State v. Reed

• Decision Date: 07 May 1996
• Citation: 676 A.2d 479
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Eric REED.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 479

676 A.2d 479

STATE of Maine v. Eric REED.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 21, 1996.

Decided May 7, 1996.

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Linda Conti, Assistant Attorney General, Augusta, for State.

James R. Bushell, Portland, for Defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, and DANA, JJ.

WATHEN, Chief Justice.

Defendant Eric Reed appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) convicting him of the crime of manslaughter. On appeal he argues that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss a murder indictment on the grounds that the State could not establish the corpus delicti of the crime of homicide. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The unusual procedural posture of the present case may be summarized as follows: The grand jury indicted defendant Eric Reed for murder in connection with the October 29, 1989 death of his seven-month old son, Alexander McKenney. In apparent recognition of the fact that the State's case rested heavily, if not exclusively, on defendant's confession to the police in June of 1993, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for the State's inability to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of homicide. The State agreed to a hearing on the corpus delicti issue prior to the trial.

The facts presented at the hearing may be summarized as follows: Alexander McKenney was the infant child of defendant Eric Reed and his former girlfriend, Delia McKenney Maddox. Maddox had primary custody of Alexander. Defendant and Maddox fought constantly over Alexander's custody: he wanted to see his son more often, and did not approve of her parenting style. Defendant once said to her that if he couldn't have Alexander, no one would.

Maddox would sometimes leave Alexander with defendant's mother, Mrs. Searles. On the weekend of October 28, 1989, Mrs. Searles and her husband were taking care of Alexander, and defendant came to stay with them for the weekend. Alexander was recovering from a respiratory infection; apart from this fact, he was generally a healthy, well-developed child.

At around 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, October 29, defendant woke his mother by pounding on her bedroom door, yelling that the baby wasn't breathing. Mrs. Searles ran into the room where defendant and Alexander had been sleeping. Their bed was located in the corner, against a wall. The baby was lying in the middle of the bed, which was unusual: he usually slept close to the wall, and defendant would sleep on the outside to keep him from rolling off. The baby was lying on his back, which was also unusual: Alexander did not like to sleep on his back, and was able to roll himself over. Alexander did not sleep with a pillow. Because the house was drafty, the family often placed pillows against the wall to keep out the draft and to keep the baby from getting his hand caught in the gap. There were two pillows on the bed, but they were not against the wall or near the baby, rather, they were at the head of the bed.

Alexander wasn't breathing. Mrs. Searles started to perform CPR, and defendant called "911". Mrs. Searles testified that the baby was pale, but not blue, and that his lips and fingernails were not blue, either. The first police officer to arrive, Officer Desjardins, testified that the baby was blue. The family and Officer Desjardins followed the ambulance to the hospital. While the emergency room staff was treating Alexander, Officer Desjardins and Mrs. Searles left the hospital and returned to the apartment.

The officer inspected the bedroom. The officer examined the pillows which had been at the head of the bed. He turned over one pillow and saw it had a four- to five-inch wet spot on the side that had been face down. In the middle of the wet spot he observed a substance that appeared to be mucous. He put the pillow down and returned to the hospital. At the hospital, the officer told defendant he had seen the pillow with mucous on it and wanted to collect it for a more thorough exam.

The doctor came out and announced to all that Alexander had died. Officer Desjardins stayed to comfort the distraught grandparents. Defendant said he needed to take a walk and left. Officer Desjardins received permission from Mrs. Searles to search the apartment and seize the pillow; he then called ahead for another officer to keep an eye on the apartment. When Officer Desjardins returned to the apartment, the first officer was already there and defendant was sitting on the couch smoking a cigarette. Officer Desjardins retrieved the pillow.

An autopsy was performed on Alexander. Officer Desjardins attended the autopsy and specifically informed the medical examiner that he believed the child had been smothered. Because the examiner was unable to determine the cause of death, he listed the cause of death as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). He testified that SIDS has become a conventional finding as a 'cause' of death although it really means there is no known cause, whether natural or unnatural; it is synonymous with "undetermined."

The examiner then explained that the fact that SIDS was the 'cause' of death does not mean the death was not the result of a homicide. For example, a child can be smothered, and this may, or may not, show up in the autopsy. Sometimes when a baby is smothered, there are small hemorrhages around the eyes as a result, but not always. The examiner testified that he specifically looked for these signs, and Alexander did not have these types of hemorrhages. He explained that a child who dies of smothering may also show signs of lividity (blue face) or cyanosis (blue color in the lips and fingernails and the...