State v. Reis
| Decision Date | 20 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | C.A. P2-03-2726A |
| Parties | STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, v. JOEL T. REIS |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
Before this Court is Joel T. Reis' (hereafter the "Defendant") Motion for Conditional Release and his Motion to Terminate Imprisonment. After a hearing, the Defendant was adjudged by a justice of this Court to be a violator of his probationary sentence in P2-03-2726A. The conduct that warranted his being a violator of his probation was also the same conduct that resulted in a criminal charge being filed against him by the Cranston Police Department. Following the hearing declaring him a violator, the Attorney General did not file an information regarding the new charge. As a result, the Defendant was not prosecuted for the new charge. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-36 and G.L. 1956 § 12-19-18(b).
The Defendant was on probation for several charges of breaking and entering. He had previously pled guilty to all of those charges. The Defendant's criminal history dates back to 2003 when he first pled guilty to breaking and entering. Since then, the Defendant has pled guilty to breaking and entering on three occasions. On June 13, 2011, the Cranston Police Department charged the Defendant with one felony count of breaking and entering. At the time of his arrest by the Cranston Police, the Defendant was on probation for the aforementioned charges. As a result, the Attorney General's Office filed a report with this Court pursuant to Rule 32 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure moving to revoke the Defendant's probation. See Super. R. Crim. P. 32(f) (). The report filed by the Attorney General states that the "Defendant did fail to comply with a specific condition of probation in that he/she failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior."
The Defendant requested a hearing, which was held over the course of three days in the summer of 2011.[1] At the hearing, the Attorney General alleged that the Defendant had failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior because he unlawfully entered the home of Carla Pacheco at 9 Marsden Street in Cranston. The Defendant claimed that this was a case of mistaken identity. After hearing all of the evidence, the hearing justice was reasonably satisfied that the Defendant had failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior.[2] The hearing justice removed nine years from one of his previously imposed sentence and ordered the Defendant to serve those nine years at the Adult Correctional Institute ("ACI").[3]
On October 7, 2011, a member from the Attorney General's Office dismissed the underlying breaking and entering charge that resulted in the Defendant's probation being revoked. In a document with the subject line "No Information " the Attorney General concluded "that there [was] insufficient evidence to warrant felony prosecution." This action by the Attorney General dismissed the new breaking and entering charge levied against the Defendant by the Cranston Police.
Shortly after the charges were dismissed, the Defendant filed the instant motions with the Court. First, the Defendant asks this Court to release him on bail pending this Court's decision on his Motion to Terminate his sentence. Next, the Defendant asks this Court to terminate the nine year term of imprisonment that he was given by the hearing justice.
Defendant's Motion for Conditional Release[4]
The Defendant came before this Court arguing that he should be conditionally released pending this Court's determination of the Defendant's Motion to Terminate Imprisonment pursuant to § 12-19-18(b). In his motion to be released the Defendant argued that this Court has the authority to release pending the determination of his other motion. The State argues that the Defendant should not be conditionally released because § 12-19-18 does not articulate any provision granting this Court the authority to conditionally release the Defendant. The Defendant concedes that there is statutory basis for this Court to conditionally release in § 12-19-18(b). Instead, the Defendant argues that it is within this Court's inherent authority to grant bail and conditionally release him pending the outcome of his motion.
In State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258 (R.I. 1980), our Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether to grant bail to a defendant while that defendant's post-conviction relief petition was pending in our Supreme Court. The Feng Court determined that the Supreme Court had the authority to grant bail to a defendant however, the Feng Court cautioned that bail should only be granted in exceptional cases. Id. at 1266. In reaching its decision, the Court looked to the inherent powers of the judiciary to determine that the Court had the authority to grant bail to a defendant while appellate review of a post-conviction relief application was pending. The Court in Feng looked at several other jurisdictions and also the history of bail in reaching its decision. The Court determined that because it had the inherent authority to grant bail then that inherent authority was incorporated into a post-conviction relief application. Id. at 1265.
The procedural posture in Feng is undoubtedly different than that of the case at bar. Nonetheless, this Court finds its holding instructive. The defendant in Feng, like the Defendant in the case at bar, was attacking a final adjudication for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The defendant in Feng was seeking conditional release pending appellate review of his post-conviction application. Importantly, the defendant in Feng was seeking release even though the post-conviction relief statute did not contain a release provision. Similarly, here, § 12-19-18 does not provide for a bail provision. Notwithstanding the fact that § 12-19-18 does not provide a bail provision, this Court held at the hearing that it had the inherent authority to grant bail to the Defendant. Bail is typically governed by statute however, as noted in Feng, it also can be found in the inherent judicial authority.
This Court has always treated bail under the principles of equity. Thus, when circumstances change, it becomes necessary to reevaluate whether bail is warranted in a particular situation. Here, the Defendant was imprisoned for being a violator of a previously imposed sentence. However, after being sentenced, the State did not file an information relating to the breaking charge in Cranston, thus triggering Defendant's right to file the instant motion with the Court pursuant to § 12-19-18(b). Consequently, the circumstances surrounding Defendant's incarceration had changed. The Court determined at the hearing that it would be equitable to, at the very least, consider whether the Defendant should be released pending the outcome of his Motion to Terminate Imprisonment pursuant to § 12-19-18(b). Notably, the Court made this finding despite the fact that § 12-19-18(b) does not provide for a bail provision. The basis for the Court's decision was founded in the Court's inherent authority to grant bail.
Having determined that this Court has the authority to conditionally release the Defendant and grant bail, the Court then determined whether release was appropriate under these circumstances. At argument, both parties agreed that Abbott v. Freeman, 322 A.2d 33 (R.I. 1974) and Feng were controlling regarding the factors to be considered in granting release to the Defendant. In Abbott, our Supreme Court delineated four factors that the trial court should consider in releasing a defendant pending an appeal. They are:
"(1) whether the appeal is taken for delay or in good faith on grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable; (2) the habits of the individual regarding respect for the law insofar as they are relevant on the question of whether an applicant's release would pose a threat to the community; (3) local attachments to the community by way of family ties, business or investment; (4) the severity of the sentence imposed, and circumstances relevant to the question of whether a defendant would remove himself from the jurisdiction of the court."[5] Abbott, 322 A.2d at 35 (citations omitted).
The Abbott Court went on to state that "[i]n cases where a short sentence has been imposed, consideration must be given to the question of whether or not a denial of bail will nullify the right of appeal."
Here, the Court never granted bail to the Defendant because he was presented as a violator of his previously imposed probationary sentences after being charged in P2-12-0801A.
Our General Assembly amended § 12-19-18 in 2010. See P.L. 2010, ch. 311, § 1. The amendment added a new subsection and became law on June 25, 2010. The new subsection states:
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