State v. Rawlings

• Decision Date: 22 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 42697–2014.,42697–2014.
• Citation: 363 P.3d 339,159 Idaho 498
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent v. Ryan M. RAWLINGS, Defendant–Appellant.

159 Idaho 498

363 P.3d 339

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent

v.Ryan M. RAWLINGS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 42697–2014.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 2015 Term.

Dec. 22, 2015.

Jay W. Logsdon, Deputy Kootenai County Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, argued for Appellant.

Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, argued for Respondent.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal out of Kootenai County challenging the burglary statute on the grounds of equal protection and freedom of speech and challenging the admission into evidence of the defendant's prior shoplifting from the same national retailer as evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft when he entered the store. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.Factual Background.

On May 6, 2014, Ryan Rawlings went into a Wal–Mart store to steal various items. He selected a large tote, placed it in a shopping cart, filled the tote with small items of merchandise, and covered them with the tote's lid. He also selected a combination floor lamp and table and placed it in the cart. He then pushed the cart through the self-checkout line without paying for the merchandise. He obviously hoped that a cart containing two items that were too large to bag would not attract attention. However, a loss prevention officer had observed Mr. Rawlings's actions. The loss prevention officer called law enforcement and then walked outside the store. He stopped Mr. Rawlings in the parking lot and asked Mr. Rawlings to come back into the store. Mr. Rawlings complied. When a sheriffs deputy arrived, he talked with Mr. Rawlings after giving him Miranda rights. The Deputy asked Mr. Rawlings whether he had previously committed thefts like this, and Mr. Rawlings answered that he had back in Ohio. He stated that he had always been able to take items from Wal–Mart stores in the past without getting caught.

Mr. Rawlings was charged with petit theft, a misdemeanor, and burglary, a felony. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the felony, and he was bound over to answer in the district court. Prior to trial, his counsel, Jay W. Logsdon, moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the grounds that the statute, as applied to Mr. Rawlings, violated both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Freedom of Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Judge Charles W. Hosack heard that motion and denied it.

Prior to trial, the Prosecutor served and filed a notice of the State's intent to present evidence of Mr. Rawlings's statement regarding his prior thefts, and Mr. Logsdon filed and served a motion in limine seeking to exclude that evidence. Judge Rich Christensen heard the motion and ruled that the evidence was admissible.

During a conference in chambers on the morning of the trial, Mr. Logsdon re-argued the motion in limine, and Judge Christensen adhered to his prior ruling. Then the Prosecutor orally moved to dismiss the petit theft charge, and the district court granted the motion. The burglary charge was tried to the jury, which found Mr. Rawlings guilty of burglary. He then timely appealed.

II.Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Burglary Statute, as Applied to Mr. Rawlings, Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Mr. Logsdon filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the burglary charge on the ground that, as applied to Mr. Rawlings, it violated the Equal Protection Clause. "The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 319–20 (1985). The first step in addressing an equal-protection challenge is identifying the classification being challenged. In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho 157, 160, 106 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2005).

The statute defining burglary states, "Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary." I.C. § 18–1401. During oral argument in the district court on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Logsdon identified the classification being challenged as follows:

The motion has two different points: One is the attack on the—for lacking an equal application, for whatever reason, blocking out the entering of certain spaces for further punishment rather than thieves that would not do so. And so the category, essentially, as it stands, would be—I think, is a category of either everybody who enters into structures with the intent to commit theft versus everybody who intends to commit theft and doesn't wind up having to enter a structure.

During his argument before the district court, Mr. Logsdon further refined the classification to be compared with the statute. He stated that when Mr. Rawlings entered the Wal–Mart, it was a commercial business open to the public and as a member of the public Mr. Rawlings had been invited in, so he was not trespassing. Mr. Logsdon added that his challenge would not include a situation where someone who intended to commit a theft in a private home was invited in by the homeowner. He also would limit his challenge to those who enter with the intent to commit petit theft, a misdemeanor, rather than grand theft, a felony. Insofar as is relevant to this case, petit theft would be stealing property where the value of the property taken does not exceed $1,000. I.C. §§ 18–2407(1)(b) 1., 8., (2) & 18–2408.

Under Idaho law, there is no requirement that a burglar actually commit a theft. The crime of burglary is complete when there is an entry with the intent to commit a theft, even if the burglar then abandons that intent or for some other reason fails to commit the theft. State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 114–15, 594 P.2d 149, 152–53 (1979) ; State v. Hewitt, 73 Idaho 452, 461, 254 P.2d 677, 682 (1953) ; I.C. § 18–1401. Also, there is no requirement that the burglar, at the time of entry, know that there is anything inside that he wants to steal; all that is required is entry with the intent to steal anything he finds that he might desire to appropriate. State v. Dwyer, 33 Idaho 224, 225–26, 191 P. 203, 203 (1920).

Thus, Mr. Logsdon contends that the burglary statute, as applied to Mr. Rawlings, denied him the equal protection of the law because it criminalized his conduct in entering a store during business hours with the intent to steal in that part of the store open to the public whatever merchandise he desired that had a total value not exceeding $1,000, but the statute does not criminalize the conduct of someone who walks around outdoors with the hope of discovering property not exceeding $1,000 in value that could be stolen without committing a common-law trespass to real property. "Equal protection embraces the principle that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefits and burdens of the law." In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho at 160, 106 P.3d at 1126. The persons in these two classifications are not in like circumstances. Therefore, Mr. Rawlings has not shown that the district court erred in holding that the burglary statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Mr. Logsdon may not like the fact that retail stores are within the ambit of the statute during business hours, but that is a matter within the discretion of the legislature.

The burglary statute enacted by Idaho's territorial legislature in 1864 would not have criminalized Mr. Rawlings's conduct because it only applied to the nighttime entry, with the required intent, "into any dwelling house, or any other house whatever, or tent." Cr. & P. 1864, § 59. In 1887, the territorial legislature enacted a burglary statute that expanded the statute's scope to what is essentially the same as the current statute. It applied to the entry, with the required intent, into "any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, or railroad car." Rev. Stats. Idaho Terr. § 7014 (1887). Since 1887, Idaho's burglary statute has applied to the entry into a store during business hours to commit a theft, except for about one year. In 1971, the legislature repealed the burglary statute and adopted the Model Penal Code, which excluded from burglary "premises [that] are at the time open to the public." Ch. 143, §§ 1, 5, 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws 630, 688, 730. The following year, the legislature repealed the Model Penal Code and re-enacted the version of burglary that had been repealed in 1971, so that burglary again included entry, with the required intent, into a store. Ch. 336, § 1, 1972 Idaho Sess. Laws 844, 871. Considering that shoplifting results in an increased cost of goods to consumers, there is a legitimate interest in discouraging shoplifting from retail stores. "We must apply the statute as written. ‘If the statute is unwise, the power to correct it resides with the legislature, not the judiciary.’ " A&B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 154 Idaho 652, 656, 301 P.3d 1270, 1274 (2012).

III.Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Burglary Statute Did Not Violate the First Amendment?

Mr. Logsdon also moved to dismiss the burglary charge on the ground that it violates the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. He argued that the element of the crime that the person enter "with intent to commit any theft or any felony" constitutes punishing someone for "bad thoughts" and has a chilling effect on speech. Mr. Logsdon does not contend that the burglary statute had a chilling effect upon Mr. Rawlings's speech. Rather, he contends that the statute may have a chilling effect upon the speech of others...