State v. Reasoner

• Decision Date: 12 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CR,1
• Citation: State v. Reasoner, 154 Ariz. 377, 742 P.2d 1363 (Ariz. App. 1987)
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Randel Steven REASONER, Appellant. 9766.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1363

742 P.2d 1363

154 Ariz. 377

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v.Randel Steven REASONER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 9766.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department A.

May 12, 1987.

[154 Ariz. 379] Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III, Chief Counsel, Crim. Div. and Robert S. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Rosenquist & Crimmins by Anders V. Rosenquist, Phoenix, for appellant.

OPINION

FROEB, Chief Judge.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of six counts of trafficking in stolen property, five counts of theft, one count each of conducting an illegal enterprise, criminal damage, and altering a vehicle identification number.Although prior convictions were alleged, after a trial of those matters to the court, appellant was acquitted of the allegations.Thereafter, appellant was sentenced to three consecutive ten-year sentences on counts one, two, and three, with the remaining counts running concurrently with either counts two or three.

The charges arose out of appellant's arrest and the execution of a search warrant on March 7, 1984, at his residence located in Phoenix.Police officers on the fugitive detail, who had requested the assistance of two officers from the auto theft detail, proceeded to appellant's residence on that date to arrest appellant on an outstanding arrest warrant from Colorado.During the execution of the arrest warrant, some of the officers viewed truck parts with missing identification numbers which indicated to them the presence of unlawful activity.Based on their observations at the time of assisting in the arrest of appellant, they procured a search warrant, returned to the residence, and seized a number of items of evidence which later led to the convictions which are the subject of this appeal.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrants, claiming that the entry into his residence was unlawful.Appellant and his ex-wife testified at the motion to suppress, and thereafter counsel stipulated that, in lieu of the live testimony of some of the officers who assisted in the execution of the search warrant, the court could consider the transcript of their testimony given at a prior hearing on a motion to suppress by appellant's ex-wife and co-defendant, Velita Jonnie Reasoner aka Nichols.The motion to suppress was then submitted on the basis of the live testimony of both appellant and Velita Reasoner, the transcript of the officer's testimony, the written motion to suppress, and the state's response.The motion was denied.

On appeal, appellant argues:

1.His arrest was without a valid warrant and therefore was illegal, rendering the subsequent search of the residence likewise illegal.

2.Even if there was a valid arrest warrant, the search of appellant's home exceeded the reasonable scope of a search incident to his arrest and was therefore illegal.

3.He was denied effective assistance of counsel in the presentation of the motion to suppress.

4.The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the jury panel, or at least additional individual jurors.

5.The trial court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of the documents examiner.

6.The trial court erred in admitting, over objection to the lack of relevance and foundation, certain critical exhibits.

ARREST OF APPELLANT AT HIS RESIDENCE

Appellant argues that there was no valid Arizona warrant for his arrest at the time police entered his residence.An officer testified that he had obtained information from Colorado authorities a few days prior to appellant's arrest.The officer testified that he had confirmed the date of appellant's escape and the existence of a valid arrest warrant with the Colorado authorities.He also obtained a picture of appellant and may have received a copy of his conviction record before making the arrest.According to the information received by the officer, appellant had escaped from Colorado prison authorities after conviction for larceny of a motor vehicle.Armed with this information, but without an Arizona arrest warrant, officers from the "fugitive detail" proceeded to appellant's residence.

Appellant answered the door and stepped back into the living room when he saw the police officers.The officers went into the house to arrest appellant.The thrust of appellant's argument is that the Colorado fugitive warrant was not a valid arrest warrant in Arizona, and therefore the officers were not lawfully in his home for purposes of making an arrest.Appellant also notes that warrantless entries, in the absence of exigent circumstances, are proscribed in Arizona.State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519(1984);State v. Martin, 139 Ariz. 466, 679 P.2d 489(1984).

