State v. Reed
| Decision Date | 13 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 52357,52357,2 |
| Citation | 412 S.W.2d 187 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Charles M. REED, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
No attorney for appellant.
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jerome Wallach, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
PRITCHARD, Commissioner.
In the presence of his counsel defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of robbery in the first degree, and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of twelve years. He has appealed from the order of the trial court denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his motion filed pursuant to Criminal Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R.
In his motion defendant asserts that the information by which he was charged was fatally defective in that it 'fails to allege a single act committed by (him) which would constitute force or violence or show cause for fear of any immediate injury to any alleged robbery victim,' and also that 'No fact whatsoever is alleged to support the allegation of fear of immediate injury to some person--an essential element constituting first degree robbery.'
The information charged that on August 27, 1963, the defendant did 'feloniously and wilfully, rob, steal, take and carry away One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars, lawful money of the United States, the property of Kathryn Neubauer and Lelia G. Allen, by then and there putting the said Kathryn Neubauer in fear of an immediate injury to her person, * * *.' Section 560.120, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., defines robbery in the first degree, and provides that it may be committed by taking the property of another from his person, or in his presence, and against his will, 'by violence to his person, or by putting him in fear of some immediate injury to his person.' One crime, that of robbery in the first degree, is defined but the statute provides that the crime may be committed by either of two ways, or by both. State v. Burns, Mo., 280 S.W.2d 119. In this case the information did not purport to charge the offense of robbery in the first degree by violence to the person of the victim; it charged only that the robbery was committed by putting the victim in fear of an immediate injury to her person. It is true, as defendant contends, that the information does not allege the acts of defendant which resulted in the victim being placed in fear, but it was not necessary that it do so. In numerous cases not pertaining to this specific contention, it has repeatedly been held that it is sufficient to charge the offense of robbery in the first degree in the language of the statute. State v. Luther, Mo., 338 S.W.2d 846; State v. Romprey, Mo., 339 S.W.2d 746; State v. Moore, Mo., 347 S.W.2d 195. Here the wording of the information followed the language of Section 560.120. In State v. Moore, 203 Mo. 624, 102 S.W. 537, 538, we find this: ...
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State v. Lumsden
...as his means of creating such fear. It is not necessary that the means of creating the fear be charged in the information. State v. Reed, 412 S.W.2d 187 (Mo.1967). Also, by reason of the foregoing, absence of a charge that a gun was used to create fear in the victim did not provide a ground......
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State v. Crockett
...to allege the acts of defendant which resulted in the victims being placed in fear of an immediate injury to their persons. State v. Reed, 412 S.W.2d 187 (Mo.1967). Consideration of the information against defendant with Section 560.120 shows that he was charged in the language of the statu......
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Sears v. State
...(Mo.1972). Neither of the cases cited by appellant calls for a different conclusion as to the sufficiency of the charge. In State v. Reed, 412 S.W.2d 187 (Mo.1967), a charge of robbery in the language of the statute was held sufficient. That case is not authority for holding bad an informat......
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State v. Mapp
...some immediate injury to his person . . .' If either fact is shown, the taking is designated as robbery in the first degree. State v. Reed, Mo., 412 S.W.2d 187, 188. In addition, the possible penalty is enhanced if it be shown that the offense was committed by means of a 'dangerous and dead......