State v. Razey

• Citation: 282 P. 755,129 Kan. 328
• Decision Date: 07 December 1929
• Docket Number: 28,947
• Parties: THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. DAISY P. RAZEY, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

282 P. 755

129 Kan. 328

THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. DAISY P. RAZEY, Appellant

No. 28,947

Supreme Court of Kansas

December 7, 1929

Decided July, 1929.

Appeal from Sedgwick district court, division No. 2; THORNTON W SARGENT, judge.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. AUTOMOBILES--Statutory Duty After Injury--Constitutional Law. The statute which makes it a crime for a person who has caused injury to another person by the operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway to fail to stop and give his name and residence and motor-license number and give pertinent information to the injured person or other person thereabout and to report the matter to the sheriff or nearest police officer does not violate the constitutional guaranty of section 10 of the bill of rights against compulsory self-incrimination.

2. SAME -- Information. The information under which defendant was prosecuted and convicted did not charge her with more than one offense.

Jean Madalene, of Wichita, for the appellant.

William A. Smith, attorney-general, R. O. Mason, assistant attorney-general, William J. Wertz, county attorney, and George L. Adams, deputy county attorney, for the appellee.

OPINION

DAWSON, J.:

The defendant was convicted of a hit-and-run offense under the statute relating to the operation of automobiles on public highways, the pertinent part of which reads:

". . . Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state who shall cause injury to any person or persons in the operation of said motor vehicle shall stop immediately and give his name and residence and any other information demanded, together with the license number of his motor vehicle, to the injured person or persons or others present, and in case of death or serious injury by such accident he shall immediately report the same to the sheriff of the county or to the chief of police, city marshal or other peace officer in the nearest town or city. The failure of any such person to comply with the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($ 1,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." (Laws 1925, ch. 84, § 1.)

The evidence for the state, with nothing substantial to combat it, tended to show that sometime after midnight on December 25, 1928, the defendant and her husband were riding northward on Waco street in Wichita in an automobile, defendant being at the wheel. As they passed an intersection defendant drove her car against two persons who were crossing the street, killing one of them and severely injuring the other. Instead of stopping as required by the statute and by the instincts of humanity she drove away. She made a statement to the police which fully covered the facts. In part, it reads:

"A. . . . I didn't see anyone until I struck some one, and it frightened me so terribly that I didn't stop and I drove on. My husband begged me to stop, but I lost my head and didn't stop; that's all I can say. I didn't really think that they were hurt but my husband thought they were. . . .

"Q. Where did you drive to after you had the accident? A. I went straight home. . . .

"Q. How long did he [husband] stay at home after you got back and before taking the car and leaving? A. I don't remember; quite a little while. . . .

"Q. Have you heard from him since he left? A. No, I have heard nothing from him. . . .

"Q. Well, about how fast would you say you were driving? A. About twenty or twenty-five miles an hour. . . .

"Q. Do you know when your husband took the license plate off the car? A. I don't know."

On behalf of defendant a demurrer to the evidence was filed, also a motion for an instructed verdict. These being overruled, the cause went to the jury, who found a verdict of guilty. Defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled and she was sentenced in accordance with the statute and its complement, R. S. 76-2501 et seq.

Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the statute in so far as it requires a person who in the operation of an automobile injures another person to stop and give the information outlined in the act. She invokes that provision of section 10 of the bill of rights, which declares that: "No person shall be a witness against himself." She argues that this constitutional guaranty is violated by the statutory obligation imposed on a motorist who causes injury to a person on the highway to stop and give his name, residence, motor-license number, and any other information demanded, to the injured person or others present, and to report the incident to the sheriff or nearest police officer. We cannot assent to that. The requirements of the statute are proper police regulations necessitated by the use of motor vehicles on the highway. The information which a motorist who causes injury to another is required to give is information pertinent to the accident, not irrelevant information. Defendant's privilege of operating an automobile on the streets of Wichita was conditioned on her obligation to stop and give the statutory information and report the injury to the proper public officer. This condition was binding upon defendant as upon all who accept the privilege of operating motor cars on the public highways. In People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 46 L. R. A., n. s., 977, 102 N.E. 530, the New York court of appeals had this question under consideration. The New York statute was substantially like ours, and the New York constitutional provisions against compulsory self-incrimination were much the same. That court held:

"It...