State v. Reardon
| Decision Date | 27 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 10740,10740 |
| Citation | 101 R.I. 18,219 A.2d 767 |
| Parties | STATE v. Edward V. REARDON. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendant is in this court prosecuting a bill of exceptions to the rulings and decisions of the trial justice, having been convicted by a jury in the superior court under an indictment charging him with a violation of a statutory obligation to keep and maintain records concerning his acquisition of certain narcotic drugs.
The record discloses that defendant, a registered pharmacist, owns and operates a pharmacy in the city of Pawtucket and that in the usual course of that business he acquires and dispenses certain barbiturates and central nervous system stimulants. Under the provisions of G.L.1956, § 21-29-8(2), persons so dealing in such drugs are required, among other things, to 'Retain each commercial or other record relating to barbiturates and/or central nervous system sitmulants maintained by them in the usual course of their business or occupation, for not less than two (2) calendar years immediately following the date of such record.' Section 21-29-3 makes unlawful certain acts or omissions with respect to such records, subsec. (g) thereof including in such unlawful omissions 'The failure to keep records as required by §§ 21-29-8 and 21-29-9.'
There is evidence that defendant during the period covered by the indictment purchased such drugs from a wholesale dealer therein on seven occasions. There is also uncontradicted evidence that such wholesaler, when filling orders for such drugs, usually executes an invoice therefor in duplicate and forwards the original invoice with the shipment to the pharmacist, retaining the duplicate copy for its file. In the instant case defendant, upon demand by inspectors of the state division of narcotics, produced for examination but two of these original invoices and was thereafter indicted under said § 21-29-3(g) for failing to keep or retain such original invoices as records required to be preserved under § 21-29-8(2). At his trial defendant was able to introduce into evidence six of the original invoices, reflecting these sales, but did not produce the seventh such original invoice and was thereafter convicted pursuant to the statute as above noted.
We will consider first defendant's contention that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to quash the first count of the indictment on the ground that he is charged therein with a failure to keep the records described in the statute and thus it does not charge him with an offense where the statutory requirement is to retain such records. It is well settled that a motion to quash an indictment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Merritt, 84 R.I. 313, 124 A.2d 540. After a careful examination of the circumstances here, we are unable to agree that the trial justice abused this discretion.
The legislature has provided statutory standards for the allegations of offenses in indictments. In § 12-12-6 it is stated, in pertinent part, that an indictment will be valid and sufficient if it charges an offense in terms of the common law or of the statute defining the offense 'or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice of what offense is intended to be charged.' The language of the instant indictment, in our opinion, charging, as it does, that this defendant did not keep records and identified by a proper citation to the statutory provision, gave notice to this defendant clearly that he was being charged with a violation of § 21-29-3(g) as it relates to § 21-29-8(2). This exception, therefore, is without merit.
Neither do we agree that the trial justice erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. We are aware that the motion, in effect, raises a question as to whether in the state of the evidence the jury could have found that the invoice under consideration was ever received by him and, therefore, could have found that he had failed to retain such a record within the meaning of the statute. Whether the word 'retain' as used in the statute was to be given so literal a construction as defendant thus argues we do not decide.
We are persuaded from an examination of the decision of the trial justice that in his opinion there was in the record evidence adduced through employees of the wholesaler susceptible of a reasonable inference that it was the usual practice of the wholesaler to execute these invoices in duplicate and to send the original to the purchaser with the order, which procedure was followed in the instant case. What defendant is arguing, as we understand him, is that this inference, standing alone, is without probative force on the question of his receipt of this invoice and, absent some evidence corroborating his receipt of the invoice, his motion to direct should be granted. We are unable to agree.
It is settled that on motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and to draw therefrom such reasonable inferences as support the state's contentions. State v. Hillman, 84 R.I. 396, 125 A.2d 94. We are of the opinion that the evidence in the record relating to the wholesaler's practice as to the delivery of the invoice with the order purchased is susceptible of a reasonable inference that the invoice was received by defendant. In such circumstances it was not error to deny the motion to direct.
However, we are concerned with defendant's contention that the admission over his objection of testimony concerning an inventory of the drugs in his store taken by state inspectors was so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error. The evidence to which reference is made appears in the record in the form of a series of inquiries obviously intended to establish that the amount of the drugs on hand in the store and the amount...
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State v. Contreras, 266-E
...to the state the evidence and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. State v. Mantia, 101 R.I. 367, 223 A.2d 843; State v. Reardon, 101 R.I. 18, 219 A.2d 767; State v. Poole, 97 R.I. 215, 197 A.2d 163. It was, therefore, not error to deny the motions for directed When we consider the de......
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State v. Byrnes, 79-412-C
...added little to the sizable accumulation of evidence presented by the state's case. We believe his ruling proper. Cf. State v. Reardon, 101 R.I. 18, 219 A.2d 767 (1966). Next, defendants claim error as a result of the trial justice's admission into evidence testimony of their alleged acts a......
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State v. Bowden
...not be considered by a jury if its probative value is clearly outweighed by a likelihood of undue prejudice. State v. Reardon,101 R.I. 18, 24-26, 219 A.2d 767, 771-772 (1966). To determine whether the evidence in a given case has that effect requires an examination of its substance and the ......
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State v. O'Brien, 78-39-C
...(1977) (evidence of reputation); State v. Rezendes, 111 R.I. 169, 174, 300 A.2d 472, 475 (1973) (relevancy); State v. Reardon, 101 R.I. 18, 25, 219 A.2d 767, 772 (1966) (relevancy).For a fairly comprehensive survey of the varying rules of other states, see the appendix to Judge Wilner's opi......