State v. Ray, 14741

Citation635 A.2d 777,228 Conn. 147
Decision Date21 December 1993
Docket NumberNo. 14741,14741
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. McKinley RAY.

Timothy H. Everett, Hartford, with whom were Thomas Nolan, Certified Legal Intern, and, on the brief, Christopher Kriesen, Certified Legal Intern, for appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, Asst. State's Atty., with whom on the brief were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and Cecelia B. Wiederhold, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The defendant, McKinley Ray, was charged in separate counts with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(1) and (3). 1 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56(a). 2 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly refused the defendant's request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-58. 3 In State v. Ray 30 Conn.App. 95, 619 A.2d 469 (1993), the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the requested instruction. The defendant then petitioned this court and we granted certification. 4 We conclude that the defendant's request should have been granted and therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At approximately 7 p.m. on September 20, 1990, the defendant and Arthur Aldrich were sitting and talking on the front porch of their residence at 131 Portsea Street in New Haven. The defendant lived in the basement apartment at that address and Aldrich lived on the first floor. After they had been talking for half an hour, Sherie Walton, who lived on the second floor, appeared and began arguing with Aldrich. Jonathan Morris also appeared and began arguing with the defendant. Apparently, Walton's father had arrived home inebriated, and the defendant and Aldrich had laughed at him and another man as they stumbled up the stairs. Their laughter had angered Walton and Morris. In addition, Walton had accused Aldrich of stealing and wearing a pair of her pants.

Walton's brother, Amar (A.J.), approached the group and then joined in the argument. At some point, Morris stepped away from the argument and then returned with a brick, rock, or piece of concrete. He struck the defendant under his right eye with the object, causing the defendant to bleed. The defendant told A.J. that he did not want any trouble. Aldrich helped the defendant, who was woozy and staggering, through the front door of the building and down a dark, narrow hallway to the first floor kitchen.

A.J. and Morris, neither of whom lived in the building, forced their way through the front door and into the hallway. The defendant and Aldrich went back into the hallway, where fighting broke out among the four men. At some point, the defendant pulled out a pocket knife with a five inch blade that he used to open boxes at work. He stabbed Morris and A.J., who then ran from the house and collapsed outside. Morris, who was stabbed four times, 5 died as a result of a wound that penetrated three and one-half inches into his chest and heart. A.J. was stabbed several times but survived.

The defendant, who testified at trial, admitted to stabbing both victims but claimed that he had been frightened and had acted in self-defense. He stated that Morris had been swinging a brick at him in the hallway, causing glancing blows to the defendant's head. Further, he testified that although he knew that he had stabbed Morris, Morris had continued fighting and the defendant did not know where or how many times he had stabbed Morris or whether Morris had been injured. Similarly, while the defendant knew that he had stabbed A.J., A.J. had continued fighting and the defendant did not know where or how many times he had stabbed him. Edward T. McDonough, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on Morris, testified that Morris was stabbed three times in the right arm or shoulder and once in the chest, and that only the chest wound was life-threatening. McDonough stated that Morris' wounds were consistent with the defendant flailing at him with the knife while Morris was moving around. 6

Before the defendant testified, the trial court requested counsel to file written requests to charge. The defendant did so, specifically requesting the trial court to charge the jury with respect to criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of manslaughter. The trial court refused to give this instruction and the defendant excepted.

The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offenses of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56(a), and assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(2). The trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of nine years imprisonment.

In State v. Whistnant, 179 Conn. 576, 588, 427 A.2d 414 (1980), we held that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if he can demonstrate compliance with each of four conditions: "(1) an appropriate instruction is requested by either the state or the defendant; (2) it is not possible to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser; (3) there is some evidence, introduced by either the state or the defendant, or by a combination of their proofs, which justifies conviction of the lesser offense; and (4) the proof on the element or elements which differentiate the lesser offense from the offense charged is sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser." The state conceded before the Appellate Court that the defendant had satisfied the first two prongs of Whistnant. 7 The Appellate Court held however, that the defendant's testimony did not place the evidence "sufficiently in dispute to support a finding of criminally negligent conduct" because "[r]ational jurors using common sense could not reasonably have found that the defendant did not perceive a substantial risk of death when he stabbed Morris with sufficient force to penetrate his chest and heart." State v. Ray, supra, 30 Conn.App. at 103, 619 A.2d 469. We disagree.

