State v. Ratliff, M-85-1546

Decision Date16 January 1987
Docket NumberM-85-1546
PartiesSTATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Donald Michael RATLIFF, Appellant. ; CA A38813.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Enver Bozgoz, Klamath Falls, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

David Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before WARDEN, P.J., and VAN HOOMISSEN and YOUNG, JJ.

VAN HOOMISSEN, Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction after a jury trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). ORS 813.100. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and in refusing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There are three issues: whether the arresting officer had a reasonable basis to stop defendant's car; if so, whether the state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him for DUII; and whether the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction. We affirm.

The trial court found:

"On October 18, 1984, at 2:25 a.m., Trooper Whitacker, driving a marked patrol car was northbound on Tingley following a traffic stop unrelated to this matter. From the point of the unrelated stop, Tingley Lane goes relatively straight and gradually downhill for approximately 3/4 of a mile in a northerly direction. The road then curves to the right going downhill to a railroad crossing. From the point of the unrelated traffic stop to the railroad tracks, no public roads intersect with Tingley Lane. On the west side of Tingley Lane, in this area, there are numerous private residences with associated driveways and one business on the east side and a business on the west side at the location where the road curves to the right leading downhill to the railroad tracks. The land on either side is relatively flat consisting of fields in the unoccupied areas. Tingley Lane has no designated lower speed, so would be a 55 mph zone in this area. It was clear with a few patches of icy road reported in other areas of the county.

"As the officer proceeded northbound on Tingley, he passed no moving or lighted vehicles. He saw no lighted vehicles in areas adjacent to Tingley Lane. Just prior to the right hand curve he looked in the rearview mirror and did not see the lights or [sic] any vehicles on Tingley. He could observe Tingley for approximately 3/4 of a mile from his location. The officer proceeded to the railroad tracks which contained a stationary train. The officer turned around and proceeded southbound. Upon completing the curve to the left, the officer now observed a vehicle proceeding southbound ahead of him. This section of road was out of his observation for a period of one to one and half [sic] minutes. The officer was curious as to where the vehicle had come from as he had not observed it as he traversed that section of road shortly before. There were private drives and a business driveway that the vehicle could have pulled out of.

"The vehicle was driving at 20-25 mph, and violating no laws. As the officer followed the vehicle, the vehicle turned right, into a private drive and stopped a short way into the drive. The drive proceeded some distance beyond, from where the vehicle stopped, to the house. The vehicle lights remained on. The officer proceeded by the vehicle, past the point of the unrelated traffic stop, around a curve and then backed into a private drive on the west side of Tingley. As the officer passed the vehicle he observed only one person in the vehicle. He did not observe the dome light come on.

"The officer stopped at his location to observe the vehicle because he didn't know where it had come from, because he found it suspicious that it pulled into a drive in the manner it did and because of the late hour.

"Shortly after backing into the drive, the officer observed the headlights of a southbound vehicle. The same vehicle that had pulled into the drive, then drive [sic] slowly past his location. The officer then followed the vehicle for approximately 1/2 mile at 20-25 mph. The officer then activated his overhead lights, stopped the vehicle, and contacted the driver who is the defendant in this case. The defendant was eventually arrested for DUII.

"The officer had received training in the apprehension of intoxicated drivers. Two items included in that training were as follows: A possible lead to an under the influence driver is the driver proceeds at a speed at least 10 mph below the posted speed and under the influence drivers when they are aware of a police vehicle on the road, with them, will stop, wait till [sic] the police vehicle is gone and proceed. The officer had been taught that driving underspeed was a characteristic that occurred in approximately half the DUII arrests in a National Traffic Safety Institute Study. These two factors, driving substantially under the speed limit and the drive/stop/proceed pattern had been factors observed by the officer in DUII arrests by him prior to October 18, 1984.

"The officer said he stopped the defendant first because the circumstances indicated further investigation for burglary or theft violations warranted the stop and secondarily because a potential DUII violation warranted the stop."

Those findings are supported by evidence in the record, and we are bound by them. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968); State v. Johnson/Imel, 16 Or.App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053, rev. den. (1974).

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained as a result of the stop of his car. He argues that Whitacker lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him. He relies on Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 1 The state argues that Whitacker had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while under the influence of intoxicants and that the trial court correctly concluded that the stop was lawful.

ORS 131.615(1) provides:

"A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry."

ORS 131.605(4) provides:

" 'Reasonably suspects' means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 and 131.625."

ORS 131.605(5) provides:

"A 'stop' is a temporary restraint of a person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place."

The statutory standard for the stopping and questioning of a person concerning the person's possible criminal activity is less than the standard for probable cause to arrest. State v. Valdez, 277 Or. 621, 628, 561 P.2d 1006 (1977). In reviewing the basis for a stop, we look to the objective facts known to the officer at the time of the stop. State v. Valdez, supra, 277 Or. at 629, 561 P.2d 1006. The significance of any of the facts known to the officer may be enhanced by the officer's special knowledge of the way certain crimes are committed. State v. Chambers, 69 Or.App. 681, 686, 687 P.2d 805 (1984).

It is true, as defendant argues, that Whitacker testified that he was primarily interested in investigating whether defendant had committed burglary or theft. However, Whitacker also testified that he suspected that defendant might be driving while under the influence of intoxicants. 2 Whitacker knew that defendant was driving 20-25 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone and that defendant followed a "drive/stop/proceed" pattern, i.e., he drove, then pulled off the road until Whitacker was out of sight, then pulled back on the road and drove once again. On the basis of his training and experience, Whitacker knew that those two circumstances often indicate that a person is driving while...

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