State v. Ratliff, M-85-1546
Decision Date | 16 January 1987 |
Docket Number | M-85-1546 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Donald Michael RATLIFF, Appellant. ; CA A38813. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Enver Bozgoz, Klamath Falls, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
David Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before WARDEN, P.J., and VAN HOOMISSEN and YOUNG, JJ.
Defendant appeals his conviction after a jury trial for driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). ORS 813.100. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and in refusing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. There are three issues: whether the arresting officer had a reasonable basis to stop defendant's car; if so, whether the state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting him for DUII; and whether the trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction. We affirm.
The trial court found:
Those findings are supported by evidence in the record, and we are bound by them. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968); State v. Johnson/Imel, 16 Or.App. 560, 519 P.2d 1053, rev. den. (1974).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained as a result of the stop of his car. He argues that Whitacker lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop him. He relies on Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 1 The state argues that Whitacker had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while under the influence of intoxicants and that the trial court correctly concluded that the stop was lawful.
ORS 131.615(1) provides:
"A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry."
ORS 131.605(4) provides:
" 'Reasonably suspects' means that a peace officer holds a belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts as authorized in ORS 131.605 and 131.625."
ORS 131.605(5) provides:
"A 'stop' is a temporary restraint of a person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place."
The statutory standard for the stopping and questioning of a person concerning the person's possible criminal activity is less than the standard for probable cause to arrest. State v. Valdez, 277 Or. 621, 628, 561 P.2d 1006 (1977). In reviewing the basis for a stop, we look to the objective facts known to the officer at the time of the stop. State v. Valdez, supra, 277 Or. at 629, 561 P.2d 1006. The significance of any of the facts known to the officer may be enhanced by the officer's special knowledge of the way certain crimes are committed. State v. Chambers, 69 Or.App. 681, 686, 687 P.2d 805 (1984).
It is true, as defendant argues, that Whitacker testified that he was primarily interested in investigating whether defendant had committed burglary or theft. However, Whitacker also testified that he suspected that defendant might be driving while under the influence of intoxicants. 2 Whitacker knew that defendant was driving 20-25 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone and that defendant followed a "drive/stop/proceed" pattern, i.e., he drove, then pulled off the road until Whitacker was out of sight, then pulled back on the road and drove once again. On the basis of his training and experience, Whitacker knew that those two circumstances often indicate that a person is driving while...
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