State v. Ratliff, 91-0079

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; GUNTHER; ANSTEAD; STONE
• Citation: 592 So.2d 315
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Donald Ray RATLIFF, Appellee. 592 So.2d 315, 17 Fla. L. Week. D127
• Docket Number: No. 91-0079,91-0079
• Decision Date: 27 December 1991

Page 315

592 So.2d 315 STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Donald Ray RATLIFF, Appellee. No. 91-0079.
592 So.2d 315, 17 Fla. L. Week. D127 District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District. Dec. 27, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1992.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Broward County; Robert W. Tyson, Jr., Judge.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joseph A. Tringali, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Mallorye Cunningham, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court erred by sentencing the defendant to less than the mandatory minimum sentence required for a sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. We reverse and remand for a resentencing to the mandatory minimum sentence. See State v. Vola, 591 So.2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). See also State v. Scates, 585 So.2d 385 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); State v. Baumgardner, 587 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); State v. Baxter, 581 So.2d 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

GUNTHER, J., concurs.

ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur specially with opinions.

ANSTEAD, Judge, concurring specially.

I agree that we are bound to reverse under the authority of our previous decisions. However, I still have doubts about the mandatory application of the sentencing provisions of section 893.13(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1989).

At issue here is whether the discretionary provisions of section 397.12, Florida Statutes (1989), may be utilized to avoid the mandatory provisions of section 893.13(1)(e). Section 397.12 encourages the use of rehabilitation and treatment in appropriate drug dependent cases. While I have previously relied on the express language of section 397.12 to support this view, I also note that we have held that youthful offender cases are excepted from the mandatory provisions of section 893.13(1)(e). In Jones v. State, 588 So.2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), we reversed the trial court for imposing a mandatory sentence under section 893.13(1)(e) upon a youthful offender convicted of selling cocaine within 100 feet of a school. In contrast, here we are requiring the trial court to impose a mandatory sentence on a person who admitted purchasing cocaine rocks from an undercover police officer, and whom the trial court found, in detailed findings of fact, to be a perfect candidate for rehabilitation.

STONE, Judge, concurring specially.

I concur in the majority opinion but take this opportunity to add my...