State v. Reeves, 54280
| Decision Date | 22 October 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 54280,54280 |
| Citation | 652 P.2d 713,232 Kan. 143 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Daniel REEVES, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. K.S.A. 21-4601 sets forth the legislative policy to be followed and K.S.A. 21-4606 sets forth certain criteria to be considered by the trial court in sentencing a criminal defendant.
2. When a sentence is fixed by the trial court within the permissible limits of the applicable statutes the sentence, in the absence of special circumstances showing an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.
3. When it is shown that the trial court failed completely to follow the mandates of K.S.A. 21-4601 and K.S.A. 21-4606 in sentencing a defendant, the court has abused its discretion and the sentence imposed must be set aside and the case remanded for the purpose of resentencing in accordance with the proper statutory procedure.
Ralph J. De Zago, Junction City, argued the cause and was on the brief for defendant.
David R. Platt, Asst. County Atty., argued the cause and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Steven L. Opat, County Atty., were with him on the brief for appellee.
Daniel Reeves appeals from the sentence imposed after he entered a plea of guilty, following plea negotiations, to one count of aggravated robbery. The sentence was ten years minimum to twenty years maximum. As a part of the same plea negotiations he also pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, the sentence for which is not an issue in this appeal. Also there is no contention that the State breached any of the provisions of the plea bargain.
The background facts are not complicated. On August 26, 1981, the defendant, along with Alvin Lamont Brown and Harry Henry, Jr., was arrested outside the home of Mr. Melvin Wells in Junction City, Kansas. At that time the automobile they occupied, registered in Reeves' name, was found to contain property identified by Mr. Wells as having been taken from his home. According to Wells the trio had entered his home brandishing a gun, tied him with electrical cords, and robbed him of personal property. When they left, Mr. Wells freed himself and called the police. His assailants were immediately arrested and charged with aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to the charges of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. The kidnapping charge was dropped. Brown also pled guilty to the same two charges and stipulated that he had used a handgun in the commission of the crimes. Brown received sentences of five to ten years for aggravated burglary, and five years to life for the aggravated robbery. The mandatory minimum sentence provisions of K.S.A. 21-4618 were applied to Brown for his use of a firearm in the commission of the crimes. Henry pled nolo contendere. He was found guilty of aiding and abetting aggravated robbery and sentenced to five to twenty years.
Presentence reports on the three men were compiled and submitted to the trial judge by a Geary County Court Services officer. Reeves' report was favorable and recommended leniency while Brown was found to be psychopathic and a danger to society and himself. As it is the disparity in the sentence given Reeves as opposed to the one assessed to Brown which is involved herein, Henry's report is not germane to this appeal.
As a result of the sentences, Brown received a controlling minimum sentence of five years while Reeves' controlling minimum sentence was ten years. Reeves filed a timely motion for modification of his sentence and the court, after having received a report from the Kansas State Reception and Diagnostic Center, denied the motion. The report was neither overly damaging nor overly favorable but did suggest a positive prognosis for Reeves and that he might be a good candidate for early parole.
The principal complaint the defendant has on appeal is that the trial court based its sentencing decision upon improper rationale, failed to follow the dictates of the sentencing statutes, and therefore abused its discretion. The judge revealed his reasoning when he ruled on the defendant's motion to modify, indicating in effect that because he could only sentence Brown to a mandatory sentence under K.S.A. 21-4618, and could not sentence Reeves in the same manner [see State v. DeCourcy, 224 Kan. 278, 580 P.2d 86 (1978); State v. Stuart and Jones, 223 Kan. 600, 607, 575 P.2d 559 (1978) ], he would simply increase the unarmed codefendant's sentence. The court's purpose was to sentence Reeves to a minimum controlling term which, when the earliest possible parole date was considered, would still require him to serve approximately the same actual penitentiary time as the defendant who used a firearm.
K.S.A. 21-4601 sets forth the legislative policy to be followed in the sentencing of criminal defendants and states:
"This article shall be liberally construed to the end that persons convicted of crime shall be dealt with in accordance with their individual characteristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities as revealed by case studies; that dangerous offenders shall be correctively treated in custody for long terms as needed; and that other offenders shall be dealt with by probation, suspended sentence, or fine whenever such disposition appears practicable and not detrimental to the needs of public safety and the welfare of the offender, or shall be committed for at least a minimum term within the limits provided by law."
K.S.A. 21-4606 sets forth certain criteria which are to be considered in setting the minimum term to be assessed in any particular sentence. It provides:
(a) The defendant's history of prior criminal activity;
(b) The extent of the harm caused by the defendant's criminal conduct;
(c) Whether the defendant intended that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious harm;
(d) The degree of the defendant's provocation;
(e) Whether there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(f) Whether the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated its commission;
(g) Whether the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained."
In the instant case it appears that the court gave no consideration whatsoever to the mandate of K.S.A. 21-4601 and made no attempt to apply the criteria of K.S.A. 21-4606 to this particular defendant. The court's sole objective in sentencing this defendant was to assess a minimum sentence which the court felt would assure that Reeves would serve as much time as Brown, the codefendant who actually used the firearm. We have often stated that when the minimum sentence lies within the statutory limits as set forth by the legislature, it will not be disturbed on appeal in ...
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State v. Marinelli
...it simply ignored the jurisdiction question and decided an appeal's merits. 239 Kan. at 647, 722 P.2d 563 (citing State v. Reeves , 232 Kan. 143, 652 P.2d 713 [1982] ). Illustrative of this judicial whiplash are three cases decided in the 1980s. Their reasoning is helpful.The first is State......
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State v. Maxwell
...showing an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Crispin, 234 Kan. 104, 671 P.2d 502 (1983); State v. Reeves, 232 Kan. 143, 652 P.2d 713 (1982); State v. Buckner, 223 Kan. 138, 574 P.2d 918 (1977). Normally a trial court has not abused its discretion when it follows......
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State v. Richard
...great assistance to the appellate courts in determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion." See also State v. Reeves, 232 Kan. 143, 146, 652 P.2d 713 (1982); State v. Coberly, 233 Kan. at 111, 661 P.2d Although the trial court did not expressly consider the factors set forth......
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State v. Powell
...[1975].) No special circumstances have been shown which even point toward an abuse of discretion in sentencing. See State v. Reeves, 232 Kan. 143, 652 P.2d 713 (1982); State v. Goering, 225 Kan. 755, 594 P.2d 194 State v. Coe, 223 Kan. 153, 574 P.2d 929 (1977). Therefore, this court will no......