State v. Reardon
| Citation | 41 S.W.3d 470 |
| Parties | (Mo.banc 2001) State of Missouri on the Information of Ronald S. Reed, Jr., Special Prosecuting Attorney of Clay County, Missouri, Appellant v. Michael E. Reardon, Prosecuting Attorney of Clay County, Missouri, Respondent. SC82688 0 |
| Decision Date | 10 April 2001 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Clay County, Hon. Carl D. Gum, Jr.
Counsel for Appellant: Ronald S. Reed, Jr. and Creath S. Thorne
Counsel for Respondent: Robert H. Martin and Michael W. Manners
Opinion Summary: A Clay County special prosecutor filed a petition to oust then-prosecutor Michael E. Reardon, on the basis that Reardon willfully violated and neglected his official duties. The court denied the petition, and the special prosecutor appealed.
Court en banc holds: The appeal is moot. Reardon's term expired in 1998, and he is no longer occupying the position. Logically, he is no longer subject to being ousted under section 106.220, which is the only relief authorized by section 106.220. The existence of an actual controversy susceptible of some relief is essential to appellate jurisdiction.
Wolff and Stith, JJ., not participating.
Ronald S. Reed, Jr., special prosecuting attorney of Clay County, Missouri, appeals from the circuit court's judgment denying his petition in quo warranto seeking the ouster, pursuant to sec. 106.220,1 of the respondent, Michael E. Reardon, from the office of Clay County Prosecuting Attorney on the basis that he willfully violated and neglected his official duties. This case was transferred here following opinion by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.2 Rule 83.04; Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
Specifically, the petition alleged, inter alia, that the respondent willfully violated and neglected his official duties in that he: (1) knowingly authorized the expenditure of money for purposes other than those for which the money was collected, as specified in secs. 570.120.5(2) and 56.330; and (2) failed to require two Clay County assistant prosecuting attorneys to pay into the general revenue fund fees collected by them for their prosecution work done in counties other than Clay County, as required by Mo. Const. article VI, sec. 13.
The appellant raises seven points on appeal in which he claims that the trial court erred in denying his petition in quo warranto to oust the respondent. He claims that the court: (1) erroneously declared and applied the law as found in sec. 570.120.5(2) in finding that the respondent's challenged expenditures were authorized by the statute as "capital outlay"; (2) erroneously declared and applied the law as found in sec. 56.330 in finding that the challenged expenditures were authorized by the statute as expenses that the respondent "is put to in the proper and vigorous prosecution of the duties of his office"; (3) erred in admitting and considering the testimony of five former and current prosecuting attorneys regarding for what purposes they authorized the expenditure of money from their sec. 570.120.5 bad-check and sec. 56.330 contingent funds; (4) erred in admitting and considering the testimony of a state senator regarding his intent as to the term "capital outlay" in sec. 570.120.5(2); (5) erred in admitting and considering the testimony of three former and current Clay County circuit court judges who authorized the respondent's expenditure of money from the sec. 56.330 contingent fund; (6) erroneously declared and applied the law as found in sec. 106.220 in finding that the respondent did not willfully violate and neglect his official duties; and (7) erroneously declared and applied the law as found in Mo. Const. article VI, sec. 13, in finding that the respondent did not have a duty to require assistant prosecuting attorneys working for him to pay into the general revenue fund fees collected by them for their prosecution work done in counties other than Clay County.
The appeal is dismissed.
The respondent served as the Clay County prosecuting attorney from January 1, 1987, to December 31, 1998, when his last term expired. In that position, he was required, pursuant to sec. 570.120.5, to collect an administrative handling cost whenever he "[took] any action" relating to the prosecution of individuals who had committed the crime of passing a bad check under sec. 570.120.1. The money collected pursuant to this section was deposited into a fund commonly referred to as the "bad-check fund." While prosecuting attorney, the respondent used money from this fund, inter alia, to purchase and frame an oil painting for his office's lobby; pay fourteen bills covering the cost of food and drinks for himself and his employees; cover the cost of office Christmas parties on three occasions; purchase flowers on three occasions, which were sent to hospitalized employees and funerals of employees' relatives; pay for a retirement party; and pay the professional dues owed by himself and his employees on four occasions. These expenditures totaled $7,074.44.
