State v. Rathbun
Decision Date | 05 March 1902 |
Citation | 74 Conn. 524,51 A. 540 |
Parties | STATE v. RATHBUN. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court. New Haven county; William T. Elmer, Judge.
Ann Maria Rathbun was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.
Levi N. Blydenburgh and Sanford B. Martin, for appellant.
William H. Williams, State's Atty., and Alfred N. Wheeler, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.
The record discloses 23 distinct reasons of appeal. Of these 19 are pursued in the defendant's brief. All of these save one relate to the charge. This one complains of the action of the court in denying the request of counsel for the privilege of examining a certain notebook in the hands of a witness for the state. The claim is formulated in the defendant's brief as one to examine memoranda used by a witness while testifying to refresh his recollection, and reference is made to accepted authority that such memoranda must be shown to the adverse party, if he requires it and that such party may, if he pleases, cross-examine the witness thereon. The finding is that at the close of the cross-examination of an expert witness for the state upon the subject of experiments made by him in his examination for barium in the body of the deceased he referred to a notebook containing memoranda made by him in connection with the experiments. The request of counsel to examine the book was then made and denied, as stated. Of this finding it is to be observed that it does not appear therefrom that the witness looked at the book while undergoing examination, or to refresh his recollection while testifying. An examination by a witness of books or papers, made after the conclusion of his testimony, furnishes no ground for a request by adverse counsel to see the books or papers. Such writings do not come within either the letter or the reason of the rule invoked. That seems to have been the situation in the present case. At least, the contrary does not appear, as it should to justify the granting of a new trial therefor. New trials are not granted upon speculative constructions of the language of findings. The erroneous action of the court should clearly appear. Furthermore, the finding discloses that the fact in support of which the witness was testifying, to wit, the presence of barium in the body of the deceased, was one undisputed by evidence, and unquestioned in any way in argument. Clearly, upon all these facts, we should not be justified in granting a new trial for this reason assigned. There was apparently no error committed. There was clearly no harm done the accused.
The accused objects because the court failed to give to the jury instructions as contained in 10 requests to charge. Many of these requests relate to the general subject of "reasonable doubt" and its application to several incidental aspects of the case. The court gave unexceptionable instructions upon this subject, and such instructions as were necessary for the jury's intelligent guidance. The court did not confine itself to general language, but told the jury that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was such proof as excluded any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The necessity of such proof in order to justify a conviction was again and again reiterated. Complaint is not made of what the court said to the jury. The complaint is rather that the precise language of certain requests in which the contention of the accused upon the evidence was emphasized, the law as applicable to certain conditions more or less argumentatively stated in support of his position, and the importance of such proof under such conditions magnified to the prejudice of the state, was not given to the jury. The court, in its instructions to the jury, should, in his presentation of the case, preserve, as far as possible, the proper perspective. Certain matters, especially if they are of minor or incidental importance only, should not be unduly magnifed, while others of equal or greater importance are minimized or ignored. The case, upon the evidence and the law applicable thereto, should be stated with the purpose of giving the jury as clear and correct a view of its various aspects as possible, and with an effort to preserve the proper balance between the various considerations which may be involved. A picture of a case, like any other picture, is not a true one which is, in portions of it, out of focus, whereby the true relative proportions of what it represents are not depicted. See State v. Rome, 64 Conn. 329, 30 Atl. 57. Argumentativeness is a recognized fault in instructions. It is never error to refuse to comply with requests embodying this fault. Abb. Tr. Brief, Cr. 429. The accused had no right to have his requests in question complied with. The court performed its full duty when it gave, as it did, such instructions as were correct in law, as were adapted to the issue, and as were sufficient for the guidance of the jury in the case before them. City of Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 276, 20 Atl. 471; Charter v. Bane, 62 Conn. 121, 25 Atl. 464. Exact compliance with requests to charge, furthermore, is not required. Substantial compliance is sufficient. In this case there was substantial compliance. City of Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 276, 20 Atl. 471; Livingston's Appeal, 63 Conn. 68, 26 Atl. 470; Town of Ridgefield v. Town of Fairfield, 73 Conn. 47, 46 Atl. 245.
Another of the requests not complied with is one framed for the evident purpose of discrediting the evidence of the state concerning the results of certain chemical and medical examinations. The request was to the effect that such evidence, being of examinations made not in the presence of a representative of the accused, should be carefully considered in view of the possibility of a failure to seek for or develop facts and conditions to the advantage of the accused which an impartial and complete investigation would have disclosed. Such instructions, involving an insinuation, if not assumption, that the examinations in question were not impartial or complete, the accused was clearly not entitled to have. The court told the jury to give all the evidence calm and conscientious consideration. There is no rule of law which compelled him to single out this particular evidence of the state for special caution as evidence coming from a tainted source, as in the case of the evidence of an accomplice.
The attempt of counsel in another of their requests to use the court to bolster up the testimony of the accused and shield her from the force of a charge of having sought to conceal her crime by presenting to the jury an argument in her behalf is too apparent to demand discussion.
The state, upon the trial, sought to establish a motive on the part of the accused for the commission of the crime charged. To this end it offered testimony of her confessed adulterous relations with one Hart, and similar relations with other men. Two of the accused's requests to charge relate to this subject. In one the court was asked to say to the Jury that this evidence should be excluded from consideration, unless it was apparent therefrom that a sufficient motive was thereby furnished to induce her to take the life of the deceased; bearing in mind, however, that it is not sufficient to establish a motive, but that it is also necessary that proof beyond a reasonable doubt be given that the motive was carried into effect. The second request is less involved, but to the same general effect its purport is that this evidence of adulterous relations should not be considered unless the state had established "such a condition of circumstances as had created in the mind of the accused an adequate and sufficient motive to commit the crime of...
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