State v. Rasmussen
| Decision Date | 17 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 38297,38297 |
| Citation | 128 N.W.2d 289,268 Minn. 42 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Melford Elten RASMUSSEN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where court's interrogation of defendant during trial had reference to certain admissions made by him at time of his arrest, and was for purpose of ascertaining whether he then denied having made such admissions as he had denied other admissions therein; where such interrogation did not indicate any bias on part of court or constitute an attempt to impress upon jury its viewpoint with respect to defendant's guilt or innocence; and where signed statement containing such admissions had been received in evidence and would be read by jury in any event, Held such interrogation did not constitute reversible error.
2. Where court charged that, if jurors believed defendant's confession was 'spontaneous and voluntary' and had not been made 'because of any fear or reward' and had been corroborated by proof as required by Minn.St. 634.03, then such admission should 'carry great weight in your minds'; but that if it was involuntary jury should 'wholly disregard it' and should not take any comment or expression by court as indicating court's viewpoint, and further instructed jury that it was to be the sole and exclusive judge of credibility of all witnesses, Held instructions given as described could not have misled jury as to its functions with reference to defendant's signed admission so as to constitute reversible error.
Dorfman, Rudquist, Jones & Ramstead, and Howard S. Marker, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, George M. Scott, County Atty., Philip J. Bloedel, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.
On May 13, 1960, defendant, Melford Elten Rasmussen, was charged by information of the county attorney of Hennepin County with having committed the crime of indecent assault upon the person of his 7-year-old daughter on May 12, 1960, contrary to Minn.St. 617.08. On May 16, 1960, he was arraigned on and entered a plea of not guilty to such information. At his arraignment, he was found to be indigent and the assistant public defender of Hennepin County was appointed by the court to defend him. On May 24, 1960, his trial was commenced and concluded, the jury returning a verdict of 'guilty as charged in the information.'
In this appeal he seeks reversal of this conviction and a new trial on the ground that (1) he was deprived of a fair trial when the court interrogated him in the presence of the jury with respect to an admission made by him in a written statement given to the police shortly after his arrest to the effect that about 2 years before in Dallas, Texas, where he previously resided, he had been involved in a similar incident with the same child; and (2) the court erred in instructing the jury that--
'* * * if you believe from the evidence that the confession or admission testified to by the State's witnesses * * * made by defendant were so made, they were spontaneous and voluntary acts of the defendant, were not made because of any fear or reward, and if you further believe that such confession has been corroborated by proof of such as required in the section of the statute that I have just read, then such confession and admission shall carry great weight in your minds.'
The written statement in which defendant's admissions were made and with reference to which the court had questioned him had been received in evidence and was to go to the jury for consideration in determining defendant's guilt or innocence. He had been interrogated by the prosecuting attorney with respect to other admissions in this statement. In so far as these admissions related to his guilt of the crime charged in the information, he testified that they were not true and had been made when he was 'woozy' or 'kind of numb' because of intoxication and that they had been made because 'I didn't * * * feel nothing too much and didn't care much neither.' In his examination at the trial he had not been questioned concerning his admissions as to the previous incident in Dallas and had neither denied nor admitted that they had been made by him. To clarify the record with respect thereto, the court then asked him the following questions and received the following answers:
'A Yes, I did, sir.
'Q You told them that, did you?
'A Yes.
'Q You told the officers that, did you?
'A Yes.'
1. We do not feel that the court's interrogation of defendant with reference to certain admissions in his confession as above described had the effect of prejudicing the jurors against him to any greater extent than would their reading of the same admissions in the written confession which had been previously received in evidence and which would be taken with them to the jury room. It did not indicate any bias or prejudice on the part of the court and certainly did not constitute any attempt to impress upon the jurors the court's viewpoint as to defendant's guilt or innocence. It may be that since defendant had denied the truth of the other admissions in the written statement the court felt that he would likewise deny those having reference to the incident in Dallas; and if so that this should be brought to the jury's attention. It thus gave defendant the opportunity to deny them, knowing that otherwise the jury would have the right to believe that they were true. While we do not favor the interrogation of a defendant by the court in a criminal case, where, as here, such interrogation is intended merely to clarify the record, we cannot hold that it constitutes reversible error. State v. Hansen, 153 Minn. 339. 190 N.W. 481; Annotation, 84 A.L.R. 1172.
In cases cited by defendant in support of his contention the situations are quite distinguishable. In all of them the interrogations involved clearly manifested the court's feeling of bias or prejudice. Thus, in State v. Sandquist, 146 Minn. 322, 178 N.W. 883, where defenda...
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State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash
...908, filed June 22, 1964. These claims were not presented or considered in our review of this case filed April 17, 1964. State v. Rasmussen, 268 Minn. 42, 128 N.W.2d 289, certiorari denied, 379 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 267, 13 L.Ed.2d 187. Our prior determination does not bar consideration of pet......
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McKenzie v. State
...whether the judge's conduct has prejudiced the jury. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 276 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Minn.1979); State v. Rasmussen, 268 Minn. 42, 44-46, 128 N.W.2d 289, 290-91, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 267, 13 L.Ed.2d 187 (1964). This standard dovetails with the standard used t......
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...viewpoint as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. State v. Shetsky, 229 Minn. 566, 40 N.W.2d 337 (1949); see State v. Rasmussen, 268 Minn. 42, 45, 128 N.W.2d 289, 291 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 267, 13 L.Ed.2d 187 (1964). Construing the court's remarks as a whole, it is ......
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Luoma v. City of Minneapolis
...and find no improper conduct. A trial judge may examine a witness when necessary in the furtherance of justice. See State v. Rasmussen, 268 Minn. 42, 128 N.W.2d 289 (1964). The trial judge here asked a few questions to clarify the record and each time gave the parties the opportunity to exa......