State v. Rattee (In re Rattee)
| Decision Date | 31 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 97–480.,97–480. |
| Citation | 761 A.2d 1076,145 N.H. 341 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | Petition of Steven RATTEE (New Hampshire Agricultural Lands Preservation Committee). The State of New Hampshire v. Steven Rattee. Steven Rattee v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Agriculture, Markets and Food and another. |
Richard R. Peppe, of Pembroke, and Elizabeth Cazden, of Manchester (Mr. Peppe and Ms. Cazden, on the brief, and Mr. Peppe orally), for Steven Rattee.
Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (Douglas N. Jones, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State of New Hampshire.
Paul F. Cavanaugh, city solicitor, of Concord, for defendant City of Concord, filed no brief.
This is a consolidated appeal from decisions of the New Hampshire Agricultural Lands Preservation Committee (ALPC) and the Superior Court (Brennan , J.) denying the request of Steven Rattee to construct a home on land subject to an agricultural preservation restriction (APR). We affirm in part and vacate in part.
The following facts were either found by the trial court or the ALPC or adduced at trial or the ALPC hearing. In May 1996, Rattee purchased at a foreclosure sale 185 acres of land on the east and west sides of Mountain Road in Concord for $216,000 and approximately $28,000 in back taxes. The deed granted to him stated that the land was subject to the terms of an APR and stated where the APR was recorded in the Merrimack County Registry of Deeds. In 1982, Rattee's predecessor in title, Horace Blood, had granted by deed the APR on approximately 103 acres of the property to the State of New Hampshire (grantee), acting through the ALPC and the commissioner of the department of agriculture (commissioner).
See generally RSA ch. 36 D (Supp.1981) (current version at RSA 432:18 to: 31–a (1991 & Supp. 1999)). The State paid approximately $406,000 to acquire the APR.
The APR states, in pertinent part:
In 1987, the prior owners constructed on land subject to the APR a small house that remains. Also included in the 185 acres purchased by the petitioner is an adjacent 3.3 acre "farmstead site," which is exempt from the APR and upon which stood a house. According to Rattee, in 1996 he arranged for that house to be burned down as a fire department exercise because it was in very poor condition.
In the fall of 1996, Rattee excavated a field on land subject to the APR to construct a new 5500 square foot home and a 1500 foot driveway that would destroy two acres. He applied for a building permit from the City of Concord, but did not seek building or placement approval from the ALPC. Shortly thereafter, the State advised Rattee that he was in violation of the APR. Rattee asserted that the APR did not apply because the house was going to be his home, and thus was subject to an exception for "dwellings used for family living by the landowner." RSA 36–D:1, II (current version at RSA 432:18, II).
In October and November 1996, Rattee and the State filed cross petitions for equitable relief in superior court. Rattee sought declaratory judgment that the APR does not require the commissioner's consent to construct a home on the site and that RSA chapter 36–D did not authorize the commissioner to require prior approval for any matters concerning the construction of a home for the landowner. He also asked the court to enjoin the commissioner from taking any act to prevent the issuance of a building permit to him. The State requested a temporary restraining order halting construction of the house and further proceedings to determine whether the APR allowed Rattee to construct a home without the prior approval of the ALPC. On November 19, 1996, the Superior Court (McGuire , J.) denied Rattee's request and issued an injunction prohibiting Rattee from performing further work on the site until he received approval from the ALPC or further order of the court.
In March 1997, Rattee filed an application with the ALPC for approval of the project. After a hearing, the ALPC denied the application. In its decision, the ALPC reasoned that "[g]iven the existing residence on the Site and the availability of adjacent, commonly owned land traditionally used for owner-operated housing, any loss of productive soils must be viewed as an unreasonable diminution of the Site's agricultural potential." It also stated that the APR prohibits subdivision of the site and that the site may only be sold as a whole. Rattee filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging that decision, with a specific request that we defer action until the superior court reached a final decision on the equity petitions.
On March 6, 1998, the Superior Court (Brennan , J.) made the temporary injunction permanent, contingent upon our ruling that Rattee is required to obtain the prior approval of the ALPC for the construction or placement of buildings for family living. The trial court concluded that the APR's exception for construction or placement of a dwelling for "family living" is subject to the prior approval of the ALPC. The court also concluded that the easterly and westerly sections of the land constitute a single site and that the APR prohibits the petitioner from subdividing or severing them from the site without obtaining a release. Rattee appealed the trial court's order, and we consolidated the petition for writ of certiorari and the appeal from the superior court.
On appeal, Rattee argues that: (1) the State, acting through the ALPC, lacked authority to acquire the right to require prior approval for the construction of owner residences on APR sites; (2) the APR did not effectively convey to the State the right to determine the location of owner residences on the site; (3) the ALPC acted unreasonably in disapproving Rattee's application; and (4) the ALPC and the trial court improperly ruled that sections of the APR site on either side of Mountain Road cannot be sold separately without the ALPC's approval.
With respect to the first argument, we do not agree that the State lacked authority to purchase or acquire more rights than are contained in the statutory definition of an APR, specifically the right to regulate construction of owner residences on APR sites. The provision requiring prior approval for construction or placement of owner residences was part of a voluntary conveyance of property rights to the State. Cf . Gephart v. Daigneault , 137 N.H. 166, 170–71, 623 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1993) (). Even if we assume that the prior approval provision exceeds the authority given to the State by RSA chapter 36–D, no rule of law bars the State from purchasing such a right. See Bennett v. Comm'r of Food & Agriculture , 411 Mass. 1, 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (1991).
We also reject the argument that the APR did not convey to the State the right to determine the location of owner housing on the site. Rattee contends that the statement in the APR that it "is intended to conform to and have the benefit of RSA 36–D" restricts the rights conveyed to those enumerated in RSA chapter 36–D. Therefore, while the APR language requiring prior approval may be clear, Rattee argues that it is rendered ambiguous by the statement that the APR is intended to conform to RSA chapter 36 D, which does not have a prior approval provision. The State counters that the prior approval provision is a "necessary, appropriate and reasonable means for accomplishing the public policy objective of preserving good quality agricultural land for future agricultural production."
"[T]he determination of a deed's intended meaning and its legal effect is ultimately a question of law for this court...." Lussier v. N.E. Power Co. , 133 N.H. 753, 756–57, 584 A.2d 179, 181 (1990). "If the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we will interpret the intended meaning from the deed itself without resort to extrinsic evidence." Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 573, 644 A.2d 51, 60 (1994).
The stated purpose of RSA chapter 36–D is to "recognize the importance of preserving the limited land suitable for agricultural production, to safeguard the public health and welfare by encouraging the maximum use of food and fiber producing capabilities of the state's agriculturally suitable land and to ensure the protection of agricultural land facing conversion to non-agricultural uses." Laws 1979, 301:1. Thus, while the APR statute and deed both reserve the right to construct "dwellings to be used for family living," requiring prior approval for such construction is consistent with the statutory purpose. Prior approval ensures that family dwellings will be constructed in a manner that minimizes their impact on agricultural production and prevents potential abuse of...
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