State v. Reilly

• Decision Date: 05 April 1899
• Citation: 78 N.W. 680,108 Iowa 735
• Parties: STATE v. REILLY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

108 Iowa 735

78 N.W. 680

STATE

v.REILLY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 5, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Winnebago county; J. F. Clyde, Judge.

The defendant was accused by information of the crime of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquors within the state.There was a trial by jury, verdict and judgment of guilty, and defendant appeals.Affirmed.H. A. Brown, for appellant.

Milton Remley, Atty. Gen., and W. H. Redmond, for the State.

WATERMAN, J.

There was a trial before the justice of the peace with whom the information was filed, and the defendant was found guilty.He appealed to the district court.In that tribunal he withdrew his plea, and demurred to the indictment.The first ground of the demurrer was that the information charged more than one offense, and upon this it was sustained.Thereupon the state amended the information by making a charge in the language of the first paragraph of section 2421 of the Code. A motion to strike this amendment, and a demurrer thereto, were overruled.

The first ground of complaint is that the amendment to the information was permitted.If the different offenses had been described separately in the original information, so that the state could have dismissed all save one, we think that it will not be claimed that such action could not properly have been taken.State v. Buck, 59 Iowa, 382, 13 N. W. 342.It is the established rule in this state that an amendment to an information is permissible, and that it may be made in the district court.State v. Merchant, 38 Iowa, 375;State v. Doe, 50 Iowa, 541.We know of no good reason why this may not be done by a substituted instrument, as was here the case.In State v. Butcher, 79 Iowa, 110, 44 N. W. 239, the amendment was attempted after the verdict.The other decisions cited by appellant on this branch of the case are not in point.

2.It is thought the amended information charged no crime.As we have said, it is in the language of the statute, and that is sufficient where, as here, the statute describes the offense.State v. Bauguess (Iowa)76 N. W. 508.If it can be said, as claimed, that by implication, under this section, it must be shown, in order to convict, that the liquor belonged to some third person, this would pertain to the proof, but not to the charge, which is sufficient if it follows the words of the law.

3.In different forms the question of the sufficiency of the evidence was raised.We have only to say that the case against defendant seems to have been fully made.It is urged by appellant that the statute is meant to punish only a common carrier, or other like person, and that defendant is not shown to be within this description.The wording of the statute is, “It shall be unlawful for any common carrier or other person,” etc.That an individual engaged in this illegal traffic, if not a common carrier, falls within the designation of “other person,” seems too clear for discussion.

4.Finally, the misconduct of the jury is made ground of complaint....