State v. Rawlings
| Decision Date | 20 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 19539,19539 |
| Citation | 829 P.2d 520,121 Idaho 930 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steven Lewis RAWLINGS, Defendant-Appellant. Boise, December 1991 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender and Deborah A. Whipple, Deputy Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for
[121 Idaho 931] defendant-appellant. Deborah A. Whipple argued.
Larry J. EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. Michael A. Henderson argued.
On December 21, 1989, between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., police officers acted in response to a report of a burglary in process at Dick's Stereo Shop on Fairview Avenue in Boise, Idaho. At the scene of the alleged offense, police officers discovered a window had been broken in order to gain entry to the building. Several of the officers positioned themselves to secure the perimeter of the building, awaiting the manager of the business to facilitate their entry into the business. At least one of the officers had drawn his sidearm, contemplating the possibility of a suspect still being on the premises.
At approximately 5:00 a.m., Officer Graybill, at the scene of the reported burglary, with his sidearm drawn, had called to his attention by another officer, a man walking across a parking lot in the block immediately to the west of the site of the reported burglary. When Officer Graybill observed this individual, he had turned north and was walking through the parking lot, approximately 150 feet from the police officer. No other persons were visible in the area at that time.
Officer Graybill crossed the street, running, to overtake the individual. As the police officer approached, the individual continued walking northerly and disappeared along the west side of the funeral home which blocked the officer's view. Upon turning the corner of the funeral home building, Officer Graybill found the individual stopped in the parking lot, facing the funeral home.
Officer Graybill inquired as to what the individual (who is the defendant in this case) was doing in that location. The defendant replied that he was looking for his cigarettes and asked the police officer if he had seen them. Officer Graybill replied in the negative and inquired as to whether the defendant had any identification that the officer could examine; the individual stated that he had no identification on his person. The police officer then inquired if the defendant had a wallet; the individual stated that he did not. Thereupon, Officer Graybill directed the defendant to turn around so that the officer could pat him down to see if he had a wallet. At this moment, the defendant threw a small object in the direction of the funeral home. The police officer heard the object land in the parking lot where it made a "hollow pinging sound."
Immediately after the preceding events, another police officer appeared in the parking lot as Officer Graybill forced the defendant to the ground and the two officers took the defendant into custody. Officer Graybill then examined the area where he had seen and heard the defendant throw an object, and found a small green Excedrin bottle which contained a white substance and some green leafy material, subsequently identified as methamphetamine and marijuana. No other materials were found in this area of the parking lot.
Defendant was charged with possession of controlled substances and was bound over to the district court at a preliminary hearing on charges of possession of methamphetamine, a felony, and possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor.
Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and the matter was set for jury trial. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion seeking the suppression of "all evidence seized at arrest...." Counsel for both the State and the defendant relied on the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing in arguing the motion to suppress to the trial court. The defendant alleged that the evidence against the defendant was seized as a result of a warrantless search or seizure, which is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and that the action of the police officer in the instant case did not fall within any recognized exception to this principle. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Defense At the conclusion of closing arguments, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments, which was subsequently memorialized in a written motion, each of which were denied by the trial court. The jury returned a guilty verdict on each count of possession of a controlled substance.
[121 Idaho 932] counsel renewed and urged the suppression motion at the commencement of the jury trial, and following the trial testimony of Officer Graybill. On each occasion, the trial court denied this motion.
Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motions and motion for mistrial. That appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals which, after hearing, vacated the judgment of conviction, holding that "the dispositive issue in this case is whether the scope of a Terry-stop-and-frisk includes a police pat down search for identification." The Court of Appeals then held that it does not, and reversed the trial court.
The State petitioned for review, which petition was granted by this Court. We vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court.
The issues presented on this appeal are:
1. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress?
2. Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct?
The defendant urges that the evidence of possession of controlled substances obtained from the discarded Excedrin bottle was obtained as a direct result, and not independent of, illegal police action and must be excluded. In this regard, defendant relies on Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Our review, therefore, must depend on an analysis of whether the defendant's disposal of the evidence was precipitated by unlawful police conduct, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and/or article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
An individual who is accosted by a police officer and has his freedom to walk away restrained has been seized. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Not all seizures of the person need be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime; a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, detain a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Such a seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment if there is an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
There is no dispute that the defendant was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he submitted to Graybill's authority. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; see California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), (suspect had not submitted to police authority and thus no seizure had occurred). The defendant maintains, however, that the seizure was invalid because the officer lacked a sufficient legal basis for the stop. Whether an officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987).
In the instant case, police officers responded to a report of a burglary in the predawn hours of December 21, 1989. The police arrived at a business property situated upon a business thoroughfare, with visible signs of forced entry having been made to the building. The police officers The defendant was the only person in the area other than the police officers. The defendant was walking away from the locale of the reported burglary. The defendant departed from a walkway and proceeded to cross the parking lot, which course of travel would take him out of the vision of the police officers. There was a motel in the direction in which the defendant was traveling. It is possible that the defendant could have been on an innocent mission, but these facts, together with the reported crime, provided objectively reasonable grounds which were adequate to support a police officer's suspicion of criminal activity. These facts, in their totality, provide a basis for the trial court's conclusion that the police officer's stop of the defendant was a valid detention of a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity, although there was no probable cause to make an arrest. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.
[121 Idaho 933] believed that the perpetrator could still be on the premises.
Defendant further asserts that the police officer running toward him with a drawn weapon was "outrageous and totally unreasonable under the circumstances" and exceeded any permissible investigative stop. An investigative stop is not converted into an arrest with a police officer taking the reasonable precaution of drawing weapons for their own safety. See United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981).
The testimony is undisputed that the police officer had drawn his weapon out of...
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