State v. Rayburns

• Decision Date: 05 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 26,797.,26,797.
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry RAYBURNS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

182 P.3d 786

2008 NMCA 050

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barry RAYBURNS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 26,797.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

February 5, 2008.

Certiorari Granted, No. 31,021, April 18, 2008.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Karl Erich Martell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION

CASTILLO, Judge.

{1} In this case, we examine the scope of our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040, to determine if Heinsen permits the State to benefit from a new six-month period under Rule 5-604 NMRA when the State dismisses a magistrate court proceeding and refiles the same case in district court after the magistrate court's exclusion of evidence as a discovery sanction. We conclude that Heinsen does not apply to the facts currently before us; therefore, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the criminal charges against Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} On August 6, 2005, Defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI), failure to use a signal properly, and violation of the open container law. He was arraigned in magistrate court on August 16, 2005. After a number of hearings and resettings, Defendant's magistrate court bench trial was scheduled to take place on February 8, 2006.

{3} On the day of trial, Defendant made an oral motion in limine, arguing that the results of his breath test should not be admitted into evidence because of the State's failure to provide the relevant certification for the machine used to test Defendant. The State asserted that it had provided a certification but conceded that the certification related to the wrong time period. Finding that the State had failed to timely disclose the appropriate certification, the magistrate court granted Defendant's motion and excluded the breath test results. Following this ruling, the State orally announced its intent to dismiss the charges pending in magistrate court.

{4} The next day, the State refiled the same charges in district court but did not file a written notice of dismissal until a month later, on March 9, 2006. Defendant was arraigned in district court on April 17, 2006. Shortly after his arraignment, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of the six-month rule, Rule 5-604, and his right to a speedy trial, N.M. Const. art. II, § 14. Defendant contended that the State did not file its notice of dismissal in magistrate court until day 205 of the 182-day time period and that the State was not entitled to a new six-month period, since it lacked a good and sufficient reason for dismissing the case and refiling it in district court. The district court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the charges.

{5} In its order, the district court made the following findings: (1) the time period to take Defendant to trial would have been February 14, 2006, which was 182 days from the date of arraignment in magistrate court; (2) the State filed its written dismissal of the magistrate court charges 205 days after the arraignment; (3) the State maintained that Defendant's oral motion was a motion to suppress evidence; (4) no new evidence or facts had been discovered by the State subsequent to its oral dismissal; and (5) the State had not demonstrated a reasonable basis for dismissing the magistrate court charges and refiling in district court under Heinsen. It is from this order of dismissal that the State appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

{6} The State's main contention is that the district court erred in not reading Heinsen to allow refiling in district court and the running of a new six-month period after arraignment. The State also argues that the district court incorrectly interpreted and applied Rule 5-604 to dismiss Defendant's case. Finally, the State contends that Defendant failed to preserve his right to raise potential speedy trial violations on appeal. We address each of these arguments below.

A. Standard of Review

{7} We conduct a de novo review of the district court's application of the six-month rule. See State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 ("We review a district court's application of Rule 6-506 [NMRA] de novo."), cert. quashed, 2007-NMCERT-008, 142 N.M. 436, 166 P.3d 1090; State v. Cardenas, 2003-NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 133 N.M. 516, 64 P.3d 543 ("The district court's application of Rule 5-604 is subject to de novo review."). However, we review the district court's determination regarding questions of historical fact with the deference of the substantial evidence standard. See State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075. Questions of historical fact include questions regarding "what really motivated the prosecutor in dismissing the case and whether his actions were taken in subjective good faith." Id. "On the other hand, a de novo standard is applied to determine the type of reasons that will justify a dismissal ... or the type of analysis that should be utilized in these cases." Id.

