State v. Reddick

• Docket Number: 2021-KP-01893
• Decision Date: 21 October 2022
• Citation: 351 So.3d 273
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Reginald REDDICK
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

351 So.3d 273

STATE of Louisiana

v.Reginald REDDICK

No. 2021-KP-01893

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

October 21, 2022

CRICHTON, J.

We granted the writ application in this case to resolve a circuit split¹ as to whether the new rule announced by the Supreme Court in Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), applies retroactively to cases on state collateral review. Applying the framework of Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), but using the authority expressly reserved to the states by the Supreme Court to determine which new rules of criminal procedure will be applied retroactively on state collateral review, we find that the Ramos jury unanimity rule does not apply retroactively in Louisiana.

In making this decision, we are mindful of the strong reliance interests at stake and the high administrative burden that many retrials of final convictions would impose on our system of justice. We further note that in voting to amend the state Constitution to require unanimity in jury verdicts, the citizens of this state chose to do so with prospective effect only. Acts 2018, No. 722, § 1, approved Nov. 6, 2018, eff. Dec. 12, 2018. This solemn decision of the people should not be disturbed by the judiciary, whose role as a co-equal branch of government is to interpret the laws, not to announce policy more rightfully reserved to the legislature. La. Const. art. II, §§ 1 - 2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By a vote of ten to two, a jury convicted Reginald Reddick ("respondent") of second-degree murder for the killing of Al Moliere in 1993.² He was sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. His conviction became final in 1998. State v. Reddick , 97-1155 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/11/98), 707 So. 2d 521, writ denied , 98-0664 (La. 9/18/98), 724 So. 2d 755. At the time of respondent's trial, the Louisiana Constitution required only ten out of 12 jurors to concur to render a verdict. La. Const. art. I, § 17 (1974). This rule had been upheld as constitutional in Apodaca v. Oregon , 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana , 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972), and was the law in Louisiana until the Constitution was amended in 2018 to require unanimous verdicts in prospective cases, i.e. , those in which the offense was committed on or after January 1, 2019. Acts 2018, No. 722, § 1, approved Nov. 6, 2018, eff. Dec. 12, 2018.

In Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1390, 206 L.Ed.2d 583 (2020), the

United States Supreme Court overturned Apodaca and held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,³ as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense and this requirement applies equally to state and federal criminal trials. 140 S. Ct. at 1395-96. This Court thereafter applied Ramos to cases on direct review, pursuant to Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). See , e.g. , State v. Cole , 19-1733 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So. 3d 524 ("[Cole's] convictions were not final when Ramos was decided, and therefore the holding of Ramos applies to any non-unanimous verdicts in these proceedings.") (citation omitted).

Because his conviction and sentence were final⁴ when the Supreme Court decided Ramos , respondent filed an application for post-conviction relief on March 30, 2021, requesting retroactive application of the Ramos rule to his conviction. While respondent's application was pending before the district court, in Edwards v. Vannoy , 593 U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1547, 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021), the Supreme Court declined to apply the new rule announced in Ramos retroactively to final convictions on federal habeas review. Nevertheless, the district court held Ramos applied retroactively and granted relief. The appellate court declined to review the decision. State v. Reddick , 21-0589 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/18/21) (unpub'd). We granted the state's writ application. State v. Reddick , 21-1893 (La. 2/15/22), 332 So. 3d 1173.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

This case was preceded by decades of development of two separate strains of constitutional jurisprudence: the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and the retroactive application of new criminal rules. In Ramos and Edwards , these two strains came together and ultimately led to respondent's application.

1. Retroactivity of New Criminal Rules

Retroactivity jurisprudence is concerned "not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies." Danforth v. Minnesota , 552 U.S. 264, 290-91, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008). In other words, a determination of retroactivity is not a determination of whether a "violation occurred." In Ramos, the Supreme Court announced that all nonunanimous guilty verdicts violated the Sixth Amendment. The question in a retroactivity analysis is whether that violation will be remedied in cases where the conviction was final when the case announcing the newly-recognized right was decided.

In Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Supreme Court set forth a new framework for retroactivity analysis in cases on federal habeas review and reflected that Court's concerns for federalism, comity, and finality. See also Withrow v. Williams , 507 U.S. 680, 699, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the "prudential concerns" of "equity and federalism" articulated in Teague ). The inquiry announced in Teague is multi-step and begins by distinguishing between old and new rules.⁵ With respect to new constitutional criminal rules in the federal habeas context, the Teague Court explained: "Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced." Teague , 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The Supreme Court then articulated two exceptions to this prohibition: (i) substantive rules that "prohibit[ ] a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense," and (ii) " ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks , 494 U.S. 484, 494-95, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (citation omitted) (explaining Teague analysis). Relevant to this case is Teague ’s second exception, which the Court later explained is "extremely narrow" and applies only when, among other factors, the new rule alters "our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Whorton v. Bockting , 549 U.S. 406, 417, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007) (citation and quotation omitted).

In 1992, Louisiana adopted Teague ’s multi-step framework to determine whether new rules of constitutional criminal law will be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review in Louisiana. State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley , 606 So. 2d 1292, 1297 (La. 1992) (noting that the considerations of finality recognized in Teague are "equally applicable in state proceedings as well as federal proceedings").

In Danforth v. Minnesota , 552 U.S. 264, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), the Court clarified that states could give greater retroactive effect to new rules in the state post-conviction context than what the Supreme Court affords in the federal habeas context. Id. at 282, 128 S.Ct. 1029 ("[T]he Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed ‘nonretroactive’ under Teague ."). This makes sense, as the concerns of comity and federalism that informed Teague are not present when a state court is reviewing a case on state collateral review. The Supreme Court itself recognized this tension in Danforth , explaining that the federal interest in uniformity

does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The fundamental interest in federalism that allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of different ways—so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution—is not otherwise limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity.

552 U.S. at 280, 128 S.Ct. 1029. The Supreme Court also pointed out: "If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague ." Id. at 279-80, 128 S.Ct. 1029.

In this sense, Danforth made clear that Teague provides a floor for when a new rule of criminal law must be applied retroactively, with a state nonetheless free to adopt its own broader test for requiring the retroactive application of a new federal or state constitutional rule. See id . at 289-291, 128 S.Ct. 1029 ("A decision by this Court that a new rule does not apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and thus no violation of that right at the time of trial—only that no remedy will be provided in federal habeas courts .") (emphasis added). Eight years after Danforth , in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Supreme Court confirmed that state courts, like federal courts "must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law." Id. at 198, 136 S.Ct. 718.

Particularly pertinent to this case, in Edwards , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct....