State v. Reed, 060420 DESUP, 1809015387
| Opinion Judge | KARSNITZ, J. |
| Party Name | STATE OF DELAWARE, v. JERRY REED, SBI: 00480004 DOB:12/06/1991 |
| Attorney | Jerry Reed, Defendant, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, Delaware 19977 Caroline Brittingham, Esquire and Nichole Gannett, Esquire, Department of Justice, 114 East Market Street, Georgetown, Delaware 19947 |
| Case Date | June 04, 2020 |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
Submitted: May 27, 2020
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRA W PLEAS: DENIED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF: DENIED MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE: DENIED
Jerry Reed, Defendant, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, Delaware 19977
Caroline Brittingham, Esquire and Nichole Gannett, Esquire, Department of Justice, 114 East Market Street, Georgetown, Delaware 19947
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KARSNITZ, J.
On September 26, 2018, Delaware State Police responded to a report of a bullet-riddled body found in the weeds along the edge of Portsville Pond outside Laurel, Delaware. Police identified the body of Isaac Hatton ("Hatton"). The homicide investigations identified Traevon Dixon ("Dixon") and Jerry Reed ("Reed") as the likely perpetrators of the crime. We may never know the real motivation of the killers - drugs, money or something else. The investigation focused upon an incident which occurred around 8:30 p.m. at the Little Creek Deli in Laurel. Police investigators interviewed witnesses and located video surveillance. The video showed parts of what police described as a verbal altercation between the victim and co-defendants Dixon and Reed.
After the incident in Laurel, several vehicles including one in which the victim traveled left Laurel. Investigators, through various witness interviews, determined that the victim and co-defendants traveled to Portsville Pond where Hatton was shot and killed. Co-defendants Dixon and Reed were charged with first degree murder1 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.2
Dixon was first scheduled for trial. He pled guilty to second degree murder3 and the weapons charge in late 2019. I sentenced Dixon to a total of 35 years at Level 5 incarceration suspended after serving 20 years, and additional periods of probation.
Reed was scheduled for trial in January, 2020. Shortly before the trial, counsel for the parties notified me that an agreement had been reached as to pleas to be entered by Reed. On January 13, 2020 Reed pled guilty to manslaughter4 and no contest to the weapons charge. Notably Reed's plea involved a lesser offense than that to which his co-defendant Dixon had pled guilty. I conducted the formal and typical plea colloquy with Reed required of me by law, including Superior Court Criminal Rules.5 Reed was given appropriate advice at the plea hearing, including the crimes to which he was entering a plea, the effect of the pleas including the effect of the no-contest plea, and the potential penalties. Reed signed the plea agreement as well as the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea form which outlined what was happening. I also reviewed with Reed the important rights he surrendered by pleading as he did. Finally, Reed admitted to me he was guilty of manslaughter, and that the no-contest plea to the weapons charge was as effective as a plea of guilty. In short, I was fully satisfied Reed entered his pleas knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
Almost immediately Reed had second thoughts. Eight days after entering his plea, Reed wrote to me asking to withdraw them. I am not permitted to consider motions from represented defendants.6 I sent a copy of Reed's letter in which he sought to withdraw his pleas to counsel. On several occasions I was advised by defense counsel that Reed did not want to withdraw his plea and wanted to proceed to sentencing. One of the occasions where withdrawal of the pleas was discussed was at Reed's sentencing, and, of course, in his presence.
I sentenced Reed on February 28, 2020. Despite having pled guilty to a lesser charge than his co-defendant, I sentenced him to a term almost identical to that imposed upon his co-defendant. I will give my reasoning for the sentencing in this opinion.
Reed has filed on his own three motions. On March 2, 2020, Reed filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. On March 31, 2020, Reed filed a motion for postconviction relief.[7] On April 13, 2020, Reed filed a motion seeking modification of his sentence.8 I address all of Reed's motions in this opinion. I find there are no grounds to support Reed's motions and deny each of them.
Defendant Reed has several consistent themes throughout his motions. He argues the following:
(1) he is innocent.