In considering whether the defendant has satisfied the requirements set forth in State v. Whistnant, supra, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant's request for a charge on the lesser included offense. State v. Montanez, 219 Conn. 16, 22-23, 592 A.2d 149 (1991); State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78, 106, 554 A.2d 686, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 3230, 106 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989). "[T]he jury's role as fact-finder is so central to our jurisprudence that, in close cases, the trial court should generally opt in favor of giving an instruction on a lesser included offense, if it is requested.... Otherwise the defendant would lose the right to have the jury pass upon every factual issue fairly presented by the evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 68, 621 A.2d 728 (1993). Under Whistnant, the evidence is "sufficiently in dispute where it is of such factual quality that would permit the [jury] reasonably to find the defendant guilty on the lesser included offense. This requirement serves to prevent a jury from capriciously convicting on the lesser included offense when the evidence requires either conviction on the greater offense or acquittal.... Nonetheless, jurors are supposed to reach their conclusions on the basis of common sense, common understanding and fair beliefs, grounded on the evidence ... from which inferences can fairly be drawn.... They should not [however] be encouraged to engage in speculation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez, supra, 219 Conn. at 23, 592 A.2d 149. On appeal, an appellate court must reverse a trial court's failure to give the requested instruction if "we cannot as a matter of law exclude [the] possibility" that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. State v. Falby, 187 Conn. 6, 30, 444 A.2d 213 (1982). "If, based on the admissible evidence presented at trial, the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant acted ... with criminal negligence in causing the victim's death, then the defendant was entitled to the charge requested." Id., at 29, 444 A.2d 213.

In State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382, 404, 429 A.2d 919 (1980), we stated: "The state of mind of one accused of a crime is often the most significant and, at the same time, the most elusive element of the crime charged. This is especially true where a person has caused the death of another person." The dividing line between manslaughter in the second degree, of which the defendant was convicted, and criminally negligent homicide is especially thin. To be guilty of the former, the defendant must be aware of and consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur. General Statutes §§ 53a-56(a) and 53a-3(13). To be guilty of criminally negligent homicide, however, the defendant must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will occur. General Statutes §§ 53a-58 and 53a-3(14). Therefore, the issue that distinguishes the two criminal offenses is whether the defendant subjectively realized and chose to ignore a substantial risk of death; State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 33, 627 A.2d 862 (1993); or merely failed to realize that he was creating a substantial risk of death.

The defendant claims that a jury reasonably could have found that he had failed to perceive the risk that he might cause...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • State v. Person
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 19 Marzo 1996
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 7 Junio 1994
    ...to permit the jury consistently to find the defendant innocent of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser.' " State v. Ray, 228 Conn. 147, 152-53, 635 A.2d 777 (1993); State v. Arena, 33 Conn.App. 468, 479, 636 A.2d 398, cert. granted, 229 Conn. 918, 644 A.2d 914 (1994). The state clai......
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 4 Marzo 2003
    ...but guilty of the lesser." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, supra, 65 Conn.App. 130, 782 A.2d 175; State v. Ray, 228 Conn. 147, 152, 635 A.2d 777 (1993). Although both parties conceded that the second prong of the Whistnant test had been satisfied, the state argued that t......
  • State v. Gary
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 19 Abril 2005
    ...a gun may be fired intentionally, recklessly or accidentally. In support of this claim, he cites our statement in State v. Ray, 228 Conn. 147, 157 n. 8, 635 A.2d 777 (1993), that the fact that the defendant used a deadly weapon "tells us nothing about the defendant's state of mind." We are ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT