State v. Ray

Decision Date21 April 1976
Docket NumberNo. 48246,48246
Citation331 So.2d 316
PartiesSTATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Charles Lewis RAY, Jr., a/k/a Charles L. Ray, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and Douglas A. Wallace, Asst. Public Defender, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reported at 320 So.2d 426, because of an asserted conflict with the decisions of this Court in Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 477 (Fla.1975), and Estevez v. State, 313 So.2d 692 (Fla.1975). Jurisdiction is provided under Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.

In the case under review the trial court entered judgments, upon guilty pleas, for sexual battery, attempted sexual battery and breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: sexual battery, and, after having entered, making an assault upon a woman lawfully within in the dwelling house. The event which was the subject of the judgment for sexual battery occurred on a date separate from the event giving rise to the other two judgments. The trial judge sentenced the defendant to 15 years for the sexual battery. Concurrent five-year sentences were imposed for the other two offenses to run consecutive to the 15-year sentence.

While affirming all three judgments the District Court ordered that the sentence for attempted sexual battery be vacated as violating the single transaction rule. It held that 'the attempted sexual battery for which the appellant was convicted was an essential element of the breaking and entering charge.' In Jenkins, supra, this Court upheld the imposition of separate sentences for possession of cannabis sativa and possession of an hallucinogenic drug even though the defendant was found in possession of the two separate drug substances on the same occasion. In Estevez, supra, we held that 'breaking and entering and grand larceny are separate offenses, not facets of the same transaction, and that two separate sentences may be imposed upon conviction of the two offenses.' The convictions in Estevez grew out of a single occurrence.

To resolve the apparent conflict between Jenkins and Estevez and the decision here reviewed we granted the petition for writ of certiorari and despensed with oral argument. After a careful review of the briefs submitted by the parties, ...

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9 cases
  • Borges v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 8, 1982
    ...the evidentiary proof. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 366 So.2d 418 (Fla.1978); State v. Heisterman, 343 So.2d 1272 (Fla.1977); State v. Ray, 331 So.2d 316 (Fla.1976); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 477 (Fla.1975); Estevez v. State, 313 So.2d 692 (Fla.1975); Foster v. State, 286 So.2d 549 (......
  • Davis v. State, 80-1656
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 30, 1980
    ...offense he says arose out of the same criminal episode as the robbery, is without merit, § 775.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1979); see State v. Ray, 331 So.2d 316 (Fla.1976); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 477 (Fla.1975); Estevez v. State, 313 So.2d 692 (Fla.1975), and this result is not altered by......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 21, 1978
    ...the holdings of this Court in Estevez v. State, 313 So.2d 692 (Fla.1975); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 477 (Fla.1975) and State v. Ray, 331 So.2d 316 (Fla.1976). In McClain the court upheld the separate sentences, citing only Estevez and Swyers v. State, 334 So.2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA In bo......
  • Sellars v. State, GG-396
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 18, 1978
    ...Supreme Court decisions. See Estevez v. State, 313 So.2d 692 (Fla.1975); Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 477 (Fla.1975); and State v. Ray, 331 So.2d 316 (Fla.1976)." In the instant case the defendant was convicted of three counts of armed robbery (Florida Statute § 812.13), a felony of the......
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