State v. Regan

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SCOTT, J.
• Citation: State v. Regan, 8 Wash. 506, 36 P. 472 (Wash. 1894)
• Decision Date: 28 March 1894
• Parties: STATE v. REGAN.

36 P. 472

8 Wash. 506

STATE v. REGAN.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 28, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Snohomish county; John C. Denney, Judge.

Richard Regan was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Affirmed.

James Hamilton Lewis, Bell & Austin, and E. S. Lyons, for appellant.

L. C. Whitney, Pros. Atty., for the State.

SCOTT J.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for the killing of one Edward Guthrie, and has appealed therefrom. The information upon which he was tried is as follows:

"In the Superior Court of the State of Washington, in and for Snohomish County. The State of Washington, Plaintiff, vs Richard Regan, Defendant. Richard Regan is accused by J. W Heffner, as prosecuting attorney in and for the county of Snohomish, state of Washington, by this information, of the crime of murder in the second degree, committed as follows The said Richard Regan, on the 8th day of November, A. D. 1892, in the county of Snohomish, state of Washington, did feloniously, purposely, and maliciously make an assault on one Edward Guthrie, and with a certain knife which he, the said Richard Regan, then and there had and held in his hand, did then and there feloniously, purposely, and maliciously strike, stab, thrust, and cut at, upon, and into the said Edward Guthrie, inflicting upon the said Edward Guthrie, in the abdomen of said Edward Guthrie, one mortal wound, of which mortal wound the said Edward Guthrie then and there died; against the peace and dignity of the state of Washington. J. W. Heffner.

"State of Washington, County of Snohomish-ss.: J. W. Heffner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the duly elected, qualified, and acting prosecuting attorney in and for said Snohomish county; that he knows the contents of the foregoing information; and that the same are true. J. W. Heffner.

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23d day of November, A. D. 1892. Chris. T. Roscoe [L. S.], County Clerk and Clerk of Superior Court. By W. H. Kennedy, Deputy."

To this the defendant interposed a motion to quash, and also a demurrer. The motion to quash was on the ground that the information was improperly verified, and that the witnesses for the state were not indorsed thereon. The points raised upon the demurrer are that the information is not specific or definite as to the crime charged, nor as to the particular circumstances constituting the alleged offense; that the information in no wise charges that an assault was ever made with a deadly weapon, or with any other weapon, and does not allege that the said knife was used, or was so used by the defendant, or that the deceased was cut with a knife. None of these points are well taken. The only object of the verification is to insure good faith in instituting the proceedings. It is no substantial part of the information, and the one before us is sufficient, under the previous decisions of this court. It appears that the names of the witnesses who testified before the state rested were indorsed on the information, and it was within the discretion of the court to permit the prosecuting attorney to indorse the names of other witnesses after the trial was commenced. It does not appear that the defendant was in any wise prejudiced because the names of the witnesses who testified on rebuttal were not upon the information before the commencement of the trial. No continuance was asked for on that ground. See State v. Townsend (recently decided) 35 P. 367. The information substantially conforms to the requirements of the statute. It states the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, so as to inform a person of common understanding with what he is charged. Nor does it charge two offenses. And the acts charged therein constitute a crime. It appears that the court had jurisdiction in the premises, and it is alleged that the killing was done by means of a knife. It will be presumed, at least prima facie, that a knife is a deadly weapon.

It is further contended that the court committed error in permitting the witness Lord to testify as follows: "Q. Did you see the defendant? A. Yes, sir; from the window out in the street. Q. Where were you, and what were you doing? A. I was at the bar, about to take a drink. I made the remark-I asked who the gentlemen were who were looking in from the window. Guthrie was behind the bar. Q. What did you say, if anything, at that time? (This was objected to by the defendant as immaterial and irrelevant. The objection was overruled, and the witness answered:) A. Well, I believe I made the remark-I asked who they were, and if they were all right. Q. What did he (meaning Guthrie) say about these men being at the window, if anything? A. The remark he made,-he said they would have to get away from the window." It is contended by the respondent that this testimony was part of the res gestae, and furthermore, that it was admissible because, prior thereto, counsel for the defendant, in cross-examining one Wilkinson, had drawn out a portion of said conversation. Upon this last ground the testimony in question was proper, and the record bears out the contention of the respondent with respect to it. Counsel for the appellant having gone into the matter, respondent was entitled to have the whole of it before the jury, and for that reason it is unnecessary to discuss the further proposition as to whether it was a part of the res gestae.

It is contended that the court erred in sustaining an objection to a question asked the witness Butler relating to the...