' and `certainty' are constantly used in a secondary sense, which it is important not to overlook, viz., as synonymous with settled belief and reasonable conviction, as when we say that such a one received stolen goods knowing them to have been stolen; or that we are certain, or morally certain, of the existence of such a fact." Justice STRONG in Shaw v. Railway Co., 101 U. S. 557, says: "It may be fairly assumed that one who has reason to believe a fact exists knows it exists; certainly, if he be a reasonable being." "Knowledge is information, and information knowledge." Edington v. Insurance Co., 5 Hun, 1; Robson v. Kemp, 5 Esp. 53. "Absolute knowledge can be had of but few things." Story v. Buffum, 8 Allen, 38. "Knowledge is nothing more than a man's firm belief," says SHAW, C. J., in Hatch v. Carpenter, 9 Gray, 271. Sir William Hamilton, in his work on Logic, (page 442,) says: "The doctrine, therefore, of the...