Our courts have held that if contraband or other evidence is seized during, or obtained as a result of, a warrantless entry of a defendant's home without the presence of exigent circumstances, the seizure is illegal and the evidence must be suppressed as the fruit of the illegal entry.State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d 877(1977).See alsoState v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545(1986).The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution also proscribes a warrantless entry of a defendant's home to arrest him in the absence of exigent circumstances.Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639(1980).

The precise question involved in this case is whether the police can enter a home to make an arrest based on their knowledge of an existing felony warrant from another jurisdiction.Based on the dictates of Payton v. New York, we hold the warrant requirement is satisfied.The basic rule of Payton is that for an in-home arrest to be valid, a neutral magistrate must, through the issuance of a warrant, intervene between the police officer and the citizen.This requirement has been met in the present case.

We agree with the dissenting opinion in State v. Bradley, 106 Idaho 358, 679 P.2d 635(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041, 104 S.Ct. 705, 79 L.Ed.2d 169(1985).The majority in Bradley held that an Oregon arrest warrant was not sufficient to arrest the defendant in his home in Idaho.However, the dissent argued that no federal constitutional principles were violated simply because the warrant was issued across a state border.Payton held that probable cause alone was no longer sufficient authority for police to enter a home to make an arrest.The Court in Payton held there must be a warrant.Here, where a warrant for appellant's arrest had been issued in Colorado, the arrest met the prerequisites of Payton.

In support of its position, the Bradley dissent cited People v. Woglemuth, 69 Ill.2d 154, 13 Ill.Dec. 40, 370 N.E.2d 1067, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 2243, 56 L.Ed.2d 408(1977).In Woglemuth, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a warrant issued in Iowa could be used to make a valid in-home arrest in Illinois.Although Illinois had a statute that specifically authorized police to make arrests on warrants from other jurisdictions, some of the principles ennunciated in Woglemuth are applicable to the present case.The Woglemuth court explained that:

The warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is not frustrated in this case by the distinctive fact that the arrest warrant was issued in a state other than that in which it was executed.Whether a valid foreign warrant is effective in Illinois is a matter of state, not constitutional, law.A suspect's constitutional right to have a neutral magistrate determine whether probable cause exists for his arrest is not undermined by Illinois' choice to extend comity to the determination of a magistrate from another state.

69 Ill.2d at 161, 370 N.E.2d at 1070.Likewise, our decision to extend comity to the decision of a Colorado magistrate in this case does not frustrate the constitutional requirements of Payton or the fourth amendment.

Appellant argues that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, A.R.S. §§ 13-3841 to -3874, is the sole mechanism for implementing a Colorado warrant in Arizona.This may be correct as far as the procedures for extraditing appellant to Colorado are concerned, but that is not the question before us.The extradition statutes set forth the procedures for returning an individual charged with a crime from the forum state to the demanding state; the statutes do not address the issue of whether the existence of the out-of-state warrant will justify the entry of an Arizona home without an Arizona warrant in order to make an arrest.At the time of appellant's arrest, Colorado had not made a demand on the governor of Arizona for appellant's return.Thus, the Extradition Act had not been triggered.Compliance with the extradition statutes is not required to give the Colorado arrest warrant the extraterritorial effect of satisfying the fourth amendment in Arizona.We have earlier held that the Colorado warrant, in and of itself, was sufficient to justify entry into appellant's home to effectuate his arrest.

In sum, appellant's arrest in his home was valid based upon the Colorado fugitive warrant.The Colorado warrant was effective because it met the requirements of Payton; a neutral magistrate intervened between the citizen and the police.Additionally, the arrest was not controlled by extradition procedures which had not been invoked.Therefore, the subsequent search of appellant's home was legal, and the evidence gathered as a result of that search was properly admitted into evidence.

THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST

Appellant argues that one of the officers who assisted in his arrest engaged in a general search of his backyard.During this alleged general search, the officer viewed truck parts with missing identification numbers.The officer testified he went to appellant's home with the "fugitive detail," without suspecting appellant's involvement in any illegal activity, and...