State v. Rasmussen

Decision Date16 March 1993
Docket NumberNo. 14227,14227
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Erik C. RASMUSSEN.

Hubert J. Santos, with whom was Hope C. Seeley, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Kevin T. Kane, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was C. Robert Satti, Sr., State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BERDON, NORCOTT and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

A jury found the defendant, Erik C. Rasmussen, guilty of the murder of his wife, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. 1 The defendant has appealed to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(b)(3) from the judgment of the trial court sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of thirty-five years. He claims that the court improperly: (1) denied his request to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses; (2) denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (3) denied his motions to suppress various evidence; (4) refused to excuse a juror and denied a related motion for a mistrial; (5) refused to instruct the jury on his theory of defense; and (6) denied his motion to dismiss and for a mistrial for failure of the state to disclose material exculpatory evidence. We find the defendant's claims unpersuasive and, therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. Shortly before 2 a.m., on May 5, 1988, the state police responded to a telephone call from the defendant who reported that his wife, Loreli Rasmussen, had been killed. Wearing only a robe, the defendant, together with two dogs, met Troopers John Kananowicz and James Brady at the front door when they arrived at his residence. When he saw the troopers, the defendant screamed, "Come in, come in, my wife's dead, upstairs, upstairs in the bedroom." After securing the dogs, the defendant led the troopers to the doorway of an upstairs bedroom. He pushed open the bedroom door revealing the unclothed, blood-smeared body of his wife lying face up on the floor in a pool of blood. A wooden dowel protruded five or six inches from her chest. Kananowicz, believing the "odd situation" he had encountered to be "very suspicious in nature," read the Miranda warnings to the defendant at 2:23 a.m. When Detective Michael Foley arrived at the scene at approximately 3:15 a.m., the defendant was lying on the floor of the first floor foyer crying and hyperventilating. Foley introduced himself to the defendant and, in order to put him more at ease and to protect the scene, asked the defendant to dress and accompany him outside to his police car. The two sat in the front seat of the car while Foley asked the defendant to describe what had happened in the house.

According to the defendant, the couple had eaten dinner at approximately 8 p.m. on May 4, 1988, and had gone to bed at about 9:30 p.m. The defendant was awakened by a noise that sounded as if someone was hitting a wall or falling on the floor. The victim's German shepherd was still on the bed and the couple's poodle was in the room, but the victim was not in the room. The defendant called out to his wife. Hearing no response, he awakened the German shepherd and gave her a command to bark. The defendant then proceeded down the hallway and found the victim's body on the floor in the spare bedroom. He activated the burglar alarm and called the police.

Because the defendant continued to be distraught, Foley transported him to the Troop E barracks where "he would be more comfortable." When they arrived at the barracks at approximately 3:30 a.m., Foley took the defendant to a conference room with freely swinging glass-paneled double doors, windows, a large table, some chairs and a telephone. As Foley went over the events of the prior evening with the defendant, he observed scratch marks on the inside of the defendant's left arm, red marks and scrapes on the back of his right wrist, and smeared blood on his hands and elbow. The defendant explained that he had received the scratches from holding onto the dogs while waiting for the police to arrive and that the blood had come from holding his wife's body. Foley then explained the nature of the investigation and the need to search the house for evidence. The defendant thereafter read and signed a form consenting to a search of the house. He also volunteered information about other buildings on the property so that they could be included in the consent form. Foley then asked the defendant if he needed anything and the defendant requested and received a glass of water.

Detective Kenneth Bissonnette arrived at the Troop E barracks from the crime scene at approximately 4 a.m. Foley briefed him, and Bissonnette returned to the scene to continue his investigation before again returning to the barracks where Foley introduced him to the defendant at 4:51 a.m. The defendant consented to Bissonnette's request to take photographs of the scratches and blood smears on his arms and hands. The defendant also consented to requests to take off his robe 2 and to allow photographs to be taken of additional scratches on his upper body and hip.

Foley then resumed his conversation with the defendant and expressed disbelief that an intruder could have entered the house, engaged in a violent struggle with the victim, and fled without rousing the defendant or the dogs. Foley, at that time, asked again about the scratch marks. The defendant told Foley that he wanted to cooperate and to talk with the police but did not want to discuss the scratch marks further without an attorney present.

At 5:15 a.m., Foley told the defendant that he was not in custody and asked if there was anything he could do for him. The defendant said that he wanted his father to be contacted. Foley did so. At 5:24 a.m., Bissonnette orally advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and offered him the use of a telephone to call an attorney. The defendant declined.

Between 5:45 a.m. and 6 a.m., the defendant agreed to allow Foley to take fingernail scrapings and swabs of the blood smears. The defendant's parents arrived at 6 a.m. and visited alone with the defendant in the conference room. As a result of the defendant's interrogation, the police procured a search warrant for his person. At 7:45 a.m., Foley and Bissonnette took the defendant from the conference room to a processing room to execute this search warrant.

The jury could also have found that the German shepherd was a well trained guard and attack dog that behaved in an extremely loyal and protective manner toward Loreli. She often barked when people approached the home and became aggressive even when people with whom she was familiar would bump into Loreli.

The jury also heard testimony that an autopsy of the body had revealed: two incised wounds and four stab wounds on the victim's neck; 3 a bruise on the nose caused by blunt trauma; abrasions and bruising on the right side of the neck; scratches on the chest and defense wounds 4 on both hands caused by a sharp-edged instrument; and a stab wound in the mid portion of the chest. The stab wounds to the neck cut the right jugular vein, trachea, larynx and esophagus. The wooden dowel found in the stab wound in the chest was attached to a mason's trowel from which the handle had been removed and the edges sharpened. This spear-like instrument had been thrust into the victim's chest so that it cut through the entire thoracic cage and exited through the victim's back. The face and eyelids showed petechial hemorrhaging. 5 The presence of petechiae could be consistent with strangulation even when neither death nor loss of consciousness results. 6 The cause of death was determined to be the stab wounds to the neck and chest that led to exsanguination. State medical examiners analyzed the victim's stomach contents and testified that she had died within two hours of eating.

The jury heard additional medical evidence based on observations at the scene and laboratory examinations of physical evidence removed from the scene. Henry Lee, director and chief criminalist of the state police forensic crime laboratory, testified that his examination of bloodstain patterns on the soles of both feet and the upper body of the victim indicated that she had been in the following positions: upright when she received an injury to her neck that caused blood to drip downward; then sitting; and, finally lying face up when the spear was thrust into her chest. 7 On the basis of this evidence, he concluded that the victim had been conscious and struggling to defend herself when she was stabbed in the throat.

On a bed in a bedroom adjoining the room where the victim was found, the police found a bloody, four foot long wooden dowel with a "T nut" connector on one end. Lee testified that this dowel had been connected to, and then had been forcefully pulled apart from, the end of the dowel that protruded from the victim's chest.

The victim's mother testified that, on the day before the killing, the victim had confided to her that she and the defendant had been arguing about the planning and preparation for the defendant's May 5 birthday party. She also testified that the victim had told her that the defendant was feeling under pressure to complete the renovation of the only bathroom in the house before the party. There was also testimony that although the defendant had said that the couple had gone to bed about 9:30 p.m., the bed did not appear to have been slept in. 8 Further, there was evidence that stereo equipment was moved from the living room and stacked on a desk next to an opened first floor office window. The equipment was stacked so that it blocked entry and exit through the window. Dust on the window sill and desk was undisturbed. The surface of the desk contained undisturbed papers and materials. The latent prints on the desk and stereo equipment belonged to the defendant. The...

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