Pursuant to sec. 56.330, the treasurer of each first-class county is required to "set aside the prosecuting attorney's fees to be used as a contingent fund for the prosecuting attorney" for the payment of various expenses. While he was prosecuting attorney, the respondent used money from this contingent fund to pay eighteen bills covering the cost of food and drinks for himself and his employees; purchase flowers on twelve occasions, which were sent to hospitalized employees and funerals of employees' relatives; pay the professional dues owed by himself and his employees on three occasions; and pay the cost for himself and his employees to attend bar association dinners on five occasions. These expenditures totaled $11,349.05. Each warrant the respondent submitted requesting payment from the contingency fund was approved and signed by a Clay County circuit court judge.
Brian Klopfenstein began working as a Clay County assistant prosecuting attorney on January 1, 1987. He generally worked three days a week as a prosecuting attorney and operated his private civil practice the other two days of the week. From 1994 to 1996, he also worked as a special prosecuting attorney in Livingston County, Missouri. He was paid $8,000 for his work as a special prosecuting attorney and did not pay any of this money into the Clay County general revenue fund. Timothy Finnical also worked for the respondent as a Clay County assistant prosecuting attorney. Like Klopfenstein, at times he worked as a special prosecuting attorney in counties other than Clay County and did not pay into the Clay County general revenue fund any compensation he received for his services rendered as a special prosecuting attorney.
On May 29, 1997, the appellant was appointed special prosecuting attorney of Clay County. On May 12, 1998, he filed a petition in quo warranto seeking the ouster, pursuant to sec. 106.220, of the respondent from the office of Clay County prosecuting attorney on the basis that he had willfully violated and neglected his official duties. The petition alleged, inter alia, that the respondent willfully violated and neglected his official duties in that he: (1) knowingly authorized the expenditure of money for purposes other than those for which the money was collected, as specified in secs. 570.120.5(2) and 56.330; and (2) failed to require two assistant prosecuting attorneys working for him to pay into the general revenue fund fees collected by them for prosecution work done in counties other than Clay County, as required by Mo. Const. article VI, sec. 13.
The petition was heard on December 7 and 8, 1998. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the case under advisement. On December 31, 1998, the trial court entered its judgment denying the petition in quo warranto. In denying the petition, the court found that the respondent's expenditure of money from the sec. 570.120.5 bad-check fund and the sec. 56.330 contingent fund was not "illegal or unauthorized" and that he "did not willfully and knowingly commit acts in derogation" of the statutes. The court also found that the respondent "did not have a duty to require Assistant Prosecutors to pay fees they earned in other counties into the Clay County general fund" and that the "Respondent was not in violation of Section 106.220, R.S.Mo. when Respondent failed to order such payment" because assistant prosecuting attorneys are not "county officers" within the meaning of Mo. Const. article VI, sec. 13.
This appeal follows.
"A threshold question in any appellate review of a controversy is the mootness of the controversy." Armstrong v. Elmore, 990 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. App. 1999). "Because mootness implicates the justiciability of a case, an appellate court may dismiss a case for mootness sua sponte." Id. As such,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Waters
...omitted) (emphasis added).ANALYSIS A threshold question in this matter is the mootness of the controversy. State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001); State ex rel. Chastain v. City of Kansas City, 968 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Mo.App.1998) (applying the doctrine of mootness i......
-
Byrne & Jones Enters., Inc. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist.
...the project has since been completed. Mootness is a threshold question that may be addressed by this Court sua sponte . State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon , 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001). “When an event occurs that makes a court's decision unnecessary or makes granting effectual relief by t......
-
State v. Jones
..."The existence of an actual and vital controversy susceptible of some relief is essential to appellate jurisdiction." State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon , 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001) (quoting Armstrong v. Elmore , 990 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) ). And a claim is moot when it has "......
-
State v. Galkowski
...because the April 2, 2013 election has passed and “it does not appear there is any relief that can be granted....” See State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001) (“[A] cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter w......
-
Conforming doctrine to practice: making room for collateral consequences in the Missouri mootness analysis.
...courts are permitted to consider matters not in the record in determining whether a case is moot. State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing Bratton v. Mitchell, 979 S.W.2d 232, 236 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998); State ex rel.Wilson v. Murray, 955 S.W......