State v. Reilly
| Citation | 169 Idaho 817,503 P.3d 1017 |
| Decision Date | 15 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 48129/48130 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James Henry REILLY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
James Henry Reilly appeals from the district court's orders denying his motions for reconsideration of relinquishment of jurisdiction. We affirm.
In these consolidated appeals, Reilly pled guilty to attempted strangulation, Idaho Code § 18-923 (Docket No. 48129), and issuing an insufficient funds check, I.C. § 18-3106(b) (Docket No. 48130). The district court sentenced Reilly to a unified term of eight years with four years determinate for attempted strangulation; a unified term of two years with one year determinate for issuing an insufficient funds check; and retained jurisdiction in each case. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
Reilly timely filed a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 in the insufficient funds case. Reilly filed an untimely I.C.R. 35 motion in the attempted strangulation case. Both motions were denied.
In an addendum to the presentence investigation report (APSI), the Idaho Department of Correction recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. After reviewing the APSI, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. Reilly subsequently filed motions under I.C.R. 351 for reconsideration of the orders relinquishing jurisdiction contending that the APSI contained "significant errors." The district court denied both motions for reconsideration. Reilly appeals.
Reilly claims that the district court erred in denying his motions for reconsideration. Specifically, "mindful" that a timely I.C.R. 35 motion was filed in the insufficient funds case, Reilly contends that the district court erred by holding that it did not have the authority to grant the relief requested in the motions to reconsider the orders relinquishing jurisdiction and abused its discretion by failing to grant relief.
As an initial matter, Reilly acknowledges that a timely I.C.R. 35 motion seeking a sentence reduction was filed and denied in the insufficient funds case prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration from which he appeals. Before the district court, Reilly asserted that he filed the motion for reconsideration under I.C.R. 35, and the district court interpreted the motion as an I.C.R. 35 motion seeking a sentence reduction. On appeal, Reilly does not challenge this interpretation.
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) provides, in relevant part:
Within 120 days of entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction, a motion may be filed to correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner or to reduce a sentence and the court may correct or reduce the sentence. ... A defendant may only file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence.
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, second motions for reduction of sentence are impermissible. State v. Hurst , 151 Idaho 430, 438, 258 P.3d 950, 958 (Ct. App. 2011). This Court has held that a motion for reconsideration of the denial of an I.C.R. 35(b) motion is an improper successive motion and the prohibition of successive motions is a jurisdictional limitation. State v. Bottens , 137 Idaho 730, 733, 52 P.3d 875, 878 (Ct. App. 2002). Because Reilly filed an I.C.R. 35 motion seeking a sentence reduction in the insufficient funds case prior to the motion to reconsider from which he appeals, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Reilly's motion to reconsider. See Bottens , 137 Idaho at 733, 52 P.3d at 878. Consequently, the denial of Reilly's motion for reconsideration in the insufficient funds case was not error.
This leaves the denial of Reilly's motion for reconsideration in the attempted strangulation case. Despite acknowledging the filing of a prior untimely I.C.R. 35 motion in the attempted strangulation case, Reilly argues in a footnote that the prior filing of an untimely I.C.R. 35 motion does not preclude the later filing of a timely motion as the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the untimely motion and, thus, the district court's order denying the motion is void. The State does not directly respond to this argument. We need not resolve this issue. Even assuming the district court had jurisdiction, Reilly's claim fails because, as set forth below, I.C.R. 35 is not a proper vehicle to seek reconsideration of the trial court's relinquishment of jurisdiction.
Reilly contends that the district court erred by concluding that it lacked authority to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction. According to Reilly, his motions for reconsideration of the orders relinquishing jurisdiction were actually requests to have his sentence reduced to probation that the district court could grant under I.C.R. 35. We disagree.
The district court determined that it did not have authority to reinstate jurisdiction after relinquishment. In doing so, it relied on the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Flores , 162 Idaho 298, 396 P.3d 1180 (2017). After the district court relinquished jurisdiction, Flores filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the district court to reinstate jurisdiction so that he could complete the retained jurisdiction program. The Idaho Supreme Court held that Rule 35 does not create a general basis for requesting reconsideration of an order or a judgment in the criminal context. Rule 35 only permits the correction, modification, or reduction of criminal sentences in some instances. Flores , 162 Idaho at 301, 396 P.3d at 1183. A motion for reconsideration of an order relinquishing jurisdiction is not within the ambit of the rule.
Although not cited by Reilly, we note two cases that are inconsistent with Flores . In State v. Knutsen , 138 Idaho 918, 71 P.3d 1065 (Ct. App. 2003), this Court held that "trial courts are empowered by Rule 35 to, in substance, ‘reconsider’ the relinquishment of jurisdiction on a timely motion from the defendant." Id. at 923, 71 P.3d at 1070. There, relying on Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1905 (1993), we stated that the term "reduce" used in Rule 35 "means to diminish in size, amount, extent or number or to make smaller, lessen or shrink." Knutsen , 138 Idaho at 921, 71 P.3d 1065.2 We held that "an order placing a defendant on probation lessens the severity of a defendant's sentence and thus falls within the district court's authority granted by Rule 35." Id .
Also, in State v. Goodlett , 139 Idaho 262, 77 P.3d 487 (Ct. App. 2003), this Court stated: "We have recently held that Rule 35 confers upon the trial court authority to reconsider an order relinquishing jurisdiction and, if the court finds it appropriate, to place the defendant on probation notwithstanding having initially ordered a sentence of imprisonment into execution." Id. at 265, 77 P.3d at 490. There, the district court summarily relinquished jurisdiction after receiving an APSI. Goodlett then filed a Rule 35 motion challenging the accuracy of the APSI and seeking placement on probation or reinstatement to the retained jurisdiction program or, in the alternative, a reduction of her sentence. Goodlett , 139 Idaho at 263, 77 P.3d at 488. The Goodlett Court first analyzed prior Idaho Supreme Court case law and concluded that pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Coassolo , 136 Idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001), "a defendant is not entitled to an opportunity to respond to information in the APSI upon a review of retained jurisdiction." Goodlett , 139 Idaho at 265, 77 P.3d at 490. Thereafter, the Goodlett Court concluded that "a defendant may use a Rule 35 motion as recourse if the trial court relinquishes jurisdiction on the basis of an APSI to which the defendant had no chance to respond." Id . We read Flores as overruling Knutsen and Goodlett to the extent they authorize trial courts to grant probation after relinquishing jurisdiction.
Reilly's attempt to avoid the holding in Flores is unavailing. In Flores , the Court expressly stated that Flores , 162 Idaho at 301-02, 396 P.3d at 1183-84. Reilly claims that this case is distinguishable from Flores because he "never specifically requested that jurisdiction be reinstated by the district court." In his motions for reconsideration, Reilly did not specifically request to be reinstated on retained jurisdiction, granted another period of retained jurisdiction, or placed on probation, but asked for reconsideration of relinquishment. However, on appeal, he argues that the most logical interpretation of his motions was that he was requesting probation. Thus, according to Reilly, his request falls outside the ambit of Flores .
First, this argument overlooks the broad holding in Flores that I.C.R. 35 does not create a general basis for requesting reconsideration of an order or a judgment in the criminal context. Flores , 162 Idaho at 301, 396 P.3d at 1183. Yet, Reilly attempts to do just that: seek reconsideration of the district court's relinquishment order. The Flores Court stated: "In fact, there is no criminal...
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