B. The Six-Month Rule

{8} Because the heart of this appeal deals with the six-month rule, we provide a short review of how this rule functions. The rules of criminal procedure for both magistrate and district courts contain limits regarding the time for commencement of a defendant's criminal trial. See Rule 6-506; Rule 5-604. The magistrate rule, Rule 6-506, "requires a defendant's trial to commence within one-hundred eighty-two days of a triggering event." Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 6, 140 N.M. 779, 149 P.3d 95 (citing Rule 6-506(B)-(E)). Similarly, the district court rule, Rule 5-604, requires "trial to commence within six months of various [triggering] events." State v. Jaramillo, 2004-NMCA-041, ¶ 9, 135 N.M. 322, 88 P.3d 264 (citing Rule 5-604(F)). The purpose of these rules "is to encourage the orderly and prompt disposition of criminal cases," State v. Lucero, 108 N.M. 548, 551, 775 P.2d 750, 753 (Ct.App.1989), and to guard against lack of preparedness on the part of the state. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075.

{9} Typically, these rules require the dismissal of criminal charges, with prejudice, if the defendant's trial has not commenced within 182 days or six months from a triggering event, such as arraignment. See Rule 6-506(E); Rule 5-604(F). However, there are exceptions to the literal application of the six-month rule. For example, the state may dismiss a complaint filed in magistrate court and refile the charges in district court, a process that often results in an adjustment of the six-month rule deadline. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 ("Ordinarily, ... filing a nolle prosequi ends the previous proceeding and allows a new six-month period to run[.]"). However, while the refiling of charges in district court may result in an adjustment of the six-month rule, this is not universally the case. See id. ("New Mexico courts have been reluctant to hold that filing a nolle prosequi always results in a new six-month period."). Instead, the district court supervises the state's discretion to dismiss magistrate court proceedings and to refile in district court "by inquiring into the reasons for dismissal to ensure that the six-month rule and the defendant's due process rights are not unduly infringed." Id. ¶ 25 (citing State v. Gardea, 1999-NMCA-116, ¶¶ 6, 7, 128 N.M. 64, 989 P.2d 439). The state will not receive the benefit of a new six-month period in district court if the state's basis for dismissing the magistrate court proceedings is improper. See Heinsen, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 26, 138 N.M. 441, 121 P.3d 1040 ("`Prosecutors may ordinarily do what they wish — unless there is a bad reason for what they do[.]'" (quoting Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 11, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075)).

{10} If a defendant challenges the state's refiling of charges in district court on a six-month rule violation, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that its actions were legitimate. This requires the state to demonstrate that its actions were not done for bad reasons or an improper purpose. See State ex rel. Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 627, 495 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1972) (holding that if a defendant asserts that the state's action was to delay or otherwise circumvent the rule, "the [s]tate must be prepared to demonstrate by proof the bona fides of the procedure it has utilized and that it has not been followed to delay [the] defendant's trial beyond the six-month period ... or to circumvent the operation of the rule"); see also Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 1, 8, 10-12, 122 N.M. 831, 932 P.2d 1075 (determining that the general rule of prosecutorial discretion includes the commensurate rule that when a defendant asserts that the state's actions were done to circumvent the six-month rule or for another bad reason, the court can dismiss the case where the state fails to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that its actions were not done for bad reasons).

{11} In this context, "fluctuations in the stories of witnesses, the unavailability and subsequent reappearance of witnesses," or "newly discovered evidence" may constitute a good and sufficient reason for the termination and reinstitution of a criminal prosecution. Delgado, 83 N.M. at 627, 495 P.2d at 1074; see also State v. Vigil, 114 N.M. 431, 433, 839 P.2d 641, 643 (Ct.App.1992) (permitting a new six-month period when the amended complaint contained significant change); State v. Aragon, 99 N.M. 190, 192-93, 656 P.2d 240, 242-43 (Ct.App.1982) (permitting a new six-month period due to newly discovered facts). New Mexico appellate courts also allow the application of a new six-month period in other circumstances, such as when the trial court rejects a plea bargain, when the defendant is in a pre-prosecution diversion program, and when an event is to the mutual benefit of the parties. See, e.g., ...