(2) his attorneys told him he would not get fair consideration at trial because he is black.
(3) the State decided not to prosecute many of the witnesses who had committed crimes which denied him equal protection of law.
(4) the State lied when it said forensic evidence was not available for his preliminary hearing, and the report exonerated him.
In his last two filings Reed added the following: (1) the arguments of the prosecutor at his sentencing were improper,
(2) the sentence was excessive,
(3) I was biased against him. In one form or another Reed has made all of these arguments in his motions.
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE PLEAS
Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides, '
Plea Withdrawal. If a motion for withdrawal of a Plea of guilty or Nolo Contendere is made before imposition or suspension of sentence or disposition without entry of judgment of conviction, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside only by motion under Rule 61. (emphasis supplied).
I have two issues with this motion. First, it was filed by Reed at a time when he was represented by counsel, [9] and I am not permitted to consider it.10In addition, Rule 32(d) prohibits me from considering a withdrawal motion after sentencing except in the context of a Rule 61 motion. Defendant has filed a Rule 61 motion and I will consider the withdrawal argument in my consideration of it. For the reasons articulated above, I deny Reed's motion to withdraw his pleas.
THE RULE 61 MOTION
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 provides a comprehensive procedure for making and evaluating criminal defendants' claims for postconviction relief. Rule 61 provides the exclusive remedy for postconviction review.11 Depending upon the stage of the proceeding, Rule 61 mandates the process, and sets certain bars to seeking relief. Rule 61 (i) limits, except in limited circumstances, the time for filing to one year from the judgment of conviction becoming final.[12] Multiple petitions are generally prohibited, with the only proviso in circumstances where new evidence creates a strong inference of innocence, or a new rule of constitutional law renders the conviction invalid.13 Other bars to relief are part of Rule 61.14
Here none of the bars apply. This is defendant Reed's first motion, and it is timely filed.
A preliminary matter. Rule 61 provides for appointment of counsel in postconviction proceeding upon request by the defendant. Here Reed made no such request, and by Rule he has waived that right.15 I am also permitted to expand the record in a postconviction proceeding.161 did so here by requiring trial counsel to file an affidavit in response. In my view, and exercising my discretion, I am requiring no further expansion of the record. I see no need for a response to the motion from the State of Delaware.
DEFENDANT REED'S ARGUMENTS
(1) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - failure to move to withdraw the pleas
Reed alleges his counsel was ineffective because they failed to file a motion to withdraw his pleas. As described above this issue was raised and ultimately withdrawn, by defendant prior to his sentencing. He has knowingly waived the claim. Even had Reed not waived the claim, there is no basis for it. Rule 61 evaluations are governed by the seminal United States Supreme Court case of Strickland v. Washington.17 Delaware has adopted the Strickland standard and requires a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.18
The issues raised by Reed concerning withdrawal of his pleas are not new. He raised, then withdrew, them prior to sentencing. The evidence against him, the conduct of the investigation, and the advice of his counsel all was evaluated by him with counsel before proceeding to sentencing. I reviewed it all with him during his plea colloquy. Reed presents only conclusory allegations now, likely based upon his dissatisfaction with results - his sentence. He does not point to any conduct of counsel which is inadequate.
In addition, I have followed this case from the beginning and been able to evaluate counsel's conduct. Without a trial it is always difficult for the trial judge to fully evaluate the evidence. But I have seen more than enough of the evidence to know it was far stronger against Reed then he now attempts to portray. I also was able to observe the efforts and arguments of defense counsel. In my view, counsel had a full grasp of the facts and made all appropriate arguments. I observed defense counsel push zealously for a speedy trial and assert some of the same arguments about the proof as advocated by Reed. In short, defense counsel fully complied with their responsibilities to the Court and the defendant. I have no doubt that defendant's pleas, which were favorable to him, were the result of counsel's hard work and efforts. Had defendant pressed his request to withdraw his pleas prior to sentencing, I would have almost certainly denied it.
There is no basis to find that Reed has met the first prong of the Strickland burden. I reject Reeds first argument.
(2) Coerced Guilty...
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